From Abdul Nishapuri’s facebook:

Pashtun hospitality and activism should be for all Pashtuns
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“Indomitable spirit of solidarity and hospitality of the Pashtuns of Bannu who wholeheartedly embraced IDPs from North Waziristan”. Good!

By the way, how many of these hospitable Pashtuns of Bannu will (or did) open their houses for Shia Pashtuns affectees of Deobandi terrorism in Hangu, Kohat and Parachinar? #JustAsking

For some people, alien Deobandism is more important than centuries-old Pashtun traditions.

Patrick Cockburn writes:

The rise of Isis and its military successes has led to short-sighted euphoria in Sunni countries. People congratulate themselves that it is no longer only the Shia who are on the offensive. But in practice Isis’s seizure of a leadership position in Syria and Iraq’s communities will most likely prove to be a disaster for them.

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/crisis-in-the-middle-east-the-end-of-a-country-and-the-start-of-a-new-dark-age-9659379.html

Can Islamic State keep control of Mosul?

The most credible story available today about the Islamic State (IS) occupation of Mosul on June 9 reads that IS occupied Mosul several years before that date and has long ruled it as a state within the state. Al-Qaeda and IS have been present in Mosul since 2006, when they took control of it by force, according to reports published by Western and Arab news outlets.

The wide Sunni sympathy for the Islamic State in Mosul cracked less than two months into its occupation, and residents are increasingly horrified by rampant arrests and executions.

Author Mushreq AbbasPosted November 14, 2014

Translator(s)Sami-Joe Abboud

But IS is losing Mosul before officially leaving it. The residents of Mosul are starting to reject IS and its activities, after first turning to the group to free them of the Iraqi army and the central government’s practices.

At the beginning of November, the Mosul wali (leader), IS’ Dar al-Ifta official Quasi Abdul Mohsen, issued a circular that caught the attention of IS-affiliated media outlets. The document was initially published via “media points” — basically booths placed across the city’s neighborhoods in which TVs broadcast IS-related videos — and subsequently shared on news and social media pages with ties to IS.

The circular mainly focused on preventing the arrest of any citizen in Mosul in the absence of a warrant signed by the Sharia judge. It read that sanctions would be imposed in the event of any violation fo this dictate.

Throughout 2013, Mosul residents demonstrated against Nouri al-Maliki’s government, which lost the city long before the IS occupation. The people there were angry at the practices of the government and the military, complaining of random arrests without warrants. But these demonstrators were hit by a harsher reality.

The IS strategy to occupy cities originally relied on taking advantage of Sunni complaints about the security authorities in Baghdad. The group timed its occupation of vast areas of Iraq for the moment when Sunni anger against the government reached its peak.

Displaced residents of Mosul in Erbil, Najaf and Sulaimaniyah testified to Al-Monitor that IS arrested 20,000-25,000 people in Mosul between June 30 and Oct. 30, 2014. These arrests included:

officers and members of the army, police, border guards and other security services
members and leaders in the local government and members of political parties, especially those participating in the recent elections
former Iraqi army officers and former Baathists
tribal and religious elders and leaders
women who worked in the judiciary or the government in Mosul, businesswomen and women who inadequately complied with IS dress codes
men who criticized IS and others who drank alcohol, smoked cigarettes or violated the tax code
Christians, Yazidis, Shabak, Turkmen and Kurds who were unable to escape
Most of the cases for these arrests were made with information provided by secret informants. The arrestees who made it out of the IS prisons have reported that the IS informant network is widely deployed in neighborhoods and that they are at once earning IS’ recognition and confidence and indulging personal reprisals or financial interests.

Mahmoud al-Musli, a young man who was reported by such an informant, told Al-Monitor after his release through the mediation of one of his relatives, “Most of those who were detained with me were taken away based on information that IS got from secret informants, and IS is getting more and more dependent on these informants.”

