In Pakistan, generals do not retire – by Syed Talat Hussain
Age of extensions
The COAS has done precisely what the chief justice did in the case of his trusted comrades, which is not much different from the reasons we hear from the president and the prime minister for retaining important members of their cabinet and advisors
It is a reality check for those who thought that only journalists and social workers never call it a day. The nation is now discovering that generals too do not retire. Not on time anyway. The extension in service to generals, now four in number, by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, raises important points. Some of these points go beyond the oversimplified current debate about the merits and demerits of these decisions. While the army’s chronic detractors see this as a sign of institutional audacity, those who are in favour are busy churning out procedural and technical arguments to defend the army chief’s right to add grace years to the career of his officers.
The significance of these decisions and their implications, however, transcend the right and wrong associated with these. The first factor that makes these decisions significant is the signal this sends across to the whole institution. And it is that while all the generals wearing the same rank are equal, some are more equal than others by virtue of the posts they hold. This may be stating the obvious realities of professional life, but it does have an added importance in the context of the reform process General Kayani himself has launched in the institution he heads.
One of the fundamentals of this entire effort has been to ensure that bad traditions of the Musharraf era are firmly rooted out. Restoring merit in the order of service has been one of the many ways General Kayani has pursued to break the debilitating legacy of his predecessor who made his own rules and exceptions as he blundered along the path of absolute power. But now the decision to grant service extensions to those who otherwise would retire into blissful oblivion brings back painful memories of the times General Kayani has tried so hard to cast into the dustbin of deliberately forgotten history. The finer point about the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these extensions will be lost in the view many are likely to hold within the institution that General Kayani too favours the favourites.
These extensions are also important because they are an admission of sorts by General Kayani that in certain individuals too much investment of time and energy has been made for him to lose their vital support. Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha’s case falls in this basket. Both as head of the ISI and as director general military operations, he has been General Kayani’s most trusted comrade. His centrality to General Kayani’s scheme of things is reinforced by the rapport he has developed with his counterparts across the world’s most important capitals including, and primarily, Washington, Riyadh, London, and Beijing. A newcomer to the job would have taken time to develop this comfort level, first with the hot seat, and then with the hard tasks he would have to perform. But while these seemingly powerful arguments — captured in the oft-used term ‘continuity’ — imply supremacy of the individual over the ability of the institution to find a suitable replacement, this is not exactly the best way to inspire confidence in other members of the team or impress upon the sceptics the diversity of leadership and command qualities the institution claims it has for every tier.
Also applied elsewhere, the same reasoning (of continuity) can have severe negative ramifications. For instance, this would mean that, theoretically, General Kayani himself too should not retire for the same reason that has caused him to retain some of his commanders. He is very comfortable in his job. He is known to everyone across the world. He is spearheading the entire breadth of operations against the militants. He has seen through turbulent political times and has not done badly in careening through these crises. Why should he retire on time? Why not extend his tenure by a year? Why not three years even? Or ten? You see how the logic of extension-for-continuity can stretch into dangerous extrapolation? It also conjures up familiar images of men in uniform viewing either themselves or other members of the team they have handpicked as indispensable to performing national level duties. This violates the golden principle that institutions progress by strictly following best practices — age of retirement being one of these.
Just as important is to see how these extensions will impact the list of individuals in the queue for the post of the chief of army staff that is going to be up for grabs by the end of this year. Some analysts have suggested that no one in the grace period of his service can be considered for the post of the COAS, and that each extension is ‘event- or task-specific’. But this is just one interpretation and certainly not the final one. Given Pakistan’s peculiar political history and the present turbulent regional situation, appointment of the next COAS will be one of the most important decisions to be made in the coming months. But this particular decision lies with the much-maligned and controversial civilian leadership, and constitutionally there is little the army command can do anything about it. Once made, this decision will have to be obeyed. However, before the decision is made, the sequence of the line-up for the post of the chief becomes exceptionally important. Shuffling the seniority list on technical grounds can be one way to throw up the present chief’s choice for his own replacement.
