Home  »  Original Articles   »   Arresting Taliban to serve America’s interests – Guest post by Peter Chamberlin

Arresting Taliban to serve America’s interests – Guest post by Peter Chamberlin

posted by Abdul Nishapuri | March 9, 2010 | In Original Articles

First published at: Therearenosunglasses’s Weblog

The multitude of theories on the reasons for the arrests are divided between cooperation and confrontation theories, either it is explained by mutual interests or by rivalries.  In my opinion, it is both.

Researchers and analysts are banging their heads against many walls, searching for meaning in reports of multiple arrests of Taliban, by the Pakistani government.  Speculation is running rampant, that Pakistan has finally “seen the light,” that it represents a “split” within the Taliban, or that Pakistan has arrested Taliban who have been negotiating with Brits or Americans.  In my opinion, the arrests began as a clean-up operation to remove links to the intelligence being revealed in British courts, but it turned into a tit-for-tat series of paybacks between the ISI and the CIA.

The true meaning of the arrests can be ascertained from the timing of the events.  It may have been primarily an American/Pakistani operation to isolate Taliban leaders who had either negotiated with the British, or had been held at Guantanamo.  British courts had taken up the case of Binyam Mohamed and American officials publicly stated that disclosing classified information about US abuse of this detainee would damage intelligence cooperation between the agencies of the two nations.

The first arrest, of Taliban number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was on, or about  Feb. 7.  Multiple news reports have tied Baradar to ongoing negotiations to identify and isolate “reconcilable” Taliban.  These attempts at negotiating have all come from the British or Afghan sides, with the US supposedly prepared to take advantage of any breakthroughs.

On February 10, 2010:

“A British court has ordered the government to disclose classified information about the treatment of a former Guantanamo Bay…It was released after judges at an appeals court on Wednesday rejected the UK government’s claim that disclosing the information would damage intelligence co-operation with US agencies.”

In the days that followed, the western media was abuzz with more reports that Pakistan had made multiple “arrests” of the Taliban’s leadership.  It is impossible to know how many of these names obtained from the Western media are correct, but some of them had also been tied to the British negotiations, while at least two of them were former inmates of Guantanamo.

Mullah Abdul Raouf. GUANTANAMO Taliban military chief for northern Afghanistan

Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir GUANTANAMO around 2006, then transferred to Afghanistan government custody in late 2007, eventually released around May 2008. American officials won’t say why he was let go and have not released a photograph of him.

Mullah Abdul Salam is unidentifiable, at this point, whether he is the governor of Kunduz, or the former Taliban who was involved with British diplomat Michael Semple and EU diplomat Mervyn Patterson, or still other candidates, such as former inmate of Guantanamo Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, or Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi.

Mullah Muhammad Hassan

Mullah Muhammad Younis.  who is also known as Akhunzada Popalzai

Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada (could be Akhunzada Popalzai)

Maulavi Abdul Kabir, aka Mullah Abdul Kahir Osmani

Mohtasim Agha Jan, son-in-law of Mullah Omer

Do the arrests mean that Pakistan has embraced the American mission in the war on terror?

The following timetable relates the arrests to the rest of the unfolding understory.

1/28-  London conference

2/2-4-  India/Iran development conference, topic opening Afghan route

2/8-  Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar

2/13-  Operation Moshtarak offensive begins

2/17-  Mullah Abdul Salam

2/18-  Car-bomb targeting Mangal Bagh mosque, blamed on Berelvi  “Ansar al-Islam”

2/18-  Mohammed Haqqani killed in Predator attack

2/20-  Two Sipah e-Sahaba militants killed Faisalbad

2/20-  Pak Army adds 26 posts to border, Balochistan

2/23-  Rigi arrested

2/23-  Pak announces new naval base near Gwadar

2/24-  Qari Zafar killed Predator

2/25-  India/Pakistan talks

2/26-  Kabul bomb targets Indian doctors

2/26-  Khalid Khwaja petitions Lahore High Court to block deportation of Taliban.

2/27-  Intra-Sunni battles Faisalbad  (revival of Sipah e-Sahaba attacks on Berelvi)

2/27-  Hafiz Saeed, “India will have to fight if it will not talk.”  Silence on Taliban arrests

If you look at the timetable to understand whether or Pakistan and the US are on the same page you see some clear evidence of a joint US/Pakistan mission to eliminate the Taliban leadership, but more than that, you see specific acts of resistance on Pakistan’s part.

There is one inescapable reality–the Pakistani Army will never truly turn on the Taliban, who represent their last line of defense, as well as their first option, in any contest with India.  The historical relationship between the military and the militants has been one where the government has used sectarian terror groups (and even created them) to keep the tribes, sects and political groups in line.  Keep these things in mind, as you consider the events.

In addition to the arrests, the timetable details American predator strikes which have eliminated some of the Army’s protected militants, in particular, Mohammed Haqqani and Qari Zafar.  In between those two American assassinations, you have the arrest of American asset against Iran,Abdolmalek Rigi, thanks to Pakistan’s ISI.  Between the Haqqani hit and the Rigi arrest, Pakistan set-up 26 border posts to block US hot pursuit into Balochistan.  Long dormant Sipah e-Sahaba started anti-Berelvi rioting in Faisalbad.  After the Rigi arrest, Pakistan announced plans for a new naval base near the Chinese-constructed port at Gawadar.

After the Predator killed Qari, the India/Pakistan talks started and quickly ended, followed by the bombing of the Indians living in Kabul.  This was followed by Khalid Khwaja (of Daniel Pearl fame) interceding at the Lahore High Court to block extradition of the Taliban.  But this does not leave us with a clear-cut case of Pakistan blocking American moves and supporting militants for political terrorism, but a record that speaks of both the United States and Pakistan together using militant Islamists and gangs for terrorism.