This list of detainees in Mosul is much more extensive than the list of those who suffered at the hands of the Iraqi security forces. Moreover, in light of the absence of laws, there are no longer courtroom trails and defense lawyers. A cleric called the “Sharia judge,” often a foreigner and one of the most radical elements of the organization, now decides on the proper punishments.

The increasing arrests have raised the density in prisons to unprecedented levels and placed pressure on the economy of the organization, which is required to pay for guards in detention centers, the investigators and food for the prisoners, prompting IS to execute many prisoners. There are cases of people being detained for smoking and being executed.

According to witnesses who spoke to Al-Monitor from Mosul, most of the executions are carried out en masse and in secret. To increase their impact, some of these executions are performed in public squares, filling the Mosul morgue with corpses. Families of detainees end up waiting for their children in front of the morgue instead of at the courts.

One man who wished that his name be withheld spoke to Al-Monitor over the phone about the changing mood of the city. “We have to admit that IS used to have a broad favorable environment within the city, and it has often imposed itself as a protector or avenger of any attack against the population. It was even taking care of hundreds of families of the detainees or the dead regardless of their affiliation to the organization,” he said.

“IS,” he continued, “which presented itself as a defender of the Sunnis, attracted sympathy and was welcomed by the people in the first days of the occupation of Mosul, especially as it was carried out under the cover of former Baathists and army officers, before people also turned against them.” He said the wide Sunni sympathy for IS cracked less than two months into the occupation of the city.

Another said, “In just a few weeks, IS lost its base in Mosul, which justified its aggressive behavior against the people and the increasing number of its detainees and executed people.”

He added, “The organization discovered that ruling is different from occupying a city whose population exceeds 2 million people. Add to this the crimes committed against Christians and Yazidis, the demolition of shrines, the displacement, the unemployment, the downfall of the city’s economy, the doubling of the inflation rate and the bankruptcy of a large number of traders. These factors helped change the popular mood against IS.”

The behavior of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s fighters, their violation of families’ privacy and of tribal values, their dissemination of reactionary laws and their imposition of certain lifestyles and dress codes unfamiliar to the population, witnesses say, also changed their city.

According to a former lawyer in Mosul, IS “did not provide the people with any economic, security or social solutions to their crises. It rather deepened their crises while waging an international and regional venture, and the people are aware that they will end up paying for it before the members of the organization.”

He added, “IS wanted to put an end to any hopes of life in the event that the caliphate shattered, and it is playing for time to promote this feeling.”

While the people of Mosul agree that IS is not part of the city’s future, the violence is increasing as fighters from elsewhere join the group, which is calling for ever more volunteers from other countries.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iraq-mosul-islamic-state-occupy-lose.html##ixzz3JA8iUSul

From Waziristan to Syria to Iraq
Amir Mir June 22, 2014 Leave a comment

The TTP and al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship and sending fighters to countries like Syria and Iraq should be seen in this light