And, finally, with these extensions, the army’s high command has followed the general trend in Pakistan where institutional heads are exercising authority in a manner that may be legally and technically sound but does not add to the image and prestige of the office they hold. The COAS has done precisely what the chief justice did in the case of his trusted comrades, which is not much different from the reasons we hear from the president and the prime minister for retaining important members of their cabinet and advisors. Pakistan, it seems, cannot move an inch without a few good souls working beyond the call of their official duty. So much for institutional governance!
The writer is a leading Pakistani journalist
Source: Daily Times
The indispensable and the helpless
By Cyril Almeida
12 Mar, 2010
“Assuming Shuja Pasha has done all those great and glorious things for the nation. Even then, when it’s time for him to retire, give him a medal, shake his hand and say khuda hafiz. Pakistan zindabad.”
Just how much disregard does the army have for rules and civilians? Let’s rewind to a year and a half ago. On Sept 30, 2008 the front page of Dawn announced: ‘Kayani shakes up army command’.
The accompanying article reads: “In a major reshuffle in the army’s top command, Chief of the Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on Monday brought in a new head of the all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) …
“Perhaps the most surprising of all such changes is the appointment of Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha as the new director-general of ISI …. A highly professional soldier in his own right, Lt-Gen Pasha has, for the past over two years, been overseeing the ongoing security operation in the tribal areas and parts of the NWFP.”
“In his capacity as the director-general military operations (DGMO) he was directly responsible for the launching and execution of all major security strikes in Fata and Swat, the latest being the major onslaught against religious extremists in the Bajaur tribal agency.”
All stuff that’s been re-hashed in recent days, culminating with the announcement of Pasha’s one-year extension. What the report did not address, though, were two things: the prime minister’s role and how long Pasha’s term was to last.
The missing details tell a story of their own.
Several weeks ago, trying to understand the arcane rules that are meant to govern the appointment of an ISI chief, I got a quick tutorial from a former head of the spy agency.
The rules, I was told, are clear-cut. The prime minister is the appointing authority and he can appoint anyone: civilian or uniformed; man, woman or, what I suspect was a rueful joke, monkey. Of course, there is often a gulf between the de jure and the de facto when it comes to civil-military relations: traditionally, the COAS has arrogated to himself the authority to appoint his spy chief, I was also told.
The 2008 Dawn report also contains this little nugget: “Gen Kayani … has put in place a new team to implement his vision for reviving the prestige of the armed forces and for enhancing the security of the state.”
So what, you ask. The army has always been in charge of national security. Nothing surprising there.
But someone around Kayani must have scratched his head and reached for a multi-year calendar. Right, that person must have thought, the chief wants Pasha to “implement his new vision” but Pasha is supposed to be put out to pasture in March 2010. That’s just 15 months away.…
Army folks can, of course, never question their boss about promotions and the like, so even if anyone did the little arithmetic necessary to realise the obvious he would never have dared raise the issue.
But for those of us not in uniform, we must ask: why was a man with 15 months to retirement picked as the spy chief to help steer his boss’s new vision for the country’s security policy? If the job wasn’t done in 15 months, then what?
Then he gets an extension.
I haven’t met Pasha, though I suspect that even if I were to, I wouldn’t be able to establish that he has in fact done all the great and glorious things attributed to him by, funnily enough, unnamed sources in recent weeks.
But let’s assume he has done all those great and glorious things for the nation. Even then, when it’s time for him to retire, give him a medal, shake his hand and say khuda hafiz. Pakistan zindabad.
But no. We’re told, again by those oh-so-loquacious sources, that Pasha is vital, that he’s needed for the sake of ‘continuity’, that without him the ‘new’ security policy can’t be implemented.
Welcome to Club Indispensable.
It’s a great club to be a part of. Everyone loves you, the media sings paeans to your heroic deeds, and nobody thinks to ask the obvious: how does staying on reflect on your peers?
The army, its members never tire of telling us, is an institution. It is professional, its officers are world-class, its training second to none. So is there no general in his early 50s, with several decades of training under his belt, in the entire upper echelons of the Pakistan Army who can fill Pasha’s enormous shoes?