The Rigi case was a concrete example of the US supporting groups who are committing terror attacks, just like the case of Pakistan and the Taliban.  Pakistan handing him to Iran is a clear sign of resistance to American plans, but it should probably be understood as retribution for the killing of Mohammed Haqqani.  But in spite of all this, there have been new signs since all of this has transpired that points to a new direction for the CIA/ISI partnership that leads where all parties have always wanted to go—central Asia.

A new war drama has emerged in Baghlan province, the former domain of “shadow” governor,Mulla Mir Mohammad; there, the forces of ISI friend Gubuddin Hekmatyar (former CIA friend) have attacked the local Taliban who are hosting IMU terrorists (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).  This marks a new direction for a joint CIA/ISI mission.  Together, Pakistan and the US will back Heckmatyar as the northern front is expanded (with the “discovery” of many new Uzbek militants) and moves to secure the new supply line.

Today’s news reports that Hekmatyar’s forces have surrendered to the Karzai (Northern Alliance) government.  This opens the door to Pakistani-backed militants becoming part of the “reconciliation” program.  This will allow the US to buy its way out of Afghanistan in such a way as to set-up the movement of US forces northward toward the hydrocarbon deposits of Central Asia.

Until this new level of cooperation was brought together, Pakistan and the US have been on a collision course over disagreements on the mission of the terror war, which began in the confrontations between Bush and Musharraf over the war in Waziristan.  That period was marked by US and British efforts to penetrate the veil of secrecy that shrouded South Waziristan, as well as the North.  One of the most effective of these intrusions was by the British through their agent Michael Semple and his efforts to find “reconcilables” and convert them to an anti-Taliban mission.

The Semple mission through Mansoor Dadullah penetrated the S. Waziristan cloak of secrecy, where it uncovered another covert mission, a joint American/Israeli/Indian mission, known as the “Pakistani Taliban” (TTP), run by Mansoor’s big brother (Mullah Dadullah).  Upon this discovery, the British mission was exposed and shut down by the American government (SEE: Dissecting the Anti-Pakistan Psyop).

The TTP project continued to rain havoc upon Pakistan, forcing the Army to finally take action, even though the local tribes had opposed past military offensives.  The TTP would rain such hell down upon the heads of the innocent people of FATA and the NWFP that they would welcome the Army with open arms and even accept an American drone war in their midst.  Anything, as long as someone got rid of those pesky militants!

After the Obama Administration took over, CIA sources were tricked into targeting the head of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, despite countless attempts to avoid him in the past, because he had become such a thorn in Pakistan’s side.  His successor, Hakeemullah, was an even bigger pain, as he escalated the terror attacks upon both government and sectarian targets until he foolishly went too far, seeking revenge upon the CIA for Baitullah, leading to his own demise.

The killing of Hakeemullah’s mentor, Qari Zafar, and the subsequent elimination of the rest of the TTP leadership has eliminated the hierarchy that was carefully cultivated over many years by the consortium of spy agencies.   The same airborne strategy that has eliminated former American assets like the Mehsuds through a succession of decapitation strikes, was also responsible for elevating them into their leadership positions in the first place.

The tricks of the trade that have been utilized to develop and control agents of influence in S. Waziristan, like Baitullah and Tahir Yuldashev (and especially their former mentor, Guantanamo inmate Abdullah Mehsud) are from the CIA’s deepest bag of dirty tricks. From what we know today, these “high-value” militants were subjected to military mind-control science, as the agency and the military pulled-out all stops in breaking these guys at Guantanamo and Bagram.   Even more severe measures were used in Uzbekistan, where Yuldashev and others were persuaded to embrace our line of thinking.  In addition to the various modes of torture employed at Guantanamo, we can safely assume that darker methods like psychotropic drugs and electroshock were also used on these reconditioned “Islamist” leaders, when we have already used them on our own troops.

American attempts to block the British court ruling that would open the door to public discussion of the secret illegal methods used upon the inmates of Guantanamo is the reason for the breakdown of communications between CIA and MI6.  It would make perfect “Imperial” sense to have Pakistan round-up and hold all the Taliban leaders who possessed first-hand experiences of the Guantanamo brainwashing process or those who had been exposed to the British negotiations which uncovered the actions of some of the brainwashed leaders in S. Waziristan.

In S. Waziristan, around the town of Wana, the graduates of the various CIA/military torture/brainwashing programs convened to create both the TTP and Jundullah, Rigi’s group.  Abdullah Mehsud had come to Wana after leaving Gitmo, along with Tahir Yuldashev, forming the base of the “Pakistani Taliban.”  There they agitated and terrorized the tribal region to accept Wahabbi “Shariah.”   They were reinforced in 2007 by Mullah Dadullah Akhund, after he was released from his year studying at another American “Islamist” university, probably at Baghram.

Near Wana, the group hosted trainers from Lashkar e-taiba and Lashkar e-Jhangvi to turn-out the large number of TTP fighters who have plagued Pakistan’s Swat region.  To this deadly mix, a radical Wahabbi preacher named Haji Namdar was exported to Bara in Khyber, from Saudi Arabia, where he had been radicalizing for the previous six years.  Namdar was like all of the aforementioned Taliban leaders who had been taken earlier in the war and were in American hands in Guantanamo or Afghanistan for long periods of time, or they were indoctrinated in countries dominated by US forces, such as Saudi Arabia, in preparation for their return to Pakistan and the planned destabilization mission.

