Related article: Kayani dictates talking points to “free media”

A number of key writers in Pakistan’s Urdu and English press have been recently ‘tasked’ to repair the image of the GHQ and General Kayani. The notable amongst them are: right-wing proxies: Kamran Khan, Dr Moeed Pirzadah, Haroon-ur-Rashid etc, and ‘liberal’ proxies: Mosharraf Zaidi, Ejaz Haider, Zafar Hilaly, Adil Najam, Shirin Mazari etc.

In the recent past, the LUBP has exposed the pro-GHQ and anti-democracy narratives of several Islamist and liberal proxies. For example, here is a video clip of veteran ISI agent, Kamran Khan, in defence of General Kayani (Aaj Kamran Khan ke saath, Geo TV, 2 Dec 2010):

In today’s Jang newspaper, veteran ISI proxy, Haroon-ur-Rashid attempts to repair General Kayani’s image which has been badly tarnished by WikiLeaks. Most probably the alleged meeting between Haroon-ur-Rashid and General Kayani took place at either General Hameed Gul’s or General Pasha’s residence in Rawalpindi.

Whether General Kayani’s explanation via Haroon-ur-Rashid is satisfactory is something better left to our readers. One may however wish to read the following news report:

Talking to journalists, Asfandyar said Asif Ali Zardari had offered him presidency before his election as President, but he had declined the proposal. The presidency was a right of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) because it had been given the mandate, he added.

A leaked diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks said: “During Ambassador’s fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10 (2009), he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He (Kayani) mentioned Asfandyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government, led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power,” the cable added.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain had confirmed the disclosure, saying, “Asfandyar Wali Khan received the offer to become the president but he declined… “Our party didn’t have the support required for the post and we could not accept the offer.”

Critical readers may also wish to revisit the following resources, General Kayani might as well wish to explain his position on such cables which happen to be so true about Pakistani politicians but so baseless about our saviours in khakis:

Wikileaks on General Kayani and his ‘democratic’ puppets

WikiLeaks unmasks who are our real puppet-masters?

Wikileaks reconfirm the Taliban ISI Alliance (LUBP update 29 Nov 2010)

General Kayani allowed US special forces to secretly operate in Pakistan

‘President’ Kayani is the most powerful man of Pakistan

US embassy cables: Pakistani army chief hints at unseating Zardari

الحذر

ناتمام
ہارون الرشید

میں اس وقت گوجر خان میں تھا ، جب کسی نے فون پر پوچھا : کیا راولپنڈی میں تم فلاں جگہ پہنچ سکتے ہو۔ غیر متوقع طور پر پروفیسر احمد رفیق اختر گھر میں موجود نہ تھے ۔ انہوں نے کہا تھا: کھانا کھا لو ، کچھ دیر میں ، میں واپس آتا ہوں۔ سفاک شب میں کمرہ گرم تھا اور بھوک بے تاب کرتی ہوئی۔ اندازہ یہ تھا کہ ڈیڑھ دو گھنٹے میں وہ لوٹ کر آئیں گے۔ غالباً آٹھ بجے تھے اور سوا دس بجے تک انتظار کیا جاتا کہ گیارہ بجے وہ سو جاتے ہیں۔ایک سیکنڈ میں مگر میں نے فیصلہ کیا: پروفیسر صاحب سے کل بھی ملاقات ممکن ہے ۔