And this whole business of a ‘critical moment’ in the counter-insurgency is a red herring. Hasn’t the army itself told us to be patient? That counter-insurgencies take years to win? Don’t the textbooks on counter-insurgency suggest that they typically last at least a decade, sometimes two? How does a one-year extension fit into that bigger picture?
The most charitable explanation for Pasha’s extension, and, let’s get real, Kayani’s later this year, is that that Kayani and Pasha are fighting the good fight, that of reorienting the Pakistan Army and changing its security outlook.
That could be true. But that would also mean Kayani has decided to wage this struggle behind closed doors, away from the scrutiny of other institutions and the public the army ostensibly protects.
I don’t know about you, but I’m not terribly confident that the army has finally produced something it never has before: a general who can, with the help of just a few uniformed allies, change the course of the country’s security policy for the better.
The least charitable explanation would be that Kayani is so disdainful of the government and the man who leads it, Zardari, that he isn’t about to waste time negotiating with them as equals, or even slight unequals.
In which case, Kayani has kept Pasha by his side because he can. After all, the generals know best and the ‘bloody civilians’ just don’t get it.
In which case, we, the people, might as well pack it all up and hand it over to the generals. Here, it’s your country anyway, you guys run it. Just do us a favour and don’t do what those other guys, Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf, did. Preposterous. That’s not Kayani, you say.
Time will tell. At the moment, only this is certain: you, me and our elected representatives are mere passengers in a vehicle that we can only pray Kayani and his boys know the destination of.
Welcome to Club Helpless.
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http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/14-cyril-almeida-the-indispensable-and-the-helpless-230-zj-05
A leaf from Turkey’s book
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 12 Mar, 2010
The major difference between the Turkish and Pakistan’s military is that the latter has more than nine lives and has an open field since even the opponents are ultimately its partners.
The discussion in Turkey on a botched coup attempt some years ago raised some hopes of Pakistan following a similar route. Operation Sledgehammer, as the attempted coup in Turkey was codenamed, involved senior military officers and aimed at creating internal chaos to allow for a military takeover.
The Turkish military is generally uncomfortable with an Islamic party in power. In April 2007 it had issued a general statement opposing the candidacy of the current president (Abdullah Gul) for the presidential elections, calling it a disaster for the country. However, Gul’s party still made it to power. Despite continued pressure from the armed forces, the Islamic AKP (Justice and Development Party) could not be dislodged due to popular support. Pakistan could have a similar experience but in a different context.
In Turkey’s case, the military was historically considered part of the nation-building process. It was Kemal Ataturk and his forces that got rid of the Ottoman empire and the system of khilafat to build a new republic based on secular principles. This meant that while people were allowed to pursue their faith, the state would not mix politics and religion.
Hence, the Turkish state never became a ‘faithless’ state. However, the military directly became the guarantor of the new socio-political system including the survival of secular politics and the establishment of more European social structures. The fact that the ruling elite built internal partnerships and supported the military began to create a wedge between the rulers and the ruled. Even leftist parties supported the military, which resulted in their losing some measure of popularity.
For society at large the only other option was offered by the Islamic parties that provided a different agenda to what was being offered by the elite, resulting in the AKP’s popularity. The debate on joining the European Union further strengthened the party’s position as it accepted the demand for democratisation laid down by the EU.
The AKP managed to outsmart the military, which was forced from the outside to accept the internal changes. The EU constantly challenged the power, perks and privileges of the Turkish armed forces, which had built their significance on the basis of being the guardians and guarantors of Turkey’s changing national narrative. The AKP did not talk about reinstating the khilafat; in fact, it benefited from the European demand for Turkey to become democratic.
Pakistan’s case is quite different. There are similarities but it is the differences which put Pakistan in a separate league. Firstly, its military was not part of the initial nation-building process. It was actually a post-colonial institution just like the civil bureaucracy. This means that the various stakeholders did not necessarily consider the military above board and an uncontested writer and guarantor of the social contract as in Turkey. Pakistan’s military was part of the state bureaucracy that gained power over time and began to dominate the state.
Each bout of military rule has extended the armed forces’ power even further. The power to extend the service of senior officers, which the current army chief has exercised, was never naturally his but was made so by Gen Ziaul Haq. As per the rules, the power to appoint, promote and extend service belongs to the appointing authority, which in the case of the federal government lies with the prime minister. Zia and later Musharraf were responsible for extending the military’s pervasive role in politics, society and the economy in order to wield power even though the armed forces were not in direct control.