The same irregular warfare tactics that US forces and the CIA were employing in Pakistan were used in Afghanistan, as well.  The same pattern of aerial decapitation inspired leadership changes, involving former Guantanamo prisoners, was followed in Afghanistan.  Next in line to Mullah Omar, Mullah Akhtar Usmani, was killed by airstrike, after a phone call was intercepted by British drone.   He was replaced by Mullah Baradar, who allegedly may be replaced bypossible Guantanamo alumnus Mullah Zakir, although some reports have listed him among the recently captured.  Zakir’s second in command is another Guantanamo parolee, Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The more we learn about the alleged “differences” between the missions of the Pakistani and the US military, the more we learn that they may not be that far apart on many issues.  Most of the drama we have become accustomed to has been no more than political theater, designed to alter the opinions of the people of both America and Pakistan so that they would embrace the never-ending war of terror.

When you look closely at the conflict that has been generated in S. Waziristan and NWFP by the TTP terrorist strikes, it becomes apparent that that was all just more consensual drama, as well—all designed to deceive the people into allowing it to happen in Pakistan and allowing it to spread forth from there, like a plague upon all mankind.

[email protected]

Comments

comments

About The Author

Abdul Nishapuri

Latest Comments
  1. Akhtar

    Excellent post.

    Here is a related news item:

    A guide to recent militant arrests and deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan
    BY KATHERINE TIEDEMANN Monday, March 8, 2010

    Confused about the recent slew of arrests and/or deaths of al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Here’s a roundup of who, what, where, and when.

    Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al-Adam. Though initial media reports suggested al-Qaeda’s American spokesman “Azzam the American,” Adam Yahiye Gadahn, was arrested in Karachi several days ago, it now appears that Gadahn’s arrest was a case of mistaken identity: Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al-Adam, from Pennsylvania, is believed to be involved in al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, and his name and origin probably caused the confusion.

    Maulvi Faqir Muhammad. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander from Bajaur was reported killed by a Pakistani airstrike in Mohmand on Friday, but a Reuters reporter apparently identified his voice on a phone call in which Maulvi Faqir said he was fine and reports of his death were propaganda.

    Agha Jan Mohtasim. This Afghan Taliban commander, who Pakistan’s Daily Times writes is the son-in-law of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, was reportedly captured on March 3 in Karachi.

    Muhammad Tufail. A commander linked to attacks in Nowshera, Tufail was reportedly killed in a shootout with Pakistani security forces in FR Peshawar on March 2.

    Muhammad Iqbal. Killed in the same shootout as Muhammad Tufail was this TTP commander who supplied suicide bombing materials to militants in Islamabad and across Pakistan.

    Muhammad Alam Binouri. Also known as Maulana Khalil and Binouri Mullah, Binouri was one of the 21 most wanted Taliban commanders in the Swat Valley and was reportedly killed in a gunbattle with Pakistani security forces on March 1.

    Muhammad Qari Zafar. This Punjabi Taliban commander wanted in connection with the deadly 2006 bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi was killed by a drone strike in North Waziristan on February 24.

    Maulana Fazlullah’s nephew. Though his name hasn’t been reported, a nephew of Swat Valley Taliban chief Maulana Fazlullah was arrested in Nowshera in late February.

    Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf. Anand Gopal reported that these four members of the Afghan Taliban’s ruling Quetta shura were arrested in late February. Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir oversaw Afghan Taliban military operations; Mullah Hassan was a minister under the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan; Mullah Akhunzada is the former Taliban governor of Zabul; and Mullah Rauof ran operations in northeastern Afghanistan.

    Umar Abdul Rehman. This Taliban operative was captured in Karachi on February 23 with a stash of suicide vest-making materials.

    Maulavi Abdul Kabir. The Quetta shura member, commander of Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan, and former Taliban governor of Nangarhar province was arrested in mid-February in Nowshera.

    Muhammad Haqqani. A suspected U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan killed this son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the al-Qaeda linked Haqqani insurgent network. Muhammad Haqqani’s involvement in the insurgency is unclear; some reports claim he provided a hideout for Arab fighters in the region, but others write that his brother Siraj, who leads the Haqqani network’s operations, wanted him to pursue a “more normal” life.

    Sheikh Mansoor. An al-Qaeda leader of Egyptian origin, Sheikh Mansoor was reportedly killed by a drone strike in North Waziristan on February 17.

    Abdul Haq al-Turkistan. The leader of a Chinese separatist insurgent group called the Turkistani Islamic Party was killed by a U.S. drone in North Waziristan on February 15.

    Mullah Abdul Salam. The Taliban’s ‘shadow governor’ of Kunduz, Mullah Abdul Salam was reportedly nabbed in Faisalabad in early February. Taliban sources say Mullah Salam was en route to meet with Mullah Baradar at the time of his capture.

    Mullah Mir Mohammed. The Taliban ‘shadow governor’ of Baghlan was reportedly arrested along with Mullah Salam.

    Mullah Muhammad Younis. Not much known about this Taliban official, but he was reported captured by the BBC and the Christian Science Monitor in mid-February. Amir Mir of The News writes that he was an “explosives expert who served as police chief in Kabul” during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan.

    Mullah Baradar. The second-in-command of the Afghan Taliban was arrested in a joint CIA-ISI operation in Karachi in early February, and is currently being held by Pakistani security forces. It’s unlikely he will be turned over to Afghan or U.S. authorities, reports claim, and a court in Lahore has ruled against his extradition, though the CIA, FBI, and Kabul reportedly want him.

    Hakimullah Mehsud. The chief of the TTP is now believed to have died from injuries sustained from a U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan in mid-January. The TTP have denied this and recently released an undated video of Hakimullah, but Taliban sources say the TTP’s top shura has not convened in two months and no one has stepped up to take Hakimullah’s place.

    Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim. A suspected U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan in early January killed this commander, who was wanted in connection with the 1986 bombing of Pan American World Airways flight during a stop in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi.

    http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/08/a_guide_to_recent_militant_arrests_and_deaths_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan

    -
  2. Abdul Nishapuri

    Peter, Thanks for writing a most comprehensive and well balanced article on this extremely complex topic.

    I tend to agree with your concluding paragraph that: “When you look closely at the conflict that has been generated in S. Waziristan and NWFP by the TTP terrorist strikes, it becomes apparent that that was all just more consensual drama, as well—all designed to deceive the people into allowing it to happen in Pakistan and allowing it to spread forth from there, like a plague upon all mankind.”

    However, I think the cost of this consensual drama is extremely high for people of this region. I also think that not all players of this drama might be very strictly following the script that they were original assigned. That’s why we at times witness some sophisticated attacks on certain high profile targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

    -
  3. Abdul Nishapuri

    Also, we may need to consider China’s interests in this war theatre, as has been reported by Amir Mir in a recent analysis:

    Death of Chinese rebel a good omen for Pakistan
    Wednesday, March 03, 2010
    By By Amir Mir

    LAHORE: The recent killing of Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the chief of the Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP), a Chinese Muslim separatist movement, in a US drone attack in the North Waziristan Agency has come at a critical juncture when Islamabad was under rising pressure from Beijing to allow it to set up military bases in Pakistan to counter the Chinese rebels operating from its soil.

    A TIP spokesman has already confirmed the Chinese separatist commander was among the three militants killed in an American drone strike in Tappi village of Miramshah in North Waziristan on February 15 while they were travelling in a vehicle. Abdul Haq al-Turkistani was closely linked to al-Qaeda and happens to be the second successive chief of the Turkistani Islamic Party to have been killed in the tribal areas. Abdul Haq, also known as Maimaitiming Maimaiti, became the TIP chief after the killing of Hassan Mahsum, the group’s previous head, by the Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. His importance can be gauged from the fact that the US Treasury Department had designated him a global terrorist in April 2009, stating he had already been appointed a member of al-Qaeda’s Majlis-e-Shura or executive council, way back in 2005. Soon afterwards, the United Nations, too, had designated him a terrorist leader.

    According to well-placed diplomatic circles in Islamabad, the growing strength of the Pakistan-based Chinese separatist movement under the command of Haq was a matter of serious concern for Beijing, which had even asked Islamabad to allow its military presence either in the NWFP or in Fata, as is the case with the US, so that it could effectively counter the Chinese separatists there. They added the killing of Abdul Haq had come as a good omen for Pakistan as it would ease off the Chinese pressure to establish military bases in Pakistan. Yet diplomatic circles said the Chinese wish to have military presence in Pakistan should not be painted as an attempt to set up military bases there. They added China does not have any military bases outside its land unlike the United States and its prime concern was the spread of violence from the Pakistani tribal belt to the trouble-stricken Chinese region of Xingjian, the main Muslim majority province.

    The Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP), which is also called East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), is a Uyghur militant group that advocates creation of an independent Islamic state of East Turkistan, in the Muslim-dominated Xingjian region of China. East Turkistan had maintained a measure of independence until early 1950s, when Mao’s victorious rebel armies turned to the peripheries and began securing Chinese borders, capturing Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and East Turkistan. The native Uyghurs resisted the Chinese occupation until 1960s, but failed to win support from neighbouring Muslim states due to their fractured tribal nature. Since the mid-1980s, however, an active pan-Islamic movement has been trying to cement the opposing groups together against the Chinese occupation of their homeland, pressing for an independent East Turkistan state. Yet Beijing, which views Xingjian as an invaluable asset due to its crucial strategic location near Central Asia and its large oil and gas reserves, is using all possible methods to quell the separatist movement.

    Beijing blames Uyghur separatists for carrying out sporadic bombings and shootouts in the past, causing an atmosphere of insecurity and fear in China. Abdul Haq appeared in a video only last year, calling for Chinese people to be attacked at home and abroad. “Their men should be killed and captured to seek the release of our brothers who are jailed in Eastern Turkistan,” said Haq, who was shown somewhere in tribal areas while carrying an assault rifle. Chinese President Hu Jintao subsequently asked his Pakistani counterpart Asif Zardari during a meeting in Beijing to take stern action against the Chinese militants hiding in the Pakistani tribal areas and carrying out terrorist activities in China, adding they might threaten the security of over 5,000 Chinese nationals working on numerous development projects in Pakistan.

    In June 2009, Islamabad arrested and extradited 10 Chinese militants to Beijing wanted on terrorism charges. But the death of Haq has come as a significant success in the ongoing Chinese campaign against the separatists. He used to run a training camp for his recruits in Tora Bora in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province prior to the US invasion in October 2001.

    However, he had relocated his camps to Pakistan’s lawless Waziristan region. Haq was considered influential enough in al-Qaedaís leadership circles that he was dispatched to mediate between rival Taliban groups after the death of Commander Baitullah Mehsud. He was spotted in the tribal areas in June 2009, attending an important meeting with Baitullah Mehsud, who was finally killed in an American drone attack in August 2009.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=226883

    -
  4. Akhtar

    Two more reports by Amir Mir which demonstrate the non-linear nature of the AfPak war theatre.

    US drones target Haqqani network after Pakistan’s refusal

    Saturday, February 20, 2010
    By Amir Mir

    LAHORE: The February 18 killing of veteran Afghan Mujahideen leader Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani’s younger son in a US drone attack in North Waziristan has come as a major success for the Afghanistan-based American forces, which have conducted a record number of 20 drone strikes in the Waziristan region in 2010.

