Related posts: LUBP Archive on Takfiri Deobandis

Takfirism is an ideology which permits killing everybody who disagrees with Takfiris. In this post, I explain that Takfirism or Takfiri terrorism is a better word than sectarianism (or sectarian violence) to describe, understand and fight Shia genocide and other forms of faith-motivated terrorism in Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

Recently I contacted my friends at the Jinnah Institute (Islamabad based think-tank) to express my concern on the use of the term “sectarianism” or “sectarian violence” which they (and other civil society groups and mainstream media persons) often use to describe Shia genocide in Pakistan.

I was concerned that terms such as sectarian violence, sectarianism or sectarian conflict are inadequate due to the following reasons:

1. These terms present a false neutral impression of disproportionately high intensity of violence and target killing facing Pakistan’s Shia Muslims;

2. The term Sunni-Shia sectarianism at least implicitly holds Sunni Muslims responsible for attacks and target killings of Shias while completely ignoring the fact that majority of peaceful Sunnis (Sunni Barelvis in particular but also moderate Deobandis and Wahhabis) reject and dissociate from the Jihadi-sectarian terrorists groups (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LeJ aka Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat ASWJ, Taliban etc);

3. The term Sunni-Shia sectarianism also hides the fact that the same terrorists who have killed at least 19,000 Shia Muslims have also killed hundreds of Sunni Barelvis and dozens of moderate Deobandis;

4. The term sectarianism or sectarian violence also hides the fact that at least some Jihadi-sectarian militants currently involved in massacre of Shiite Muslims are supported by Pakistan military establishment which treats them as its Jihadi assets for proxy war operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir etc;

5. The term also hides the institutional and financial support available by Saudi and other Gulf States governmental and non-governmental organizations to the Jihadi-sectarian militants.

In my view, sectarian violence label is an insult to Shia genocide. It is gross misrepresentation of the suffering of thousands of Shias and hundreds of Sunnis killed by LeJ-ASWJ-Taliban terrorists.

Can we use sectarian violence to describe Jewish Holocaust? Of course, not. Therefore we request our friends to have some pity on Shias, don’t use ‘sectarian violence’ discourse unless they also use it for the Holocaust.

We will appreciate if media persons and activists clearly use and supports the ‘Shia genocide’ and ‘Takfirism’ discourse to highlight massacres of Shias in Pakistan.

We will keep criticizing the ‘sectarian violence’ discourse, irrespective of who uses this term.

Recently, the Jinnah Institute held a round table on “sectarian violence” in Islamabad. The rationale was told by them that “sectarianism” is a conceptual term they use for hate infrastructure. I argue that sectarian violence is oft misused to hide or rationalize Shia Genocide. For example, a few days ago, at least four newspapers reported an incident of Shia massacre by LeJ terrorists as violence between Sunnis and Shias. https://lubpak.com/archives/225785

An activist told me that not a single volunteer will show up if he branded any demonstration as Shia killings, 100 will show up if it is branded as a demo against sectarianism. I argue that the use of sectarianism discourse is misleading and counter productive. Takfirism or Takfiri terrorism is a better alternative because it does not present false neutrality and also because it does not present false binary of Sunni vs Shia.

Given that several analysts and scholars e.g., Asian Human Rights Commission, ShiaKilling.com, Dr. Taqi, Saroop Ijaz, Kamran Shafi, Zofeen Ibrahim, Farrukh Pitafi etc are increasingly using the ‘Shia genocide’ discourse, it is important that all of us in the mainstream and social media use consistent, unambiguous terminology, and instead of attributing Shia genocide to Sunnis, attribute it to Takfiris.

Explanation of Takfirism

Takfirism is a centuries-old belief (almost as old as Islam) that was revived in late 19th and early 20th century in Saudi Arabia which resulted in treating all non-Wahhabi sects as impure Muslims, polytheists (mushrik) or infidels (kafir). It was further institutionalized by the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology and the ideologies of Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, Mullah Omar in Afghanistan, Manzoor Nomani in India, Taqi Usmani, Rafi Usmani, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Ihsan Elahi Zaheer etc in Pakistan.