Like Turkey, the ruling elite in Pakistan has also contributed to building the military’s power. In fact, in Pakistan’s case the civil-military divide is not simply linear but both horizontal and vertical. Eventually, all political leaders make strategic compromises with the military for short-term gains. The signing of illegal deals or hiding the military’s assets or trying to whitewash the defence establishment’s blunders is done because political leaders and significant members of civil society believe they can benefit from association with the generals.
If we were only to dig up and compare the statements of individuals regarding military rule it would be easy to see the somersaults made by so many to secure their financial and other interests. The short memory of the people helps some get away with murder.
But Pakistan does not have the convenience of foreign actors who would help with a fundamental change as in Turkey’s case. Islamabad’s international benefactors have happily rebuilt their links with GHQ, especially now that there seems to be some hope of making gains in Afghanistan. Foreign stakeholders like the US have always been shortsighted as far as Pakistan is concerned.
But it is also a fact that they want to keep the military on their side because it is not ideologically opposed to using religion as a tool. This is not to suggest there is something wrong with the idea, but it is a matter of a military not geared to apply western or even Islamic principles of secularism as done by Turkey. Therefore, the only gains the US and its allies can hope to make in the region are to get maximum support from the armed forces even though they do not hope to change the institution. The military has a radical outlook and is comfortable with some aspects of political Islam as an operational tool. The Islamists are integrated into the military machine as those who adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with external actors.
For instance, the military is keen for the US to stay but only deal through the GHQ both nationally and regionally. Policymakers in Washington are of the view that the idea of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan has deeply perturbed Pakistan’s military.
However, the issue with a multifaceted institution, which builds multilayered partnerships, is that it is difficult to push back. It can change clothes and reappear once a crisis is over. Thus the major difference between the Turkish and Pakistan’s military is that the latter has more than nine lives and has an open field since even the opponents are ultimately its partners.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
[email protected]
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/14-ayesha-siddiqa-a-leaf-from-turkeys-book-230-zj-06
جنرل پاشا: تسلسل کا معاملہ