    The ongoing wave of drone attacks was largely motivated by Pakistan’s refusal to launch a major military operation against the al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani militant network in North Waziristan while its forces are already conducting a military offensive against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan network in South Waziristan.

    The American and Pakistani authorities have already confirmed that Mohammed Haqqani, the younger son of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and three others were killed when missiles struck a house on Thursday night in Dande Darpa Khel area of North Waziristan. However, it was not immediately known if Sirajuddin Haqqani, the elder son of Jalaluddin who currently leads the Haqqani network, was present at the house at the time it was struck, and whether he was hit by the drone attack or not.

    The Thursday’s drone attack at the heart of the Haqqani network came close on the heels of a series of arrests of some senior Afghan Taliban leaders, including Mullah Mohammad Omar’s deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, which is being described as the most severe blow to the extremist militia ,which is pitched against the US-led allied forces in Afghanistan since 2001.

    Informed circles say the killing of Mohammed Haqqani, also a key figure in the Haqqani network, in the drone attack that was actually directed against his father and brother, would prove the American claims regarding the presence of the al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani network in the Pakistani tribal areas.

    Haqqani network is a separate militant group but still pledges allegiance to Mullah Omar, the fugitive Ameer of the Afghan Taliban and has a history of links to the Pakistani establishment since the days of Afghan Jihad.

    The Americans have targeted the Haqqani network in Waziristan extensively since the dawn of 2010, especially since a suicide bomber killed seven senior CIA officers in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 31, 2009. But the February 18 drone attack was the first one to have successfully targeted one of Jalaluddin’s sons.

    While there are those in the Pakistani establishment who say the US drones are lately hitting their targets fruitfully due to Pakistani intelligence cooperation, diplomatic circles in Islamabad say Washington and Islamabad were not on the same page on the issue of targeting the Haqqani network after which the Obama administration had launched the ongoing wave of drone attacks targeting North Waziristan.

    These circles said that while the Americans treat Sirajuddin Haqqani as an enemy, there are powerful circles in the Pakistani establishment, which still consider him as a strategic asset and a possible ally in Afghanistan after the likely exit of the Americans.

    Pakistan has recently been under tremendous US pressure to act against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. On January 21, 2010, American Defence Secretary Robert Gates had stated in Islamabad that he would explore a possible Pakistani plan to move against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan later this year.

    Gates said he would ask the Pakistani leaders about plans to broaden their campaign to North Waziristan, a bastion of al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network, known for attacking US and Nato troops fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. But the very next day, the official spokesman of the Pakistan Army Maj Gen Athar Abbas stated that Pakistan’s “over-stretched” armed forces had no plans for undertaking any fresh anti-militant operations in 2010. This added a surprising new element to the situation and caused tension in Islamabad’s uneasy relations with Washington.

    In fact, his statement on the day Robert Gates arrived in Pakistan was seen as a snub to the Obama administration, which is pushing Islamabad to take action against all the militants, particularly the Afghan Taliban and their Haqqani network, and everywhere in the tribal borderlands. Athar Abbas argued that the Pakistan Army was not in a position to open new fronts as it was still busy operating in South Waziristan and in Swat and the rest of the Malakand region.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=225195

    —————————-

    Pakistan wipes out half of Quetta Shura

    Monday, March 01, 2010

    By Amir Mir

    LAHORE: In a major policy shift, the powerful Pakistani establishment seems to have decided to abandon the former Taliban rulers of Afghanistan by agreeing to launch a massive crackdown against their command-and-control structure, which has already led to the arrest of nine of the 18 key members of the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura from different parts of Pakistan, and that too within a short span of two months.

    According to well-informed diplomatic circles in Islamabad, the decision-makers in the powerful Pakistani establishment seem to have concluded in view of the ever-growing nexus between the Pakistani and the Afghan Taliban that they are now one and the same and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) could no more be treated as two separate Jihadi entities. Therefore, the establishment is believed to have revised its previous strategic assessment of the two Taliban groups, which have a common mentor (Mullah Mohammad Omar) and decided to proceed against the Afghan Taliban as well, considering them a greater threat for Pakistan now than in the past.

    Diplomatic circles pointed out that the arrest of the Afghan Taliban leaders have come at a crucial juncture when the US-led allied forces are busy in launching a massive military offensive against the Afghan Taliban forces in the Marjah town of Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province, after President Obama’s new-year public declaration to kill or capture the top fugitive leaders of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda, both inAfghanistan and Pakistan. Since the beginning of February 2010, the Pakistan authorities have captured seven senior members of the Taliban Shura, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy of Mullah Omar, and four Taliban shadow governors of Afghan provinces. These high-profile arrests, combined with the ongoing US-led military offensive in Helmand and the unending spate of drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas, have adversely dented the command and control structure of the Taliban, thereby affecting its military might in Afghanistan.

    However, well informed diplomatic circles in Islamabad maintain that American pressure alone could not have made Pakistan to act against the Taliban network. They claim the influence of the Saudi royal family, coupled with the US pressure, eventually compelled the Pakistani intelligence establishment to finally abandon the Afghan Taliban, who were earlier being protected as a strategic asset to be used in Pakistan’s favour after the exit of the allied forces from Afghanistan. These circles further claim that the Pakistan intelligence establishment was in fact persuaded to cooperate with the Americans by Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, the younger half-brother of King Abdullah. Being the chief of General Intelligence Presidency, which is the Saudi Arabian intelligence service, Muqrin reportedly conducted shuttle diplomacy between the key civil and military leadership of the two important Muslim countries, finally making Pakistan to proceed against the leadership of the Afghan Taliban.