Takfirism claims that the Muslim ummah (the community of believers) has been weakened by deviation in the original (Salafist) practice of Islam. Takfirism classifies all deviating and non-practising Muslims as kafirs (infidels) and calls upon its adherents to fight all Muslim infidels.

Small isolated groups of Takfirist militants have existed throughout the Arab world since early 20th century, particularly in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab statelets etc. They regrouped alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, during the so called Jihadi war against Soviet forces. The Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Uzbek leader Tahir Yuldash and Sheikh Essa, who were later the top leadership of al-Qaida, were among the fiercest proponents of Takfirism in these years. After the US invasion Takfirism flourished in Iraq, where the al-Qaida leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, killed in June 2006, was a leading exponent.

After 2003 Takfirism gained support among al-Qaida’s middle leadership and the rank and file. These ideologues were no longer defined by their hatred of the US military machine. Takfirism encompassed the belief that infidels within Muslim societies (Sufi Muslims, Shiite Muslims, incumbent governments and armies) gave strength to the enemy and were a danger to be eliminated. Leaders of infidel Muslim societies were prime candidates for elimination before those who had been led astray from Islam could be brought back into the fold. The Takfirists were enemies of all deviant and non-practising Muslims. The difficult, isolated terrain of North and South Waziristan and other tribal agencies in Pakistan were their new sanctuary – where their presence was conveniently ignored by Pakistan Army in order to retain its strategic influence in Afghanistan.

The recent creed of Takfiris is much more narrow minded and violent than the original ideologues, who had concentrated upon driving out western occupying forces from Muslim territories. The Takfirists focus on the enemy within. The lesson they learned after 9/11 is both simplistic and misleading: they had been ransomed for US dollars and bombed by both western and Pakistani infidels. Henceforth, they would make no distinction between Muslims and Christians or between presidents Musharraf and Bush. The elimination of the enemy within was a necessary preliminary to any showdown with outsiders. Repeated assassination attempts against General Musharraf, attacks on Pakistani ministers belonging to secular parties (PPP, ANP etc) must be viewed within this context. Because of anti-Shia and anti-Sufi ideology inherent in Salafism, they always looked down upon Shiites and Sunni Barelvis/Sufis, considering them as infidels.

This dual sensibility against Westerners and fellow Muslims afflicts all Takfirist militants, whether in al-Qaida or its allied groups (Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LeJ, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat ASWJ etc). They must continue their war against western armies, but meanwhile will lay down the basis for a conformist Islamic state to keep dissenting brethren in line. As well as raising the standard of rebellion against Muslim states, they have attacked moderate pro-Islamic reformists inside Tribal Agencies and other parts of Pakistan. Takfirists abhor Shiism, which they regard as an unacceptable deviation from Islam. Sectarian warfare has assumed a partnership with jihad, over which it often takes precedence. Takfirism is messianic – the sole leadership of Muslims against apostates and the infidel West. (Source)

Takfirism may be viewed as the ultimate expression of unconstrained Islamism.

• Islamism is the ideological proposition that the legitimacy of the political order be derived from Islam.
• Salafism is an institutionalized form of Islamism professing the conviction that such legitimacy resides solely in the emulation of the precedents of early Islamic history.
• Jihadism is the belief that the use of force is permissible (and/or obligatory) and governed by Islamic jurisprudence, as reinterpreted by Islamism.

These three Islamist concepts overlap, with Salafism and Jihadism as intersecting subsets of Islamism, yielding four applicable labels: non-Salafist, non-jihadist Islamists; Salafist, non-jihadist Islamists; non-Salafist, jihadist Islamists; and Salafist, jihadist Islamists.