آخری وقت اشاعت: جمعرات 11 مارچ 2010 , 12:00 GMT 17:00 PST
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2010/03/100311_gen_pasha_extension_reasons_haroon.shtml
ہارون رشید
بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، اسلام آ باد
ایک کلیدی ادارے کے کلیدی سربراہ کو موجودہ کلیدی وقت پر ہٹانا شاید موجودہ فوجی سربراہ جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی کے لیے کوئی آپشن نہیں تھی۔ یہی سوچ شاید پاکستان کی اہم ترین خفیہ ایجنسی آئی ایس آئی کے سربراہ لیفٹننٹ جنرل احمد شجاع پاشا کو اس وقت مزید ایک سال کی توسیع دینے کے فیصلے کے پیچھے کارفرما ہوسکتی ہے۔ تاہم اس سوچ کی بہترین وضاحت ایک ہی لفظ کرسکتا ہے اور وہ ہے ’تسلسل‘۔
آئی ایس آئی کے سربراہ لیفٹنٹ جنرل احمد شجاع پاشا
جنرل پاشا آئی ایس آئی کے ڈائریکٹر جنرل کی حیثیت سے ستمبر دو ہزار آٹھ سے فرائض سرانجام دے رہے ہیں۔ اس سے قبل وہ پاکستان فوج میں ایک اور اہم ترین عہدے ڈائریکٹر جنرل ملٹری آپریشنز پر بھی ایک طویل عرصے تک کام کرچکے ہیں۔ وہ قبائلی علاقوں میں شدت پسندی کے مرض کے علاج میں ابتدائی دنوں سے مصروف تھے۔ تاہم وہ فوج سے اٹھارہ مارچ کو ریٹائر ہونے والے تھے۔
ان کی ملازمت میں اضافے سے ناصرف پاکستان کے اندر بلکہ بیرون ملک بھی اطمینان کا اظہار کیا گیا ہوگا۔ ان کا اس عہدہ پر جاری رہنے سے شاید ہی اس موقع پر کسی کو اختلاف ہوگا۔ امریکہ جو آج بھی کسی حد تک آئی ایس آئی سے شاکی ہوگا شاید ہی اس فیصلے سے اختلاف کرنے کی حالت میں ہو۔ اس نے بھی باقی دنیا کی طرح اس امید کا اظہار کیا ہے کہ جنرل پاشا شدت پسندوں کے خلاف حالیہ کامیابیوں کے سلسلے کو جاری رکھ سکیں گے۔
بعض تجزیہ نگاروں کے مطابق افغانستان میں امریکہ نے حالات میں بہتری لانے کے لیے اپنے لیے جو اٹھارہ ماہ کی ڈیڈلائن طے کی ہے اس تناظر میں یہ فیصلہ کافی اہمیت کا حامل ہے۔ اس موقع پر کسی نئے شخص کو آگے لانے، جاری کارروائیوں سے متعارف کروانے اور تمام گیم پلان کو سمجھنے سمجھانے میں کافی وقت ضائع ہوسکتا تھا۔ امریکہ کے لیے افغانستان میں اس کی موجودگی کا ایک ایک دن بھاری اور وہاں سے باعزت واپسی کا امکان مشکل ہوتا جا رہا ہے۔ ایسے میں کسی نئے فوجی افسر سے تعلقات استوار کرنے کی شاید حالت میں نہ ہو۔
بعض لوگوں کا خیال ہے کہ جنرل پاشا کی مدت ملازمت میں توسیع سے جنرل کیانی سمیت کئی دیگر کی مدت ملازمت میں توسیع کے امکانات بھی بڑھ گئے ہیں۔
امریکی فوجی کمان کے اعلیٰ ترین افسران ایک مدت سے اسلام آباد کے دورے کر رہے ہیں تاکہ پاکستان کے ان دو اہم ترین جنرلوں یعنی جنرل کیانی اور جنرل پاشا کو اپنے موقف کا قائل کرسکیں۔ لیکن ان دونوں پر مشتمل پاکستانی سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ بظاہر ایک حد تک اس سے متفق ہے۔ جنرل کیانی نے گزشتہ دنوں بھارت ’سینٹرک‘ ہونے کا بیان دے کر واضح کر دیا کہ کم از کم ہندوستان سے متعلق فوج کی پالیسی میں کوئی تبدیلی نہیں آئی ہے۔ ہاں طالبان کے معاملے پر کچھ اتفاق رائے حالیہ گرفتاریوں اور سوات اور وزیرستان میں کامیابیوں سے ظاہر ہو رہا ہے۔ تاہم یہ اتفاق دائمی صورت اختیار کرسکے گی یا نہیں اس بارے میں ابھی شکوک وشبہات موجود ہیں۔