From Waziristan to Syria to Iraq
Mosul: ISIS is rapidly advancing in the security vacuum left by Iraqi security forces.
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The militants belonging to the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are marching towards Baghdad after seizing control of two major cities of Mosul and Tikrit amid media reports that the Sunni fighters who want to overthrow the Shia-dominated Maliki government are being aided by hundreds of their ‘jehadi brethren’ from several Muslim countries including Pakistan which has come to be known as the hotbed of holy warriors.
The holy warriors of the ISIS are rapidly advancing in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the refusal of the West to recommit forces to stabilise Iraq. The ISIS is in the same position today that existed before the US surge back in 2007 when 130,000 American troops, backed by hundreds of thousands of Iraqi security forces, had to face a tough battle to clear Baghdad and four other key provinces. The American and Iraqi forces, which were being backed by the US Air Force and the Army aviation brigades to target the command and control centre and training camps of the then Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), took more than a year to claim victory.
However, as things stand, there are no US forces on the ground to support the Maliki government, the American air power is missing and the Iraqi military has already been mortified while surrendering or retreating during the ISIS crusade from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad.
The al-Qaeda-linked ISIS fighters are being aided by hundreds of holy warriors from different countries like Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Egypt, Turkey, etc. That the Pakistani holy warriors had been fighting foreign wars in Afghanistan, Jammu & Kashmir, Chechnya and Bosnia is widely known. But their involvement in external jehad was substantially curtailed after 9/11, with the military establishment under Musharraf reversing its policy of using militancy as a foreign policy instrument.
The Musharraf regime’s U-turn on the Kashmir jehad deeply offended Pakistan’s jehadi mafia which subsequently decided waging internal jehad by declaring a full-fledged war on the state of Pakistan that is still on.
The network sending the Pakistani Sunni fighters to Syria is said to be run by the TTP and the LeJ jointly, both of which are affiliated with al-Qaeda because of their common anti-Shia and anti-American agenda.
As Pakistan’s resurgent jehadi factory keeps producing and supplying well-trained and highly motivated fighters, several al-Qaeda-linked jehadi/sectarian groups especially the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have lately been found involved in exporting holy warriors to wage jehad on new external fronts, especially in Syria and Iraq. Media reports of the Pakistani mercenaries joining hands with the rebels of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria to fight against the Bashar al-Assad regime had first appeared last year as Syria became the new centre for global jehad.
It was an anti-Shia ideology that drove TTP to join the Syrian conflict.
In a January 2013 video, TTP ameer Hakimullah Mehsud, discussing the organisation’s post 2014 objectives, had described TTP as an international organisation. Asked about the uprisings in Arab Spring countries, Hakimullah said, “We support them and we will aid them. If they need our blood, our life; if they need our people, we are ready for every type of assistance so that the democratic and secular system [in Arab nations] comes to an end.”
Reiterating that the Taliban have a global jehadi agenda, a close aide of Hakimullah said that the TTP fighters had been sent to Syria upon the request of al-Qaeda’s operational commander in Syria, Abu Omar Baghdadi who wanted Pakistani Taliban to be part of a global jehad.
Still from a video released by ISIS.
Still from a video released by ISIS.
More than two years since the beginning of the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, thousands of holy warriors from various Muslim countries including Pakistan have reportedly travelled to Syria to fight with al-Qaeda-linked ISIS. And going by some latest media reports, hundreds more holy warriors belonging to the TTP and LeJ have reached Iraq to join hands with the forces of the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq.
An Iraq-based jehadi organisation — the Ansarul Islam — has already released a video showing training activity in a jehadi camp dedicated to the memory of Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, one of the two cleric brothers who took centre-stage during Lal Masjid standoff in July 2007. Ghazi was killed in a military operation on the mosque and now lives in the jehadi hall of fame.
The video starts with a slickly-edited training montage showing fighters of the Ansarul Islam busy in various exercises and posing for the camera, their faces covered by pieces of cloth. Then the video segues into a tribute to Ghazi. In the beginning, a message from Ghazi is read out, addressed to the “men of the Ummah”. The video then shows visuals of Lal Masjid itself, along with Jamia Hafsa and troop deployment prior to the military operation. The voice-over, which showers praise on Lal Masjid militants, also condemns the government of Pakistan and the army for conducting the operation.
An Iraq-based jehadi organisation — the Ansarul Islam — has already released a video showing training activity in a jehadi camp dedicated to the memory of Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi.
At one point, the heavily armed militants are shown holding a banner with the organisation’s name: Jamaat Ansarul Islam’s Muaskar al-Sheikh Rasheed Ghazi. This loosely translates as: Ansarul Islam’s Sheikh Rasheed Ghazi Force. The video ends with an Urdu jehadi anthem, which is interspersed with Arabic lines.
The Lal Masjid’s link with global jehad is established when Osama bin Laden is quoted in the video praising Maulana Rasheed Ghazi as a hero. Thus, Ghazi keeps inspiring the followers of his cause not only in Pakistan, but also in Iraq where the holy warriors of the Ansarul Islam have not only named a jehadi training camp after Rasheed Ghazi but also subdivision of their group.
According to the TTP circles, the Taliban are prepared to help their Sunni Muslim brethren worldwide by providing manpower to ease their hardships, be it Syria or Iraq. The network sending the Pakistani Sunni fighters to Syria is said to be run by the TTP and the LeJ, both of which are affiliated with al-Qaeda because of their common anti-Shia and anti-American agenda. The leaders of this network are Usman Ghani, a former commander of the LeJ from Punjab, and Alim Ullah, a TTP commander from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
In fact, the TTP and al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship and the Taliban believe that sending fighters to countries like Syria and Iraq will be seen as an act of loyalty toward al-Qaeda. Compared with the Afghan Taliban who are least concerned about jehad in other countries, the Pakistani Taliban’s overall agenda has leaned more towards the concept of a global jehad.
The most dangerous phase from Pakistan’s point of view will be when these holy warriors finally return to their homeland to further strengthen the al-Qaeda-linked TTP. There are suspicions that their renewed activities would instantly widen the Shia-Sunni conflict here which may also lead to an escalation in the ongoing proxy war in Pakistan.