سڑک ویران تھی۔ پچاس منٹ کا فاصلہ پینتیس منٹ میں طے ہو گیا۔ ڈرائنگ روم میں داخل ہوا تو وہ سوپ پی رہے تھے اور یا للعجب جنرل کیانی بھی وہاں موجود تھے۔ خود کو صوفے پر گرا کر میں نے سگریٹ سلگانے کا ارادہ کیا تو کسی نے مجھ سے کہا: پہلے سوپ پی لیجئے۔ یکایک احساس ہوا کہ ماحول کچھ زیادہ ہی سنجیدہ ہے ۔ ذہنی طور پر میں تیار تھا کہ شکایت کی جائے گی مگر پریشان نہیں ۔ اوّل اس لیے کہ اپنے موقف کی صداقت کا مجھے یقین تھا ، ثانیاً جنرل ایک بہت ہی شائستہ آدمی ہے ۔ دلیل سے وہ بات کرتا اور دلیل سے سنتا ہے ۔ موصوف کا روّیہ بھی ہمیشہ خوشگوار رہا۔ ایک بار اگر نکتہ چینی کی اور اگرچہ بہت ہی سخت الفاظ میں لیکن کوئی ذاتی پس منظر نہیں ۔

ہم وسیع و عریض ڈرائنگ روم کے ایک کونے میں تھے اور کوئی چوتھا وہاں نہ تھا۔ “ہم وکی لیکس کے بارے میں بات کر رہے تھے”مشترکہ دوست نے کہا ، دل کی گہرائیوں میں جس کا احترام اور محبت ہے ۔ واضح طور پر ان کا اشارہ اس کالم کی طرف تھا ، امریکی سفیر کے ساتھ، وکی لیکس میں منکشف ہونے والی جنرل کی ملاقات میں ، جس پر تبصرہ کیا تھا۔ عرض یہ کیا تھا : چیف آف آرمی سٹاف ، جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی سے ملاقات نہ ہو سکی وگرنہ خود کو میں تھام نہ سکتا اور
“You too Brutus”
کا وہ ترجمہ انہیں سناتا جو ایک عرب شاعر نے کیا تھا”تم بھی بروٹس؟ پس افسوس ہے ، پھر افسوس ہے ، پھر افسوس ہے” جیسے ہی مشترکہ دوست نے تمہیدی جملہ کہا ، ماحول کے تناؤ کو کم کرنے کے لیے ، میں نے فارسی کا مصرعہ پڑھا۔

قلم گوید کہ من شاہ جہانم

(قلم نے کہا، میں ہی دنیا کا بادشاہ ہوں)

۔ تناؤ مگر کم نہ ہو سکا۔ جنرل کے چہرے پر سنجیدگی تھی اور بہت گہری سنجیدگی لیکن جب انہوں نے بات شروع کی تو اندیشہ تحلیل ہو گیا۔ اس سے زیادہ تیزی کے ساتھ ، جب سورج کی تابناک کرن ، شبنم کا قطرہ پگھلا دیتی ہے ۔ “آپ سے میں نے عرض کیا تھا کہ وکی لیکس ، امریکی سفیر کا نقطہ نظر ہے اور ان کے نقطہ نظر سے مرتب کی گئی خام معلومات ” ان مہربان نے لقمہ دیا۔ “جی ہاں”میں نے کہا”لیکن اگر دوسروں کے بارے میں وکی لیکس کے انکشافات درست ہیں تو یہ کیوں نہیں؟”

اس بھولی بھالی صورت والی این ڈبلیو پیٹرسن کے متعلقہ تار میں انکشاف یہ تھا: جنرل نے ان سے کہا کہ وہ اسفند یار ولی یا صدر زرداری کی ہمشیرہ محترمہ فریال تالپور کو صدر بنانے کے آرزومند ہیں۔

اب جنرل نے لب کھولے اور ہمیشہ کے دھیمے انداز میں یہ کہا “آپ میرا موقف سن لیجئے۔ اس کے بعد آپ چاہیں تو اپنے موقف پر قائم رہ سکتے ہیں “42 سال کی صحافتی زندگی میں ، سیّد ابو الاعلیٰ مودودی، نواب زادہ نصر اللہ خاں اور گلبدین حکمت یار سمیت، ان گنت فصیح لوگوں سے واسطہ رہا لیکن جنرل کیانی سے بہتر انداز میں اپنا موقف پیش کرنے والا آدمی نہ دیکھا۔ وہ نواب زادہ ، گلبدین اور سید صاحب ایسے فصیح تو شاید نہیں کہ اردو اور انگریزی کا ملغوبہ بناتے ہیں۔ محتاط مگر ایسے اور اس قدر سوچا سمجھا اظہارِ خیال کہ آپ حیران رہ جاتے ہیں۔

