ISI routinely hires Pakistan’s right wing journalists to feed the stories in order to improve the image of military mafia. Such stories are usually very abstract and are written by the ISPR  ”master minds” in such  a way which ( in their “wisdom”) will leave a better impression of the current Don (COAS) and his cronies.

It is pertinent to note that during the era of mad dictator one good thing that happened in Pakistan was that the military mafia in Pakistan faced an internal rift , unfortunately though it was not the rift between good and bad , instead it was the rift between the two factions of mafia fighting for the power.

Due to the nature of “War on Terrorism” , Pakistan’s military had to “sell their mothers” (as American’s call it) , in order to save their skins. Hence they (Military) had to fight against their own progenies i.e. the mullahs. This resulted in a natural rift between the two factions in the military.

It is usually very hard to identify the real loyalties of Pakistan’s military generals (and indeed they usually don’t have any loyalties except to their own’s self). However there are at times visible clashes between the two factions.

If we look back to the period ‘between’ 2006-2009, it now becomes very clear that the faction led by the current Don (Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani) successfully defeated the other faction led by the mad dictator (General Musharraf). Today I was reading the story by an ISI news reporter in “The News” which makes thing very clear.  However as I said this story is encrypted it in such a way that we need to use the correct cipher to decipher the message in this story.

So let me first put here some facts related to this story, before I go on and explain the story.

a) DGMO: The DGMO or the MO Directorate referred here in this story is no other than “Ashfaq Pervez Kayani” who was DGMO ‘between’ 2003 – 2006.

b) Tariq Majeed (Aka Chemical Tariq) : General Tariq Majeed retired as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7th October 2010  and you can now understand why this story is fed now, and was not fed before his retirement. Tariq Majeed as also described in this story belonged to mad dictator’s faction in the army.

c) The Commander of 12th Corps:  It was Lt. General Hamid Rab Nawaz who was the commander of 12th corps during 2004-2007.

d) Maj. General Nadeem Ejaz: Well he was the trusted friend of mad dictator and he is in the dock for many crimes. There is a great chance that he might be made as the first “scapegoat” (if it ever happened) for all the crimes of Army. I am really interested to find out why? (Any one knows more about the reasons?)

e) “Some Key Generals”: This is the terms used in the story to refer to the other faction in the military mafia led by Ashfaq Kiyani. These include Khalid Shameem, Salauddin Satti and perhaps few major generals like Ahmad Shuja (Current DG ISI) and Naushad Kiyani (current DG MI) and last but not the least Lt. General Nadeem Taj.

f) “The GHQ” : The term GHQ here is being used in this story to refer to Ashfaq Kiyani, who was the VCOAS in 2007 and was sitting in “The GHQ”.

g) “key GHQ adviser” : Again this refers to Ashfaq Kiyani.

h) Well placed and well informed sources: This refers to ISPR in the story.

Please note that as far as the substance of this story is concerned, it is nothing but falsehood in every aspect. Though there were differences between the two factions of the mafia , however they had nothing to do with anything described in this story , Chemical Tariq or Ashfaq Kiyani or the mad dictator no one had any difference of opinion on any of the operations like killing of Bugti or Lal Masjid. The differences as one can guess were more of the nature that usually happen in two mafia factions (i.e. to get the full power).

Now let us read the story:

While Musharraf continues to embarrass Pakistan and its authorities, including the Pakistan Army, an important source has revealed that the General Headquarters (GHQ) and its most vital arm, the Military Operations Directorate, was bypassed by the former dictator, both in the Lal Masjid operation and Bugti killing.

The source said that none of these extremely controversial operations, which sowed the seeds of terrorism in Balochistan and the rest of the country, were the brainchild of the MO Directorate.

The source said that in both these military operations, the GHQ and concerned field command were not directly involved. “In both the cases, General Musharraf bypassed the GHQ and its MO Directorate, and gave direct orders to the relevant field commanders,” said the well-placed and well- informed source.
Ideally and as per the military’s established rules, no such operation could take place without being conceptualised and cleared by the MO Directorate. However, Musharraf, the all powerful dictator that he was, did not engage the MO Directorate.

