Govt offers Kayani two-year extension By Absar Alam Sunday, February 14, 2010
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=27249

ISLAMABAD: The government has asked General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to accept an extension in his tenure as Chief of Army Staff for another two years. The verbal offer was made to sound out General Kayani whether he would agree to or turn it down. The move has been made to ensure continuity in Pakistan’s policy on the war on terror and it also has a nod from Washington as the Army has achieved remarkable successes in the war on terror under General Kayani’s command. General Kayani has not yet given his consent and is considering this offer, it was learnt. The offer of extension has come at a time when battle lines for a second round have been drawn between the government and the judiciary. It was learnt that the Army has communicated its decision to all stakeholders that it would prefer not to be seen taking sides.

According to the sources, the extension in service cases of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Chief of General Staff Lt-Gen Muhammad Mustafa Khan, and DG ISI Lt-Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha are ready to be sent to the prime minister and the president for approval. The ministry formed the recommendations on the basis of a consensus that emerged within Pakistan and outside after military’s successes in Swat, South Waziristan and other Fata areas. Although, the DG ISI has already given his consent to accept the extension, the cases of General Kayani and Lt-Gen Mustafa are still pending. Knowledgeable sources claim that General Mustafa, who retires in October this year, will accept the extension if only General Kayani decided to stay. Washington, which has already given an extension to its Centcom Chief General David Petraeus, has supported this move by Islamabad as it believes that such an extension would ensure continuity in Pakistan’s policy towards the war on terror. The decision is linked to the resolution of the ongoing confrontation between the judiciary and the government and the constitutional package that would ensure the supremacy of parliament vis-i-vis the president. The problem with Pindi establishment is that Washington is not comfortable with the perception of Zardari government’s governance style which is being equated with the corrupt Karzai administration in Kabul. “The US is not comfortable working with two corrupt administrations in two neighbouring countries which are at war with terrorists,” the sources said. The sources claimed that the establishment had no axe to grind and was making sincere but quiet efforts to play the role of a firefighter to end the confrontation between the executive and the judiciary.

Extensions do not need govt’s approval: Army ISPR clarifies only promotions require ratification By Ahmad Noorani Sunday, February 21, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=27383

ISLAMABAD: As promotions of senior officials in the Army are becoming the centre of focus in the national politics, the Pakistan Army has officially clarified that extension in services of lieutenant generals is purely the prerogative of the Army chief and does not need the federal government’s approval. Director-General Inter Services Public Relation (ISPR) Maj-Gen Athar Abbas told The News that the COAS can extend the service of any serving lieutenant-general without any ratification from the federal government. “The cases of promotion are sent to the federal government for approval, but, according to rules, there is no need to get approval in case of extension in service of a lieutenant-general,” the Army spokesman said.

This issue is being considered very important because the extension in service of any of the lieutenant generals retiring this year would have significant impact on the present seniority list.
Lt-Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Lt-Gen Tanvir Tahir, Lt-Gen Mohammad Ashraf Saleem and Lt-Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha are retiring in March this year; Lt-Gen Ijaz Ahmad Baksh and Lt-Gen Nadeem Ahmed in May; and Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, Lt-Gen Shahid Iqbal, Lt-Gen Zahid Hussain and Lt-Gen Mohammad Asghar are retiring in October this year.

The ISPR chief’s statement has also raised question marks on some news reports that a summary for the extension in services of some top Army generals is being or has been sent to the Prime Minister Secretariat through the Ministry of Defence. It has also been reported that Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, Corps Commander Peshawar, was given extension last year by the COAS without any approval from the federal government. The second most important issue is the appointment of CJCSC which would definitely have an impact on the appointment of COAS. This appointment will be made six weeks prior to the appointment of the Army chief (if the PPP government does not extend the service of General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who is retiring on November 28, 2010). The incumbent CJCSC General, Tariq Majeed, will retire on October 8, 2010. Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz told The News that after creation of this office some thirty years back, this position was given to the services chiefs in rotation. However, during the tenures of Gen Zia and Gen Musharraf this criteria was not followed and this office remained with the Pakistan Army.

Lt-General Hamid Nawaz was of the view that this time the position should be offered to some top official of the Pak Navy or the PAF keeping in view the tradition of democratic governments in the past. This issue is being considered very important as this position could be used to manipulate the appointment of the COAS. If a junior officer is pushed up, others may be forced to retire, thus creating space for the desired officer, many analysts think. According to Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid, a major-general is retired on reaching the age of 57 while a lieutenant general is retired either on reaching the age of 58 or completing the four-year tenure, whichever comes first. He explained that if a major-general is promoted as lieutenant general at the age of 56 he will be retired after two years on becoming 58 and if he was promoted as lieutenant general at the age 52 he will stand retired after four years at the age of 56. Hamid said that the COAS is always made form the armoured, artillery or infantry corps of the Pakistan Army and lieutenant-generals from the engineering or services corps are not considered.