چند جملوں میں بات انہوں نے نمٹا دی اور مجھے عرب شاعر امراوالقیس یاد آیا، جس نے کہا تھا: جب میں کلام کرتا ہوں تو کوئی دوسرا نہیں بولتا اور جب میں خاموش ہوجاتا ہوں تو کسی کے کہنے کو کچھ باقی نہیں بچتا۔

جنرل نے سوال کیا: کیا آپ نے تار کا پورا متن پڑھا ہے ؟ عرض کیا : جی نہیں ، فقط اخبار کی خبر۔ جنرل نے یہ نہ کہا کہ پورا متن پڑھے بغیر تبصرہ زیبا نہ تھا اور وضاحت کی : تین باتیں محترمہ نے کہی ہیں۔ اوّل یہ کہ میں نے اسفند یار ولی خاں کو صدارت کی پیشکش کی، ثانیاً یہ کہ محترمہ فریال تالپور کو یہ منصب سونپنے کا ارادہ کیا۔ اسکے بعد وہ یہ کہتی ہیں: جنرل نے کہا”میں مداخلت نہ کروں گا”ان کا موقف یہ تھا:اوّل یہ کہ اسفند یار ولی کو صدارت کی پیشکش میں نے نہیں ، خود زرداری صاحب نے کی تھی اور اے این پی کے رہنماؤں نے یہ بات پوری طرح واضح کر دی ہے ۔ محترمہ فریال تالپور کا کبھی ذکر ہی نہ ہوا ، معلوم نہیں یہ مغالطہ کہاں سے در آیا اور سب سے اہم نکتہ یہ ہے کہ جب میں نے مداخلت نہ کرنے کا عزم کر لیا تھا توکسی کو صدارت کا منصب کیونکر سونپتا۔ اس کے بعد انہوں نے واشنگٹن پوسٹ کے ایک حالیہ تبصرے اور کچھ دوسرے واقعات کا حوالہ دیا۔ امریکہ بہادر کے بارے میں اپنے طرزِ احساس پر براہ راست کوئی تبصرہ نہ کیا لیکن مفہوم آشکار تھا : بدترین حالات میں بھی ، میں نے وہی کچھ کرنے کی کوشش کی جو ملک کے مفاد میں تھا۔

اب میری باری تھی ۔ گزارش کی : جنرل صاحب! صدمہ بہت شدید تھا ۔ جب قوم کے رہنما امریکی سفیر سے ملک کے داخلی معاملات پر بے تکلفی سے بات کریں تو ایک عام پاکستانی کو دکھ پہنچے گا۔ صبح گیارہ بجے تک اخبار دیکھنا ہوتے ہیں۔ کالم لکھنے کے لیے تب فقط ایک گھنٹے کا وقت ہوتا ہے ۔ متن کو گاہے عرق ریزی سے دیکھا نہیں جا سکتا۔ آپ کا موقف درست لگتا ہے لیکن صدمات نے نڈھال کر رکھا ہے اور ضبط کا یارا نہیں۔

اب کچھ اور موضوعات پر گفتگو شروع ہوئی ۔ ہلکی پھلکی باتیں، سیاست سے براہِ راست جن کا تعلق نہ تھا۔

غیر ضروری تبصروں سے گریز جنرل کی فطرت ثانیہ ہے ۔ پنجابی محاورے کے مطابق ساری زندگی اس طرح اس نے گزاری ہے ، جیسے بتیس دانتوں میں زبان۔