In the case of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s killing, the source said, General Musharraf involved the then Military Intelligence chief Major General Nadeem Ejaz and the top command of 12 Corps.

In a briefing on Balochistan issue by the then DGMO and much before the killing of the Baloch Nawab, General Musharraf once talked about the idea of killing Bugti but the idea was not agreed to by the DGMO, who warned that it would lead to unrest. Later, Musharraf never engaged the GHQ and executed his plot to kill Bugti through the MI and the Commander of the 12 Corps.

After the Bugti killing, some key generals in the GHQ in their in-house interactions expressed their dismay over the Kohlu military operation. The Lal Masjid operation, which killed over a hundred persons and led to the escalation of terrorism cases manifold, was no different from that of the military operation aimed at killing Bugti.
The source said that the planning of the Lal Masjid operation was done by Commander 10 Corps Tariq Majid on the direct instructions of the ousted dictator.
“The GHQ and its MO Directorate were not involved in any such planning,” the source said, adding that a day after Lieutenant Colonel Haroon became the first casualty of the pre-Lal Masjid operation, Musharraf convened a meeting of top political and military authorities and given his mind that a full-fledged operation had to be carried out.

An important member of the GHQ spoke against this option and asked Musharraf to review his decision because it involved the lives of more than 100 persons. The dictator was told that when the military was taught to leave some exit point even in case of its enemy, then why should not the extremist elements holed up in Lal Masjid. Musharraf was also warned that if the Lal Masjid operation was executed, it would throw the country into a muddle for quarter of a century.

Instead of listening to his key GHQ adviser, the source said Musharraf snubbed the officer and asked him to mind his own business. Later, the assignment to do the massacre in Lal Masjid was given to 10 Corps without getting the military operation cleared by the GHQ.

It has also been revealed that Musharraf wanted to mislead the masses about the number of casualties by burying the dead unannounced and in unknown places. He was of the view that the CDA authorities would do the task of silent and hidden burial of those killed in the Lal Masjid operation.

Musharraf, who has recently formally joined politics, has lately said that if given the chance, he would repeat the Lal Masjid and Bugti operations. These two operations brought enormous disrespect for the Army and caused retaliatory attacks against the military personnel and installations in all parts of the country.
The first-ever suicide attack in a military unit in Dargai where dozens of soldiers were killed in 2006, was also the consequence of Musharraf’s announcement owning the American missile attack on a Madrassa in Bajaur where more than 80 children were killed.

Under pressure from his American masters, whom he served against the interest of Pakistan, Musharraf said that they were not the American forces but the Pakistan Army, which attacked and killed such a large number of children, including the age of 10. Musharraf lied that they were terrorists but not even a single bullet was found from the rubble of the Madrassa.

Many in the military today admit that the post 9/11 policies and Musharraf’s controversial decisions like the Lal Masjid operation, killing of Bugti and owning up of Bajaur massacre not only fuelled extremism and terrorism but made the military controversial.

Let us read this after applying the cipher:

While Musharraf continues to embarrass Pakistan and its authorities, including the Pakistan Army, an important source has revealed that Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani (in 2007 as VCOAS) and Ashfaq Kiyani in 2004 (as DG MO), was bypassed by the former dictator, both in the Lal Masjid operation and Bugti killing.
The source said that none of these extremely controversial operations, which sowed the seeds of terrorism in Balochistan and the rest of the country, were the brainchild of Ashfaq Kiyani.

The source said that in both these military operations, Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and his cronies were not directly involved. “In both the cases, General Musharraf bypassed Ashfaq Kiyani, and gave direct orders to the relevant field commanders,” said the ISPR.

Ideally and as per the military’s established rules, no such operation could take place without being conceptualised and cleared by Ashfaq Kiyani. However, Musharraf, the all powerful dictator that he was, did not engage Ashfaq Kiyani.