Adding to the complexity of the configuration is Takfirism. Contrary to the previously defined forms of Islamism, Takfirism is generally not a self-applied label; few groups or individuals have declared themselves Takfirists.

Takfirism is nonetheless a distinct ideological approach with significant operational consequences for present-day Salafist-jihadism. Extremist groups of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, Salafist Al Qaeda groups in Libya, Yemen, Mali and Saudi Arabia, Deobandi-Wahhabi extremmists (LeJ, ASWJ, Taliban) in Pakistan are examples of Takfiris.

Literal roots and historical evolution of the concept

At the base of Takfirism is the Arabic word takfir — pronouncing an action or an individual un-Islamic — from the root k-f-r. The semantic origin of the root associates it with the deliberate denial of a solemn truth. The conventional meaning, over the course of Islamic history, has reserved kufr for the rejection of an agreed-upon precept of Islam. For example, a Muslim’s deliberate failure to perform the commanded ritual prayer or the day long fast during the month of Ramadan (Ramzan) is considered an act of kufr. A non-Muslim who rejects the call to Islam is a kafir (plural kuffar).

Over the course of its history, the Islamic scholastic tradition both rationalized and formalized its treatment of the kuffar. While the constraints imposed by the Islamic laws governing the conduct of war provided some level of protection to certain categories of kuffar, Islamic jurisprudence also stipulated that the default attitude toward the kuffar in general should be one of hostility and belligerence. Thus, kuffar (but not Muslims) could be enslaved and their property looted. Furthermore, jurisprudence even discussed extreme instances in which the mitigating constraints were lifted, such as during a battle in which it was impossible to distinguish between combatant and noncombatant (biyat), and when the enemy deliberately used noncombatants (Muslims or otherwise) as human shields (tatarrus).

In contrast, the development of the notions of dhimmah (zimma) (communal trust—applicable to non-Muslims living permanently in an Islamic state), aman (personal safety—applicable to non-Muslims, even from hostile states, legally visiting the Islamic state), and ‘ahd (state treaty or covenant—applicable to friendly non-Muslim states and their subjects) excluded large fractions of the kuffar from the permissible mistreatment. In general, however, scholastic pronouncements neither protected individuals from risks nor endowed them with the privileges associated with these categories, which remained largely theoretical; the actual practice was dictated by political power.

Islamic scholasticism, however, did engage in two other conversations that have proven to be of relevance in modern Islamism. The first concerned the question of infidel versus apostate (kafir asli versus kafir murtadd). Contrary to the Muslim apostate, the infidel, as an original non-Muslim, could be subject to the aforementioned protective categories; an apostate did not benefit from such possibilities and was furthermore subject to capital punishment. Two conditions were set for the exercise of such punishment: first, the act of apostasy must satisfy jurists’ criteria—with ample opportunities to rescind it—and second, the punishment should be meted out by the state. The jurisprudence of apostasy, another juristic field abandoned in the secularly-illusioned Islamic twentieth century, remains woefully inadequate in the new order, where shifting religious allegiance is no longer equivalent to treason in warfare.

The second conversation concerns the distinction between pronouncing a statement or an action un-Islamic (takfir al-qawl or takfir al-f‘il) versus pronouncing an individual a kafir. Traditionally, theological and juristic debates within the Islamic scholastic tradition have allowed a large margin of disagreement that ranged from mild differences (khilaf) to accusations of kufr. These intellectual positions, as eminent scholars often cautioned, were to be restricted to a pronouncement on statements and actions; only the aforementioned formal apostasy process could determine whether an individual was a kafir. Yet, whether as a result of the discontinuity inflicted on the Islamic scholastic tradition in the last century—and the emergence of militancy as a claimant to that tradition—or of pragmatic opportunism, modern Islamism has too often conflated these two discussions, thereby creating a mechanism by which to resuscitate accusations of apostasy against non-Islamist Muslim foes.