http://tns.thenews.com.pk/ttp-al-qaeda-from-waziristan-syria-to-iraq/#.VGeY_PmsWSo

For nearly a mile we drive by mounds of knee-high rubble. The Arab village of Barzan is gone; not a single house is standing.

Two young Kurdish soldiers, or peshmerga, riding with us claim that when ISIS invaded, the Arabs celebrated. The soldiers say the Arab villagers accused the Kurds of being occupiers and thanked the Sunni extremists for liberating them.

During the fight against ISIS here, U.S.-led airstrikes reduced some of the homes to rubble. The peshmerga blew up the ones left standing.

“The Arabs are not welcome here anymore,” one of the young soldiers says. In his mind they are all ISIS sympathizers. “They killed our friends, our family and you think we will welcome them back? Impossible.”

Among those killed was the young man’s brother.

http://krcc.org/post/back-and-forth-battle-iraqi-town-splits-ethnic-lines#.VGjZLOWtdz4.twitter

Abdul Nishapuri said:

Deobandis were violent and takfiri long before General Zia. Yes, Zia was able to galvanize their takfiri hatred and violence but don’t ignore the fact that Deobandi were willing patners while Barelvis, Sufis and Shias were not. In return, Deobandi clerics and leaders gained a lot of political and financial benefits. Now blaming Zia or army alone will be unfair. They shared the benefits, should share the costs too.

Also, don’t ignore that they are willing partners and supporters of transnational Deobandi and Wahhabi takfiri terrorism, a project in which Pakistan army is a minor partner while USA and Saudi Arabia are major players.

Hamza is a 33-year-old from Fallujah, a city ruled by Islamic State 40 miles west of Baghdad, who became an Isis fighter last year after being attracted by its appeal to his religious feelings. Two months ago, however, he defected, after being asked to help execute people he knew – and being appalled by invitations to join in what amounted to rape of captured Yazidi women.

In an interview with The Independent, given in the safety of another country, he gives a vivid account of why he joined Isis, what it was like to be a member of the jihadist group, and why he left. He reveals extraordinary details about how the army of Isis operates, the elaborate training that its fighters receive in Iraq and Syria and the way in which taking part in executions is an initiation rite, proof of the commitment and loyalty of fighters.

An intelligent, idealistic, well-educated, and religious man, Hamza defected from Isis after six months as a trainee and a fighter because he was deeply upset by the executions, some of them of people he knew in Fallujah. He became conscious that if he stayed in Isis he would soon have to carry out an execution himself. “I don’t like Shia but when it comes to killing them I was shocked,” he says.