    Subsequently, in a swoop carried out against the well-entrenched network of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani authorities first arrested Mullah Mir Muhammad, the shadow governor of Baghlan province, who was detained from Faisalabad on January 26, 2010. The next arrest was that of Mullah Abdul Salam, the shadow governor of Kunduz province, who was nabbed a few days later. The third arrest was that of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was nabbed on February 11, 2010 from the premises of a Sunni-Deobandi-run religious seminary in Karachi. The seminary, Khudamul Quran, is located 10 to 25 kms from the Toll Plaza on the Super Highway in the jurisdiction of the Lonikot police station in Hyderabad district.

    The significance of Mullah Baradar’s arrest can well be gauged from the fact that he is credited by the Americans for rebuilding the Afghan Taliban into an effective fighting force besides coordinating its military operations against the US-led allied forces in Afghanistan. There are reports that Baradar represented Mullah Omar in all the peace talks with the United States, which were in fact mediated by Saudi Arabia, in the past two years. In a related development, the US State Department spokesman PJ Crowley stated on February 27: “Pakistan’s decisive action against the Afghan Taliban is already showing results and such measures would encourage the extremist militia to seek reconciliation. This is expressly the kind of decisive action that Washington has sought in its strategy from the outset, and that has been the basis upon which the United States has worked with Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

    Almost a week after Mullah Baradar’s arrest, the Pakistani authorities arrested Maulvi Abdul Kabir, the shadow governor of Nangarhar province on February 20 in Nowshehra. Three other arrested members of Quetta Shura include Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, who used to co-supervise the military affairs of the militia, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, a former foreign minister in the Taliban regime, Mullah Abdul Rauf, the former chief operational commander of the Taliban in northeastern Afghanistan, Mullah Ahmad Jan Akhundzada, the former governor of Zabul province and Mullah Muhammad Younis, an explosives expert who had served as a police chief in Kabul during the Taliban rule. However, the Pakistani authorities have so far only confirmed the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, since he was nabbed during a joint operation carried out by the ISI and the CIA.

    The remaining nine members of the Quetta Shura who are still at large are believed to be Mullah Hassan Rehmani, the former governor of Kandahar province in Taliban regime; Hafiz Abdul Majeed, the former chief of the Afghan Intelligence and the surge commander of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan; Amir Khan Muttaqi, a former minister in Taliban regime; Agha Jan Mutasim, the Taliban’s head of political affairs; Mullah Abdul Jalil, the head of the Taliban’s shadowy interior ministry, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and the commander of the Haqqani militant network; Mullah Abdul Latif Mansoor, the commander of the Mansoor network in Paktika and Khost; Mullah Abdur Razaq Akhundzada, the former corps commander for northern Afghanistan; and Abdullah Mutmain, a former minister during the Taliban regime who currently looks after the financial affairs of the extremist militia.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=27544

    -
  5. Akhtar

    Bridging the gap
    Dawn Editorial
    Wednesday, 10 Mar, 2010

    Part of the problem between the US and Pakistan is undeniably a difference of strategic interests.

    Much continues to divide the American administration and the Pakistan Army when it comes to war against militancy in the region.

    But a relentless focus on the negatives can often miss signs of convergences when and where they occur. In the last week, Gen Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, has given interviews to PBS and CNN in which he has taken a measured and thoughtful line on Pakistan: the general appreciated the turnaround in Swat/Malakand division, acknowledged the sacrifices of military men and civilians, outlined some actions the security forces have already taken in North Waziristan, accepted the wrongs committed by the US in the region in the past and showed some sympathy for the army’s desire of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan.

    And yet Gen Petraeus did not end up sounding like he was simply pandering to a remote Pakistani audience. When asked by Charlie Rose of PBS, “So the bottom line is you are satisfied with the Pakistani effort and the Pakistani cooperation and the Pakistani effort to wipe out the Taliban in Pakistan?” the general demurred. “Well, I wouldn’t allow you to put words in my mouth. What I would say is that Pakistan has made significant progress in its fight against extremists threatening its existence.”

    Pakistan and the US could do with more such frankness in the months ahead. Part of the problem between the US and Pakistan is undeniably a difference of strategic interests — another fact that Gen Petraeus acknowledged in his PBS interview. But part of the problem seems to be that for many years the US and Pakistan were unwilling to be honest with one another.

    For a long time, the American side relentlessly bashed Pakistan for its support for the Afghan Taliban and tolerance of militancy generally. Yet the fact of the matter is that had the US been in Pakistan’s shoes it might have made the same choices: regard the military threat posed by India as pre-eminent and be wary of over-stretch and blowback inside the country. This is not to imply that the Pakistan Army has done absolutely everything it could and should have in the war against militancy — the army is at the very least guilty of responding tardily to the internal threat — but to point out that American policy was not grounded in the realism needed. On its part, the Pakistan Army has held its cards unnecessarily close. It should have spelled out what it could or could not do in various circumstances and presented the outside world with clearer alternatives. Guessing games and feints have helped neither the Americans nor the Pakistanis.

    http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/14-bridging-the-gap-030-zj-08

    Lawmakers’ tiff reveals complex US-Pakistan ties
    Wednesday, 10 Mar, 2010

    Experts point out that any newfound cooperation from Pakistan is not uniform across the government and its institutions, citing tensions between the military and President Asif Ali Zardari, the weak civilian president.

    WASHINGTON: A weekend tiff involving lawmakers from Pakistan’s tribal areas and airport security personnel in the United States underscores how tough it is to reverse years of US-Pakistani mistrust.