ایک غریب خاندان کا فرد، ہوش سنبھالتے ہی جسے یتیمی کا داغ سہنا پڑا اور خاندان کی ذمہ داری اس پر آپڑی۔ وہ ایک تنہا آدمی ہے ، یکسر تنہا۔ پھونک پھونک کر اس نے زندگی کا ایک ایک قدم اٹھایا ہے ۔ عمر بھر اسے بقا کا سوال درپیش تھا۔ زندگی اب اس پر مہربان ہے لیکن اب اوربھی مجبور۔ جذبات سے کھولتے ، باہم متصادم اور اپنی باقی ماندہ آزادی کے لیے برسرِ جنگ معاشرے میں ایسی ذمہ داریاں اس پر آپڑی ہیں کہ ذرا سی بے احتیاطی کا وہ خطرہ مول نہیں لے سکتا۔

۔ اتنے میں اس صاحبِ ذوق نے ایک شعر پڑھا۔

بہلا نہ دل نہ تیرگیء شامِ غم گئی
یہ جانتا تو آگ لگاتا نہ گھر کو میں

اللہ اس کا حامی و ناصر ہو۔ پہلے بھی عرض کیا تھا کہ جنرل کی حب الوطنی اور دیانت پر مجھے کبھی شبہہ نہ ہوا۔ دل پر یہ زخم البتہ باقی ہے اور پیہم ٹیس دیتا ہے کہ کاش امریکی سفیر کو اعصاب پہ سوار نہ کیا جاتا۔پاکستان ایسا بھی مجبور نہیں ۔کاش ایک دن و ہ سحر طلوع ہو ، جب قائد اعظم کا پاکستان استعمار کے پنجوں سے نکل آئے۔ آئینی حدود میں رہتے ہوئے ، خاموشی اور عاجزی کے ساتھ جنرل اس سلسلے میں بہت اہم کردار ادا کر سکتا ہے ۔

Asfandyar was considered for President: Wikileaks
US embassy cables: Pakistani army chief hints at unseating Zardari

** guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 30 November 2010 22.06 GMT

* Article history

Thursday, 12 March 2009, 04:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000516
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: LITTLE MOVEMENT ON RECONCILIATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 506 B. ISLAMABAD 508
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
Summary

1. As street protests threaten to topple the Pakistani government, the US ambassador discusses ways to end the crisis with leaders. In one meeting the head of the Pakistani army, General Ashfaq Kayani, tells her that he may be forced to “persuade” President Asif Ali Zardari to resign. The ambassador says the comments are not an indicator of an imminent army coup. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

2. Read related article

1. (C) Summary. In a last-ditch effort to reduce tensions with the Sharif brothers ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12, President Zardari offered Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of Senate leader if PML would form a government with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in Punjab but will do little to pacify Nawaz Sharif or the lawyers. Shujaat is considering the deal, which will be sealed by the March 12 vote in the Senate; it could end governor’s rule in Punjab–if Shujaat can keep the PML forward block in line. Other compromise efforts have failed, although the UK High Commission is probing for the various parties’ positions in advance of a possible HMG mediation effort. After seeing Interior Minister Malik and Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan, Ambassador will see Shujaat March 11 and the Sharifs on March 12.

2. (C) Amid reports of possible targeted killings and Mumbai style attacks during the march, the GOP began arresting Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) members and some civil activists. Interior Minister Malik assured Ambassador he had no plans to arrest the Sharifs or key civil society leaders like Aitzaz Ahsan, but caveated this by saying he might have to arrest Imran Khan or others “who did not obey the law.” Lawyers and JI activists already have begun infiltrating Islamabad; if a significant number of demonstrators cannot enter the capital, we expect protests in multiple areas, especially in Punjab, beginning March 12. Accordingly, we are issuing a Warden Notice March 11.

3. (C) During Ambassador’s fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash.