حالیہ طالبان رہنماؤں کی گرفتاریوں سے ہی آئی ایس آئی کی شبیہ بہتر نہیں ہوئی ہے بلکہ اندرون ملک سیاست میں مداخلت بھی اگر مکمل طور پر ختم نہیں تو کم ضرور ہوئی ہے۔ اس ادارے کا سیاسی سیل کافی عرصے سے غیرمتحرک ہے جس کا کریڈٹ بھی شاید جنرل پاشا کو جاتا ہے۔ انہوں نے اس ادارے کی سیاست میں مداخلت کے تاثر کو کافی حد تک ختم کیا ہے۔ یہی شاید وجہ ہے جو اب ہمیں سیاست میں ان کی مداخلت کے الزامات کافی عرصے سے سننے کو نہیں مل رہے ہیں۔ ایک اور خوشگوار تبدیلی انہوں نے چند ماہ قبل اسلام آباد میں بھارتی ہائی کمیشن کی ایک تقریب میں شرکت کر کے محسوس کروائی تھی۔
بعض لوگوں کا خیال ہے کہ جنرل پاشا کی مدت ملازمت میں توسیع سے جنرل کیانی سمیت کئی دیگر کی مدت ملازمت میں توسیع کے امکانات بھی بڑھ گئے ہیں۔ جنرل کیانی کے علاوہ جائنٹ چیفس آف سٹاف کمیٹی کے چیرمین جنرل طارق مجید بھی اس سال اواخر میں ریٹائر ہونے والے ہیں۔ لیکن بعض تجزیہ نگاروں کے مطابق جنرل طارق کی جگہ جنرل کیانی کی ملازمت میں توسیع کے امکانات زیادہ روشن ہیں۔
جنرل کیانی کے علاوہ جائنٹ چیفس آف سٹاف کمیٹی کے چیرمین جنرل طارق مجید بھی اس سال اواخر میں ریٹائر ہونے والے ہیں۔ لیکن بعض تجزیہ نگاروں کے مطابق جنرل طارق کی جگہ جنرل کیانی کی ملازمت میں توسیع کے امکانات زیادہ روشن ہیں۔
لیکن جنرل پاشا کی مدت ملازمت میں توسیع کے فیصلے پر بعض حلقوں کی جانب سے تنقید بھی سامنے آ رہی ہے۔ روزنامہ ڈان نے آج کے اپنے اداریے میں لکھا ہے کہ فوج میں بحیثت ایک ادارے کے نیا افسر تلاش کرنے یا موجودہ کی پالیسیوں کو آگے بڑھانے کی صلاحیت رکھنے والوں کی کمی نہیں ہونی چاہیے۔ اخبار کے مطابق جنرل کیانی کو اس موڑ پر پہنچنے کے بارے میں اس وقت سوچنا چاہیے تھا جب انہوں نے جنرل پاشا کو آئی ایس آئی کا سربراہ مقرر کیا تھا۔ اس وقت واضح تھا کہ وہ تین برس کی مدت پوری نہیں کرسکیں گے کیونکہ ان کے دو سال ملازمت میں رہ گئے تھے۔
لیکن ناقدین کے مطابق ملازمتوں میں توسیع اپنے وفادار اور حمایتی افسران کو دینے کی پرانی روایت ہے۔ جنرل پاشا بھی ایسے افسر ہیں جن پر خیال ہے کہ جنرل کیانی اندھا اعتماد کرسکتے ہیں۔ اس وقت جو طالبان اور القاعدہ کے خلاف کامیابیاں مل رہی ہیں وہ انہیں جاری رکھ سکتے ہیں لہذا ان کی موجودگی کو ضروری قرار دیا جا رہا ہے۔ پاکستان کی سکیورٹی پالیسی نے جو موڑ لیا ہے اس میں امریکی اس پر تنقید اور شک کم کرنے لگے ہیں۔ سکیورٹی اسٹیبلشمنٹ کی اب کوشش ہوگی کہ اسی تاثر کو مزید بہتر بنایا جاسکے۔
آئی ایس آئی کی اہمیت مستقبل قریب میں افغانستان کے طالبان سے مذاکرات کی تجویز کے تناظر میں بھی زیادہ دیکھی جا رہی ہے۔ اگرچہ پاکستان فوج اب شدت پسندوں کے کسی تعلق یا رابطے سے انکار کرتی رہی ہے لیکن اس کے باوجود امریکہ اور افغانستان آئی ایس آئی کے کردار سے انکار کو تیار نہیں۔ ان کا خیال ہے کہ یہ ادارہ ان اور طالبان کے درمیان پل کا کردار بخوبی ادا کرسکتا ہے۔
Azaz Syed [Dawn]’s Correspondent was attacked because of this story:
Convict in Musharraf attack case denied appeal By Azaz Syed and Matiullah Jan Sunday, 24 Jan, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/16-convict-in-musharraf-attack-case-denied-appeal-hs-06
House of DawnNews correspondent attacked by ISI sleuths
http://criticalppp.com/archives/4809
جنرل نالِج۔۔۔
اصناف: آس پاس, سیاست, پاکستان, پردیسی
حسن مجتییٰ | 2010-03-18 ،10:39
پتہ نہیں پاکستان مسئلہ ہے کہ حل جہاں منتخب حکومتیں تو اپنی معیاد شاذ و نادر پوری کر پاتی ہیں لیکن فوجوں کے سربراہ جنرل ریٹائرمنٹ کی مدت تک پہنچنے سے بھی پہلے توسیع پا لیتے ہیں۔