    The six lawmakers were en route from Washington to New Orleans on Saturday when two were tagged for further screening at the capital’s airport — scrutiny they found insulting. They scrapped their two-week US trip, which was sponsored by the State Department, and went home midway through.

    The airport incident was splashed across Pakistani media on their return, with the parliamentarians claiming they were told they would not be subject to full-body electronic scans.

    Washington says those assurances were not given.

    “This situation could have been avoided,” said an official at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington.

    State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said he regretted how the procedures were perceived by the lawmakers. A US airport security official said the measures were “an essential part” of the multilayered approach to keep the public safe.

    Either way, the outcome was embarrassing for the Obama administration and feeds into a pattern of Pakistani hostility and suspicions over US intentions in the region.

    “We are genuinely trying to improve relations but it doesn’t mean there will not be misunderstandings along the way,” said Larry Schwartz, a senior spokesman for the US Embassy in Islamabad, who accompanied the parliamentarians.

    While in Washington, the group met State Department officials, including the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, as well as members of Congress.

    The program is one of many by the United States to boost people-to-people ties but the discordant ending to the visit underlines how hard it is to reach that goal.

    “It is impossible to characterise the US-Pakistan relationship both historically and today in anything but the most complex and contradictory terms,” said Alexander Thier from the US Institute of Peace.

    “Behaviour on both sides is duplicitous. The Pakistanis do not feel they are equal or respected partners by the United States. They feel mistreated.”

    Security cooperation

    The trust deficit, said former US ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin, is one of the chief obstacles to improvements in the relationship.

    “The majority of Pakistanis distrust the United States because they believe we favour military dictators over civilian leaders and we are quick to abandon economic aid once we have achieved our security goals,” she said.

    There have been signs recently of better understanding, with Washington praising Pakistan after the arrest in Karachi of a top Afghan Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

    But the high-level arrest raised questions over whether the detention had more to do with Pakistan securing its own interests in the region than helping Washington as it fights militants in neighbouring Afghanistan.

    Why Pakistan chose to arrest Baradar at this time and the circumstances of the detention are also unclear, with a variety of explanations from apparent promises by Washington to put more pressure on India to a role for Islamabad in reconciliation talks with the Taliban.

    Experts point out that any newfound cooperation from Pakistan is not uniform across the government and its institutions, citing tensions between the military and President Asif Ali Zardari, the weak civilian president.

    Moreover, any shift in government and military ties has not yet translated into a boost in public sentiment, with deep suspicion over US-funded projects after Congress passed $1.5 billion a year in new civilian aid over the next five years.

    “I don’t think the Obama administration has found the key yet towards more favourably influencing public opinion,” said James Dobbins, an expert on the region with Rand Corporation.

    What Pakistan’s government says in public is often not reflected in private conversations with US officials.

    For example, Pakistan’s government does not broadcast support for US pilotless drone attacks against militants because of public anger over those strikes but US officials say it has endorsed them privately.

    http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/04-pak-us-ties-qs-04

    -
  7. Sadia Hussain

    The crack-down on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership is the fall out of London conference to apprehend the non-compatible elements of Taliban. While there should be no relaxation for terrorists who vow to harm our homeland. There are many who were either coerced to join this war or were influenced by the propaganda; such elements once they are freed can relapse to militancy so it is imperative that corrective measures are taken to rehabilitate them.
    Our jails are the hub of crime-breeding and training, they do not give convicts a chance to repent but they fall into the vicious cycle of crime. Such elements need to be given a chance to become productive citizens of Pakistan

    -
  8. Yasir Qadeer

    I wonder why the debate only focuses on Pakistan finally doing what US wants it to do. Even if USA wants Pakistan to arrest terrorists, I am sure 99% of the Pakistani people want it to do the same. We cannot allow these slaughterers to roam around freely.

    -
  9. Akhtar

    Arresting the Taliban —Zafar Hilaly

    The Taliban phenomenon will not end by desultory arrests of a few leaders. Until Afghanistan has a much more ethnically representative government, the Americans depart and Pakistan’s strategic concerns are addressed, the struggle for primacy in Afghanistan will continue

    By the looks of it, if we were to tip Pakistan on its side, the entire Taliban/al Qaeda command centre would land in Karachi. First, Mullah Baradar, then Motasim Agha Jan, the former Taliban prime minister at Kabul, and now Adam Yahiye Gadahn, the al Qaeda spokesman, have all been captured from Karachi.

    Assuming that the al Qaeda spokesman has to be around his leader, then Osama bin Laden is likely to be in the environs of Karachi, perhaps tilling the palm orchards in Malir, where his height should prove useful as a coconut picker.

    As for Mullah Omar, a friend swears that he saw the Commander of the Faithful, as befits his status, in the posh Defence Society. And, indeed, several cockeyed and furtive individuals wrapped in cloaks who answer to Omar’s description can be spotted taking walks around sunset. Clearly, if it is strategic depth that the Taliban and al Qaeda seek from Pakistan, they have it in spades.

    Judging by these arrests, which include that of Mohtasim Aga Jan, Mullah Omar’s son-in-law, it would appear that Rawalpindi is furiously distancing itself from the Afghan Taliban. Normally, this would have been a cause for rejoicing. The more the Taliban are weakened, the quicker Afghanistan and the northeastern regions of Pakistan will return to normalcy. But that is mere wishful thinking. Baradar, for instance, had reportedly been discarded by the Taliban leadership and was more of a nuisance than an asset. And it is just possible that our cities may have been chosen as the new battleground, which is why the Taliban high command is in Quetta, Faisalabad and Karachi.

    The Taliban phenomenon will not end by desultory arrests of a few leaders. Until Afghanistan has a much more ethnically representative government, the Americans depart and Pakistan’s strategic concerns are addressed, the struggle for primacy in Afghanistan will continue.