In the case of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s killing, the source said, General Musharraf involved the then Military Intelligence chief Major General Nadeem Ejaz and Lt. General Hamid Rab Nawaz.

In a briefing on Balochistan issue by Ashfaq Kiyani (in 2004) and much before the killing of the Baloch Nawab, General Musharraf once talked about the idea of killing Bugti but the idea was not agreed to by Ashfaq Kiyani, who warned that it would lead to unrest. Later, Musharraf never engaged Ashfaq Kiyani and his cronies and executed his plot to kill Bugti through Nadeem Ijaz and Chemical Tariq.

After the Bugti killing, Ashfaq Kiyani and his cronies in the GHQ in their in-house interactions expressed their dismay over the Kohlu military operation. The Lal Masjid operation, which killed over a hundred persons and led to the escalation of terrorism cases manifold, was no different from that of the military operation aimed at killing Bugti.

The source said that the planning of the Lal Masjid operation was done by Chemical Tariq Majid on the direct instructions of the ousted dictator.
“Ashfaq Kiyani and his cronies were not involved in any such planning,” the source said, adding that a day after Lieutenant Colonel Haroon became the first casualty of the pre-Lal Masjid operation, Musharraf convened a meeting of top political and military authorities and given his mind that a full-fledged operation had to be carried out.

Ashfaq Kiyani spoke against this option and asked Musharraf to review his decision because it involved the lives of more than 100 persons. The dictator was told that when the military was taught to leave some exit point even in case of its enemy, then why should not the extremist elements holed up in Lal Masjid. Musharraf was also warned that if the Lal Masjid operation was executed, it would throw the country into a muddle for quarter of a century.

Instead of listening to Ashfaq Kiyani, the source said Musharraf snubbed the officer and asked him to mind his own business. Later, the assignment to do the massacre in Lal Masjid was given to Chemical Tariq without getting the military operation cleared by Ashfaq Kiyani.

It has also been revealed that Musharraf wanted to mislead the masses about the number of casualties by burying the dead unannounced and in unknown places. He was of the view that the CDA authorities would do the task of silent and hidden burial of those killed in the Lal Masjid operation.

Musharraf, who has recently formally joined politics, has lately said that if given the chance, he would repeat the Lal Masjid and Bugti operations. These two operations brought enormous disrespect for the Army and caused retaliatory attacks against the military personnel and installations in all parts of the country.
The first-ever suicide attack in a military unit in Dargai where dozens of soldiers were killed in 2006, was also the consequence of Musharraf’s announcement owning the American missile attack on a Madrassa in Bajaur where more than 80 children were killed.

Under pressure from his American masters, whom he served against the interest of Pakistan, Musharraf said that they were not the American forces but the Pakistan Army, which attacked and killed such a large number of children, including the age of 10. Musharraf lied that they were terrorists but not even a single bullet was found from the rubble of the Madrassa.

Many in the military today admit that the post 9/11 policies and Musharraf’s controversial decisions like the Lal Masjid operation, killing of Bugti and owning up of Bajaur massacre not only fuelled extremism and terrorism but made the military controversial.

Again as I said the story does not at all mean that the current Don (Ashfaq Kiyani) and his cronies had any differences with the mad dictator and his cronies (Chemical Tariq, Nadeem Ejaz etc..) over killing of Bugti or Lal Masjid Operation. However this story clearly identifies the members of the two factions. In fact only the member of Mad dictator’s faction which was defeated by the current Don’s faction.

There are some other interesting points in this story which reflects the working of mafia. For example the name of Lt. General Hamid Rab Nawaz is no clearly mentioned, like the name of Chemical Tariq and Nadeem Ejaz. I am not sure what Hamid Rab Nawaz is doing these days he is perhaps MD Fauji Fertilizer.

Similarly the story was published only after the retirement of Chemical Tariq as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8th October. When he was sitting general it was perhaps not possible to publish such a story.
Moreover it is not really clear who the story is addressed to (apart from the public consumption). It seems that there might be still be significant internal rift between the two factions.

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