پاک فوج کے جرنیل بھی سدا سہاگن ہوتے ہیں۔ موجودہ منتخب جمہوری حکومت نے پاک فوج اور ائی ایس آئی کے ریٹائر ہوتے ہوتے سربراہان جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی اور جنرل شجاع پاشا کے عہدوں میں توسیع فرماکر خود کو کچھ دنوں کے لیے آکسیجن مہیا کردی۔
اب صدر زرداری اپنی خواب گاہوں کی کواڑوں کو مقفل کرلینے کی زحمت نہ کریں کہ اب قلم اور بندوق کی سازشیں ان کے لیے ذرا تھمنے لگی ہیں۔ اب وہاں کوئی نہیں آئے گا کہ عظیم جرنیل امریکہ پدھار کر آنے والے ہیں-
جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی اور جنرل شجاع پاشا کی امریکہ آمد کو پاکستانی میڈیا اور ‘اعلی مگر گمنام ذرائع’ رکھنے والے صحافی ایسے ڈھول تاشوں سے پیش کر رہے ہیں کہ جیسے نیپولین وزیرستان سے ‘وار آن ٹیرر’ جیت کر آمریکہ آرہے ہوں۔ یا جیسے کسی زمانے میں لیاقت علی خان اور صدر ایوب امریکہ آتے ہونگے۔
مانا کہ جنرل کیانی اور شجاع کوئی فلوریڈا میں نارنگیاں کھانے تو نہیں آرہے اور نہ ہی بِیچوں پر نہانے یا لاس ویگاس میں جوا کیھلنے بلکہ دہشت گردی کے خلاف جنگ کی نقشہ بازی کرنے۔ لیکن جو نقشہ بازی پاکچند صحافی کر رہے ہیں اس سے تو لگتا ہے جنرل شجاع اور جنرل کیانی کے اس دورے سے پاکستان کی قسمت بدل جائے گی۔ یعنی کہ دہشتگردی کے خلاف عالمی جنگ کی قمست کا تمام دار و مدار جنرل کیانی کے تمغوں سے بھرے کندھوں پر آن پڑا ہے۔
یہ بھی کہ صدر زرداری سے دفاعی امور پر بات چیت کے اختیار اب کیانی نے اپنے ہاتھ میں لے لیے ہیں۔ نیز امریکہ اور پاکستان کے تعلقات میں چار چاند لگ جائيں گے۔
دہشتگردی کے خلاف جنگ میں نہ جانے کتنے امریکی نیٹو اور اتحادی فوجوں کے جنرل آئے اور ریٹائر ہوکر چلے بھی گۓ ۔ اگر پاکستان کی دہشتگردی کے خلاف جنگ لڑنے کے لیے جرنیلوں کی توسیع ضروری ہوتی تو پھر بطور جنرل پرویز مشرف میں کیا خرابی تھی۔
بات یہ ہے کہ دس سال تک جرنیلوں کا قیدی رہنے والے آصف علی زرداری نے پاکستان کی سیاسی تاریخ سے یہ سیکھ لیا ہے کہ جج ہوں کہ جرنیل ان کے قلم کے لیے ایک سال کی توسیع کی مار ہیں۔
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/urdu/2010/03/post_604.html
True, Paki generals never retire, even when they retire!!!
Look at Hamid Gul, Aslam Baig and never ending list of incompetent idiots, who even when retire, they dont stop from imposing their ideas, which believe it or not , are totally different from what they were doing when they had power.
there are other type of generals, who take appointment as Ambassadors, head of govt agencies, form housing societies and remain serving the nations.
I must admit these generals are extremely lucky that they rule poor Pakistanis who dont judge them on their actions, we give respect to Ayub Khan ( despite he started and lost the war, engineered elections against Fatima Ali Jinnaha, made bundle of money for his Gandara business, changed the capital near his village) , no punishment for Gen Niazi, General Yahya, Tikkha or currently Gen Musharraf, whose misadventure took lives of thousands of poor soldiers.
Is there any way we can get rid of them?