    The Taliban cannot be defeated militarily for the simple reason that they do not offer battle, get defeated and surrender. Instead, they dissolve, regroup and attack whenever an opportunity arises and the odds are in their favour. They may not win, but they do not lose either. Eventually, therefore, they will have to be engaged, accommodated and politically appeased in some way unless Afghanistan is to remain eternally a battleground for all and sundry.

    Hence, while their arrest conveys a clear message to the Afghan Taliban that Pakistan will not be trifled with, and that the Taliban had better get down to the serious business of negotiating with Kabul or be prepared to take us on, paradoxically, each arrest reduces our leverage with the Taliban. And a point may well be reached when we are viewed by the Taliban and al Qaeda as no better than the Americans with all the consequences for our security and negotiating strategy that such a perception would entail.

    Nevertheless, although we have no burning desire that the Taliban serve in a Karzai-led administration, we do care that a peaceful changeover takes place following the US departure. And, on no account, do we want to see Afghanistan return to the fratricidal mayhem that caused the refugee influx in 1979, which emasculated the local economy and changed the socio-economic complexion of the NWFP.

    We can only hope, therefore, that there is a strategy behind the recent arrests, and that we are not doing what we are simply to please the US or in return for weaponry and other assistance that is on offer. And that this strategy is not merely part and parcel of a joint US-led effort to militarily defeat the Afghan Taliban, but part of a well-thought out strategy for achieving our goal in a post-US Afghanistan.

    This goal — of an Afghanistan that maintains a benign posture towards Pakistan — would fulfil two indispensable requirements: first, ensure that our border will remain peaceful; and second, that India will not be permitted, in connivance with the regime in Kabul, to threaten Pakistan’s security by engaging in a policy of encirclement or use the Afghan soil to destabilise Balochistan. Of course, if it were also to result in the recognition by Kabul of the present borders between the two countries, so much the better. However, that would be icing on the cake, because regardless of whether Kabul obliges or not, only a strong Pakistan can ensure respect for its borders.

    Ironically, many of the dangers that we face in Afghanistan today are the creation of our American ally. It was the vacuous Bush who, in his desire to set up India as a counterweight to China, inveigled India into Afghanistan. Karzai, of course, welcomed the move. Using India to leverage its position with Pakistan is a ploy that nearly all Afghan rulers have employed. And Karzai, for all his glib talk, was no exception.

    India’s ambition to become a player in Afghanistan and Central Asia suited Bush. He believed that the more countries he roped in to help, the better. But the mistake was to ignore the impact that India’s malignant intent towards Pakistan would have on Islamabad, which is an infinitely more important player than India when it comes to fighting, or fashioning peace in Afghanistan.

    This belated realisation dawned on the Americans only after Bush left office and a vastly more cerebral team, or at least one that was not brain dead, took over the show in Washington. The most dramatic indication that reality has ‘checked in’ was the US concurrence, at Pakistan’s insistence, that India be kept away from the Istanbul and London parleys on Afghanistan, a condition that remains a sine qua non for Pakistan’s cooperation in the war in Afghanistan.

    By backpedalling on the Indian role, Washington has reaped the reward in greater cooperation as seen by the arrests in Karachi, the near perfect targeting by drones and the ongoing ground operations on our side of the Af-Pak border. More importantly, it has made our military’s job of selling the war to the populace considerably easier. If Obama can resist being ‘loved’ by India, as Bush could not, he will be able to count on Pakistan. On the other hand, if he cannot then, simply put, he will lose in Afghanistan.

    The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at [email protected]

    http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=20103\12\story_12-3-2010_pg3_2

    -
  10. Akhtar

    Karzai ‘very angry’ at Mullah Baradar’s arrest: aide

    KABUL: The Afghan government was holding secret talks with the Taliban No 2 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – when he was captured in Pakistan, and the arrest has infuriated President Hamid Karzai, according to one of Karzai’s advisers. Karzai “was very angry” when he heard that the Pakistanis had picked up Baradar with help from the US intelligence, the adviser said. Besides the ongoing talks, he said Baradar had “given a green light” to participating in a three-day peace jirga that Karzai is hosting next month. Other Afghan officials, including the Helmand governor’s security adviser, also confirmed talks between Baradar and the Afghan government. ap

    http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=20103\17\story_17-3-2010_pg7_3

    -
  16. luggage celine

    Nem todos conhecem ESSA fabricante alem DE Motocicletas. Localizada em uma pequena aldeia perto da cidade m茅di茅vale de Rottweil, ao sul da Alemanha, un Hollister Motos soi orgulha DE fazer motos nicas Clientes para nicos. Atores J entregaram motos de Par谩 de Hollywood e 脿 VEZENOBRES, C么me o Sheike Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Pr铆ncipe herdeiro font Bahre茂n. Suas Motocicletas pas tm RP脡O definido, mas Podem chegar, dependendo dos anseios faire cliente, a mais de 200 euros mil. Nossa escolhida par essa Seleta lista une Hollister Excite, Qu茅 foi o modelo escolhido C么me o MAIS bonito do mundo pelo pblico presente ao Daytona Bike Week (EUA) em 2003. Recentemente, em 2010, Hollister lanou o modelo Viper, sua ltima criao.

    -
  18. Ray Ban RB3025 Aviator lunette Discount R06

    Available in pewter or gold metallic leather, these stunning dress shoes feature 3/4″ heels, flat vamp bows, and rhinestone encrusted embellishments that are so shimmery, they could nearly double as Christmas tree ornaments but of course, that’s not nearly as fun as having them on a pair of shoes.

    -