Following this principle and considering all lieutenant-generals who will retire this year, the seniority list will be as follows on November 28, 2010 (the date Gen Kayani will retire):

1- Lt-Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne (retiring on March 8, 2011)

2- Lt-Gen Muhammad Yousaf (retiring on March 8, 2011)

3- Lt-Gen Syed Absar Hussain (retiring on March 8, 2011—never commanded any core)

4- Lt-Gen Javed Zia (retiring on Sep 21, 2011—never commanded any core)

5- Lt-Gen Shujaat Zamir Dar (retiring on Sep 21, 2011—never commanded any core)

6- Lt-Gen Mohsin Kamal (retiring on Sep 21, 2011óhe has opted for a office job because of health issues)

7- Lt-Gen Jamil Haider (retiring on Sep 21, 2011 ñnever commanded any core)

8- Lt-Gen Nadeem Taj (retiring on Sep 21, 2011)

In case ISI chief General Pasha is given extension by the COAS, he will be on the 12th position and Chief of General Staff Lt-Gen Mustafa Khan will be on number 13 on the seniority list.
According to Gen Hamid, for being a suitable candidate to become COAS, command of a corps is almost a mandatory condition. Some experts say that the present seniority list is also the result of tactical and strategically planned promotions and appointments by ex-Army chief and military dictator General Pervez Musharraf. These experts said that during Kayani’s tenure as COAS, appointments and promotions were made on merit. At the same time, they fear that any mistake by the political rulers of the country may lead to handing over the command of the Pakistan Army to someone very close to Musharraf. These experts also say that while making recommendations for the next COAS, the issue of illegal allotment of agricultural farmhouse adjacent to that of former prime minister Shaukat Aziz at Chak Shahzad, could also be considered by the relevant influential circles.

These experts say that in fact the equally important appointment will be that of CJCSC. If he is taken from the Pakistan Air Force or the Pakistan Navy as per the democratic tradition, issues could be resolved amicably. Otherwise, if some junior-lieutenant general is promoted as general to make him the CJCSC, those senior to him will have to resign keeping in view the Army norms and that could possibly open a Pandora’s box which will pave the way for political appointments. General Aslam Baig was of the view that the outgoing COAS sends a list of five senior lieutenant-generals to the federal government four months prior to his retirement, and the government can appoint anyone from this list keeping in view the criteria and cannot go beyond this list. However, Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz was of the view that the federal government had full powers only in case of appointment of the COAS, and it could appoint any of the senior lieutenant generals for the position.

NO QUESTIONS ASKED????

Excerpts of the conversation between Gen Musharraf and Lt Gen Aziz June 11, 1999
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/jun/11talk.htm

External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh today released transcripts of the conversations between Pakistani Army chief Gen Parvez Musharraf, who was in China, and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz in Pakistan on May 26 and 29.

“These two tapes and the transcripts have been authenticated through voice authentication and printing,” the minister said.

The conversations ranged on a wide variety of issues relating to the conflict — from the downing of the Mi-17 helicopter on May 28 to the visit of Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to New Delhi tomorrow.

Gen Musharraf was told that the helicopter had fallen in Indian territory after being shot down.

Gen Musharraf: Has this Mi-17 not fallen in our area?

Lt Gen Aziz: No, sir. This has fallen in their area. We have not claimed it. We have got it claimed through the mujahideen. (May 29).

During the conversations, Gen Musharraf was apprised of every aspect of the developments by Lt Gen Aziz.

Following are excerpts from the conversations:

Gen Musharraf: What is the news on that side?

Lt Gen Aziz: There is no change in the ground situation. They have started rocketing and strafing. That has been upgraded a little. It had happened yesterday also and today. Today high-altitude bombing has been done… Our stand should be that all these bombs are falling on our side.

Gen Musharraf: That briefing to Mian Sahib (Nawaz Sharief) that we did, was the forum the same as where we had done previously? There at Jamshed’s place.

Lt Gen Aziz: No. In Mian Sahib’s office… Today for the last two hours the BBC has been continuously reporting on the air strikes by India. Keep using this — let them keep dropping bombs. As far as internationalisation is concerned, this is the fastest this has happened. You may have seen in the press about UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s appeal that both countries should sit and talk.

Gen Musharraf: This is very good.

Lt Gen Aziz: Yes, this is very good.

The above conversation on May 26 also took note of the protests made by Indian officials to the Pakistani authorities about the support — logistical and otherwise — that Islamabad provided to the infiltrators holed up in Kargil and other areas, demanding its immediate withdrawal.

Excerpts from the May 29 conversation:

Gen Musharraf: Idea on LoC.

Lt Gen Aziz: Hint is that given that the LoC has many areas where the interpretation of either side is not what the other side believes. So comprehensive deliberation is required. So that can be worked out by DGMOs.

Gen Musharraf: If they [the Indians] are assured that we are here from a long period, we have been sitting here for long, like in the beginning, the matter is the same — no post was attacked and no post was captured. The situation is that we are along our defensive Line of Control. If it is not in his [Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s] knowledge, then discuss it altogether. Emphasise that for years, we are here only. Yes, this point should be raised. We are sitting on the same LoC for a long period.