Takfirism thus is the tendency, manifested among some Salafist-jihadist formations, to conflate the pronouncement of one’s statements and actions as un-Islamic with the accusation of apostasy. Takfirism has invalidated the lengthy and juristic apostasy process in favor of reassigning to Salafist-jihadists the prerogative of meting out capital punishment. In its most extreme forms, it rejects any protective category for non-Muslims, relegating large factions of the Muslim community, up to its totality, to the status of apostasy (kafir murtadd) and assigning to itself the right to administer capital punishment. Takfirism further lifts the constraints imposed on the conduct of war by Islamic jurisprudence on the bases of scholastic discussions allowing their conditional rescission in certain scenarios. Takfirism, pushed to its full potential, is thus an unrestrained license to kill.

From their application of this phenomenon in Algeria during the 1990s to their multiple terrorist actions worldwide particularly in Mali, Yemen, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia etc, Takfirist groups have demonstrated their ability to prolifically use this license. As a result, some ideological backlash has occurred from the most atrocious Takfirist actions. While some Islamist ideologues have attempted to qualify the premises applied by Takfirists, unfortunately they have often done so only on the basis of the need for moderation, not as a rebuttal to the misuse of the scholastic corpus. (Source)

According to a Saudi analyst, despite ostensible operations against Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, the “roots of the problem have so far not been addressed,”; the Takfiri discourse, which accuses opponents of being apostates, continues to flourish in Saudi Arabia. “People who promote Takfiri thoughts are not held accountable unless they start to form a danger to the government,” the Saudi Analyst told AFP. “There has not been a serious strategy to combat this ideology.” According to another anaysist, the Takfirist (Al-Qaeda, violent Salafist) ideology should be tackled by allowing more space for moderates. “The best way to combat the extremist ideology is not just through military confrontation, but also through strengthening the moderate discourse… It is there, but it needs the support of society and the state,” the analyst said. “The open religious discourse in Saudi Arabia is moderate, but the danger is in the extremist discourse… This creates extremist elements and nourishes terrorism,” he added. But hope of seeing a change appears dim. “Nothing will change in Saudi Arabia in the next 30 years. Even if change (strategy) starts right now, it would take at least 15 years to start seeing results,” he said. (Source)

Tough, bold measures are needed to fight Takfirism

Takfiris have one goal and their rhetoric is clear; they seek to “unify” all Muslims under one grotesque government (Khilafat under one Ameer-ul-Momineen) based on their Salafist-Jihadist view of Sharia law with no regard for the desire of moderate Muslims (whom they consider apostates). Takfiris are conducting active insurgencies using the most heinous methods in, at least, seven countries and plotting the overthrow of many more governments from North Africa to the South Pacific. Politically and economically, the civilized world cannot afford to ignore or lose this war. Tough, bold measures are needed.

For example, recently the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki urged the parliament to bar Takfirism (accusations of blasphemy) as a threat to public order. Marzouki warned: “Such practices can threaten the peace between citizens living in the same country and lead to conflict.” He asked the president and members of the Constituent Assembly that approved on new government of the North African country in December to adopt legislation that outlaws takfeer and accusations of blasphemy. Marzouki urged that those who breach the new law should be prosecuted in order to protect the coexistence, fraternity and solidarity in Tunisia. (Source)

Takfiris have been classified by some commentators as violent offshoots of the Salafi movement, yet while Salafism is seen as a form of ‘fundamentalist Islam’, it is not an inherently violent movement and does not always condone terrorism. Takfiris, on the other hand, condone acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals against non-Muslims and also against deviant and non-practising Muslims (infidel Muslims).

Takfiris practice labeling of fellow Muslims as kafir is a legacy from the medieval Islamic writer, Ibn Taymiyyah, who is also revered by Salafis. This belief allows Takfiris to justify the use of violence against fellow Muslims; a contemporary example being the anti-Shia and anti-Sunni Sufi violence perpetrated in Iraq, Pakistan and Syria.