4. (C) Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring at victory on all fronts; today, he recognizes he must compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the lawyers’ march fizzles–and it may–Nawaz retains the high moral ground in public opinion and can continue attacking a now weakened Zardari. We should encourage Zardari to continue efforts to ease tensions and ask the Saudis and the UAE to weigh in with their respective allies. This could be a protracted process. End Summary.

Mediation/Confrontation/Collapse

——————————–

5. (C) There are three political scenarios in play as tensions between President Zardari and the Sharif brothers rise ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12: mediation/accommodation, which resolves the Sharifs’ disqualification from holding public office, ends governor’s rule in Punjab and addresses the judicial issue; confrontation, which leads to violence and possible Army intervention; and a fizzled march that sets the stage for continued conflict.

Mediation/Accommodation

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6. (C) On March 11, Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan described to Ambassador and Polcouns his

ISLAMABAD 00000516 002 OF 004

mediation efforts with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman over the past week. Zardari, he asserted, agreed to request a review of the Supreme Court decision disqualifying the Sharifs, said that after a positive outcome to that review Shahbaz Sharif would be reinstated as Chief Minister Punjab, and agreed to a conference to discuss restoring the judiciary. In return, Nawaz should delay the lawyers’ march.

7. (C) Nawaz reportedly agreed but then changed his mind and demanded reversal of the court decision, an end to governor’s rule in Punjab and reinstatement of the former Chief Justice. Under pressure, Nawaz relented and agreed to the judicial conference idea but offered only to ask the lawyers to consider postponing the march, and said all this had to be accomplished in a day. Asfundyar noted that it was impossible to demand a immediate review of a Court decision that had not been formally issued. He told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge.

8. (C) Asfundyar said that Zardari was surrounded by advisors who were not politicians, so he was not being encouraged to compromise; Nawaz’s chief advisor was Chaudhry Nisar who, with the Sharif brothers disqualified, stood the best chance of being the next PML-N Prime Minister. Nawaz had provoked the Court by launching a campaign over the doctored exam scores of the Chief Justice’s daughter, and this had prompted the ruling against Shahbaz. Asfundyar attributed the crisis 70 percent to Nawaz and 30 percent to Zardari. In Asfundyar’s view, there was an absence of trust on both sides, and what was needed was a cease-fire in which to conduct reasonable negotiations. If the march fizzled, there could be time to work out a compromise; if the march sparked violence, there was “nothing to do but pray.”

9. (C) Asfundyar welcomed the idea of UK mediation but said it was the U.S. view that counted most. He also urged that we contact the UAE to pressure Zardari and the Saudis to pressure Nawaz to back off. ANP had seen PML-N members distributing cash envelopes to a stream of supporters this week; like Zardari, Asfundyar said he believed the money was coming from the Saudis. Asfundyar was open to continue mediating if asked. He reminded Ambassador that Zardari had offered him the job of Prime Minister immediately after the February 2008 elections.

10. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, UK High Commissioner Brinkley said he had received approval to approach the various sides, discern their bottom lines, and report back to London. HMG had not yet decided whether to take on any role of mediator or guarantor. The UK planned to make a public statement today urging the parties to resolve their differences democratically and eschew violence. Brinkley was scheduled to see PM Gilani and possibly Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif on March 11, and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and Asfundyar Wali Khan on March 12.

11. (C) Late on March 11, the PML confirmed press reports that the PPP had reversed course (Ref B) and now had offered Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of leader of the Senate if PML agreed to join PPP in a coalition government in Punjab. Shujaat will meet PM Gilani later March 11; on March 12, the newly constituted Senate would vote on a party leader. If the deal goes through, it would end governor’s rule in Punjab but it is unclear if a PPP-led government will reduce tensions. It remains unclear, however, if Shujaat can hold on to his 28-35 member “forward block” of Nawaz supporters to seal this deal. Without the PML forward block, the PPP cannot form a government.