He refused to execute some Sunni accused of working with Iraq’s mostly Shia government “or what they [Isis] call ‘the pagan government’,” he said. Surprisingly, he was not punished for this, but was told by his commander that he would be asked to carry out an execution later and, in the meantime, foreign jihadis would do the job.

Hamza gives a fascinating insight into the lives led by Isis fighters. “I was paid 400,000 Iraqi dinars (£231) a month in addition to many privileges, including food, fuel, and more recently, access to the internet,” he says.

His disillusionment stemmed not only from his future role as an executioner but the offer of sex with captured Yazidi women, something he considered the equivalent of rape. “It was in the first week of December 2014 when they brought about 13 Yazidi girls,” he said. “The commander tried to tempt us by saying that this is Halal [lawful] for you, a gift from Allah that we are allowed to satisfy ourselves without even marrying them because they are pagans.

“On the other hand, there were some Tunisian Muslim girls who came from Syria. Those Muslim girls were sleeping with some commanders under a marriage contract for a week only and then they were divorced and married to another one. I asked one of them how she had come to be in Syria and she answered that she had travelled first to Turkey and then across the Turkish-Syrian border.” The three British schoolgirls who likewise crossed into Syria may well find that they are similarly treated by Isis.

Hamza does not want his real name or location disclosed, though he believes that for the moment he is safe. He asked for certain details about his escape in January be concealed, but otherwise is open about how he came to join Isis forces and what he did. In many cases what he says can be confirmed by other witnesses from Fallujah interviewed by The Independent, though none of these were fighters.

“It’s a complicated story,” he says, when asked how he came to join Isis. Last year, the group captured Fallujah, where Hamza and his family were living. “They were kind to people in general and did not force them to join their military service,” he recalls. “They had many ways of gaining people’s goodwill and support: for example, they would go house to house, asking those living there if they needed anything and offering services such as education, saying ‘We will enlighten your children, so don’t send them to the government’s schools.’

Hamza told his family that he would follow them to Baghdad within a few days, but had decided at this moment, July 2014, to join Isis. His motive was primarily religious and idealistic. He says that he “decided to join them willingly because I was convinced that the Islamic State is the ideal state to serve, and to work for, Allah and the after life, which is the surest part of life”.

He was accepted immediately by Isis, his preacher recommending him to a military commander, though he was not at first sent to a military unit.

“However, the problem was that I was a little bit shaken after attending those executions. I don’t like Shia but when it came to killing them, I was shocked. Although they were showing us videos of Shia militias killing Sunni people, we were troubled when we attended real executions. In November, a large number of Sunni men were taken prisoner on the grounds that they were working with the government…

“In the fourth week of November there were some executions to be carried out. One of our commanders asked me and my fellow fighters to bring our guns to be used in an execution the following day. But the victims were Sunnis, some of whom I knew.

“I couldn’t endure what we were going to do. I tried to explain that, if they were Shia I would do it immediately. The commander said: ‘I will give you another chance later. For now we have Mujahideen [jihadis] to carry out the killing.’”

Asked if he thinks Isis will be defeated, he says that this will not be easy, even though coalition air strikes mean “they cannot advance now”.

Hamza says he is now entirely disillusioned with Isis. “At the beginning I thought they were fighting for Allah, but later I discovered they are far from the principles of Islam. I know that some fighters were taking hallucinatory drugs; others were obsessed with sex. As for the raping, and the way different men marry by turn the same woman over a period of time, this is not humane.

“I left them because I was afraid and deeply troubled by this horrible situation. The justice they were calling for when they first arrived in Fallujah turned out to be only words.”

Patrick Cockburn

Life under Isis: Why I deserted the ‘Islamic State’ rather than take part in executions, beheadings and rape – the story of a former jihadi

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/life-under-isis-why-i-deserted-the-islamic-state-rather-than-take-part-in-executions-beheadings-and-rape–the-story-of-a-former-jihadi-10111877.html