Takfiris also reject the traditional Muslim duty to obey one’s legitimate rulers in all manners that do not contradict Sharia, as sedition is viewed as a great danger to a nation. Takfiris consider all political authority that does not abide by their interpretation of Islam as illegitimate and apostate; a view which closely mirrors Qutb’s views on jahiliyyah. As such, violence against such regimes and fellow Muslims is considered legitimate.

Takfiri views on suicide attacks also differ significantly from that of orthodox Islam. Takfiris believe that one who deliberately kills himself whilst attempting to kill enemies is a martyr (shahid) and therefore goes straight to heaven. As such all sin is absolved when a person is martyred, allowing carte blanche for the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants, for example. Suicide attacks on Pakistan’s Sunni Barelvi (Sufi) Muslims, Shia Muslims, Christians etc are an example of the Takfiri ideology of the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASWJ).

Takfirism is not a new phenomenon; indeed, takfiri practices arise sporadically in Islamic history. For example, the Kharijites’ practice of takfir became the justification for their indiscriminate attacks on civilian Muslims. Takfiris resemble modern-day analogues of the Khawarij, a seventh-century off-shoot Islamic sect which waged war against the fourth Muslim Caliph Ali. Modern examples are the Iraqi insurgent groups who justify their actions against Shi’as by labeling them kafirs, e.g. the bombers of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, attempted attacks on Syed Zainab’s mausoleum in Damascus, demolition of the Prophet Muhammad’s daugther’s mausoleum in Medina etc.

Strictly speaking, takfirism most accurately describes terrorism by Muslims against other Muslims. But it it important to understand the term in a wider context given that (1) many of the leaders of al-Qaeda are known to have adopted a takfiri ideology, and (2) the anti-terrorism strategy should emphasize that the majority of the victims of modern terrorism are Muslim.

There may also be a useful nexus to cult terminology; regarding takfiri indoctrination, French terrorism expert Roland Jacquard states: “Takfir is like a sect: once you’re in, you never get out. The Takfir rely on brainwashing and an extreme regime of discipline to weed out the weak links and ensure loyalty and obedience from those taken as members.” Thus, the phrase “takfiri death cult” may have some relevance.

First, unlike jihad, which arguably has a variety of interpretations, takfir has historically had an overwhelmingly negative connotation. Second, commentators do use the term to describe terrorists and their ideology. Last, and perhaps most important, some of the most influential Muslim religious leaders have strongly come out against the takfiri doctrine.

In July 2005, there was an interfaith conference in Amman of 200 of the world’s leading Islamic scholars from 50 countries. The group, which included Sunnis and Shias, unanimously issued a ruling, known as The Amman Message, specifically forbidding the practice of takfir. Since then, over 500 Islamic scholars worldwide have adopted the ruling. In The Amman Message, the participating scholars issued a unanimous ruling, known as the “Three Points of the Amman Message.” In it, they took the following actions:

1. They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 Mazhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shi’a and Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic theology (Ash’arism); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise definition of who is a Muslim.
2. Based upon this definition, they forbade takfir (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims.
3. Based upon the Mathahib, they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam.

While it is undoubtedly a welcome development, the The Amman Message is just one step, and its effect on the Takfiri ideology and violent operations of al-Qaeda, Taliban, LeJ-ASWJ etc will be limited unless the message is propagated and enforced at multiple levels (media, curricula, parliament, society etc) by the respective States.

Compiled from various sources:

http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/basics/takfirism

http://mondediplo.com/2007/07/03takfirism

http://armiesofliberation.com/archives/2009/09/03/takfirism-lets-kill-everybody-who-disagrees/

http://longwaranalysis.com/category/takfirism/

http://news.charlesayoub.com/index.php/article/27224/Tunisia%20President%20Calls%20for%20Outlawing%20Takfirism

Wikipedia

Baloch Jundullah-LeJ terrorists kill Shia judge, guard, driver in Quetta

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