Confrontation

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12. (C) In a March 11 meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, Interior Minister Malik described his efforts to mediate with the lawyers to convince them to hold a peaceful march outside of Islamabad, but he said the lawyers so far have spurned the GOP’s proposals. Malik plans to block roads into Islamabad

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beginning March 13. Ambassador warned that efforts to arrest the Sharifs or high-profile activists like Aitzaz Ahsan would not be well received in Washington or elsewhere. Malik denied he had any intention of arresting the Sharifs or Aitzaz but qualified this by saying “unless they do not stop, but I will tell you first. I have to maintain law and order.” He said he might have to arrest Imran Khan and some JI activists. (Note: On March 10, Punjab police began arresting 200-250 JI student activists and low-level PML-N workers. Mission contacts report many activists already are going underground. Neither the Sharifs nor Aitzaz Ahsan have been arrested. Geo TV News, which the GOP has criticized for being anti-government, disappeared from cable TV. See septel for updates.)

13. (C) Malik said he had received serious threat information regarding a Mumbai style attack in Karachi on March 13-14 by the Jandallah group that previously had attacked the U.S. Consulate. There were also reports of a proposed targeted killing, against whom was unclear. JI leaders were giving their students “black coats” so they could look like lawyers and already were infiltrating Islamabad. Malik expected crowds of at least 4,000-5,000 in the capital, even with road closures.

14. (S) In four conversations with Ambassador this week, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani hinted that, however reluctantly, he might have to urge Zardari to resign, if conditions deteriorate. He did not offer any red lines. Kayani indicated that Asfundyar Wali Khan or someone else broadly acceptable might be an appropriate replacement for Zardari. We do not believe Army action is imminent, but we do believe Kayani was laying down a marker that, if he had to intervene, the U.S. had been forewarned and given many opportunities to avoid intervention by pressuring both Nawaz and Zardari. Kayani made it clear that regardless of how much he disliked Zardari, he distrusted Nawaz even more. The scenario Kayani hinted at was one in which he would pressure Zardari to resign (and presumably leave the country). This would not be an official Army “coup;” it would leave the PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani in place and preclude the need for elections that likely would bring Nawaz to power.

15. (S) Kayani hinted at disquiet among his corps commanders who believe Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to Pakistan’s economic and security challenges. ISI DG Pasha highlighted to Ambassador his concerns about Zardari’s alleged corruption on the flight to the U.S. for the strategic review, and we have multiple sources demonstrating Army complaints about Zardari. Kayani believes the U.S. has the most influence over Zardari, and he knows we are Pakistan’s most important ally, especially for increasing the capacity of the Pakistani Army. Kayani told Ambassador he has talked directly to Zardari, but he does not appear to have conveyed the seriousness of Army concerns about Zardari or the security situation vis a vis the march. (Note: Kayani may be seeking to avoid a confrontation that would prompt Zardari to make a disastrous decision to try and oust the COAS.)

A Fizzle

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16. (C) At this point, everything appears to rest on the outcome of the lawyers’ march. PML-N does not have a proven reputation for putting demonstrators on the streets, although JI does. By applying the road closure/detention tactics that worked for Musharraf in 2007 to stop pro-Nawaz demonstrations, the government might be able to avoid a serious clash this time. But if a policeman fires into the crowd or a terrorist attacks protesters, all bets are off.

17. (C) There is also the likelihood that the march will not occur as scheduled. Blocked from Islamabad, there could be multiple flash points in the Punjab, early demonstrations in Islamabad, and a series of confrontations with the police. This could be a protracted clash of wills.

18. (C) Comment: Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring victory in the face after negotiating a PPP win in Senate elections, setting Nawaz up for an entirely legal

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disqualification, and looking toward successful Friends and Donors meetings that would provide the financial support needed to bolster his sagging popularity. By over-reaching to make a grab for Punjab without doing his homework on vote counting in Punjab, Zardari now needs to compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the march fizzles, Nawaz retains the high moral ground in the public’s eyes and will use it to continue attacking a weakened Zardari. Zardari needs to win back the military’s confidence.

PATTERSON

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