Lt Gen Aziz: This is their weakness. They are not agreed on the demarcation under UN’s verification, whereas we are agreed. We want to exploit it.

Gen Musharraf: This is in Simla Agreement that we cannot go for UN intervention.

Lt Gen Aziz: Our neighbour does not accept their presence or UNMOGIP arrangement for survey of the area. So we can start from the top, from 9842 [NJ 9842]. On this line, we can give them logic but in short, the recommendation for Sartaj Aziz Saheb is that he should make no commitment in the first meeting on the military situation. And he should not even accept a ceasefire, because if there is a ceasefire, then vehicles will be moving [on Drass-Kargil highway]. In this regard they have to use their own argument that whatever is interfering with you, that we don’t know, but there is no justification about tension on the LoC. No justification. We want to give them this type of brief so that he does not get into any specifics.”

Where has US aid to Pakistan gone? Mariana Baabar
http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/10/where-has-us-aid-to-pakistan-gone.html

Where has US aid to Pakistan gone? Mariana Baabar [STORY APPEARED IN 2007]

ISLAMABAD : The billions of dollars in US military aid to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, without any accountability, has now been billed as a “tsunami of new funding”.

Washington’s Centre for Public Integrity, in its report, says that today human rights activists, critics of the Pakistani government and members of Congress want to know, where most of the money — totalling in the billions — coming through a Defence Department programme, subject to virtually no Congressional oversight, has disappeared to.

The Centre says that this is a major finding of more than a year of investigation by the Centre for Public Integrity’s International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). US military aid to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks includes almost $5 billion in coalition support funds, a programme controlled by the Defence Department to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror. Pentagon reports that the ICIJ obtained through the Freedom of Information Act requests show that Pakistan is the No 1 recipient of these funds — receiving more than 10 times the amount that went to the No 2 recipient, Poland — and that there is scant documentation of how the money was used.

Pakistan also benefited from other funding mechanisms set up in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks. In three years after the attacks, Pakistan was the third-largest recipient of the Pentagon’s new regional defence counter terrorism fellowship programme, designed to train foreign forces in counter terrorism techniques. More than $23 million was earmarked for Pakistan in fiscal 2006 for “improving counter terrorism strike capabilities” under another new Pentagon programme referred to colloquially as Section 1206 training, which allows the Pentagon to use a portion of its annual funding from Congress to train and equip foreign militaries. Pakistan finished first in the race for this new Pentagon-controlled training.

The US State Department rates Pakistan’s human rights record as poor and reports a long litany of abuses. That nourishes critics’ claims that the US largesse has been put to abusive purposes, including to buy weapons that have been turned against Pakistani civilians and to offer bounties on suspects the US is seeking. According to Senator Sana Baloch, an opposition lawmaker who fled the country out of safety concerns, the US has several military bases inside Pakistan, including some in the senator’s home province of Balochistan. “Most of the US bases are based in Balochistan,” Baloch told ICIJ in an interview. “One or two of them are in Kharan, my own home district. The US is using the bases in this area for the war on terror. We are very supportive of the US in this role.”

The majority of the new US funding to Pakistan has come in the form of billions of dollars of coalition support funds (CSF), a post-9/11 funding mechanism created to reimburse key countries for expenses incurred in supporting American counter terrorism operations. According to K Alan Kronstadt, an expert on South Asia at the Congressional research service, by August 2006, CSF accounted for roughly $4.75 billion of the military aid Pakistan received from the US since the terrorist attacks. Pentagon documents obtained by ICIJ say the money that went to Pakistan was largely for “military operations on the Afghanistan border.”

Coalition support funds are considered a reimbursement by some and a blank check by others. Craig Cohen, the co-author of a recent Centre for Strategic and International Study on US aid to Pakistan, asked rhetorically whether CSF money is “intended to yield some sort of specific action on the part of the government,” adding, “If so, there’s clearly no oversight.”

Olga Oliker, an expert on US defence policy and co-author of a recent RAND think tank report on the human rights performance of internal security forces in South Asia, said she’s concerned that US-made weapons that go to Pakistani security forces and US training that the forces receive are being used against civilian populations. “In implementing assistance,” she told ICIJ, “the US has paid relatively little attention to human rights abuses and oversight. People weren’t paying attention.”

The new Democratic-controlled Congress has taken a greater interest in CSF payments to Pakistan. Under the previous GOP majority, there was virtually no oversight of CSF payments to any country. In January 2007, the House of Representatives acted to impose conditions on military aid to Pakistan by adopting the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. Section 1442 of the bill relates to Pakistan. It identifies areas of concern for US policy, including the need for Pakistan to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology, to address the presence of the Taliban and other extremist forces and to secure its borders to prevent movement of terrorists. The bill would impose limits on foreign assistance to Pakistan, declaring that the US assistance may not be approved until “the president determines and certifies to the appropriate Congressional committees that the government of Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control. “In addition, Pakistan would be required to demonstrate that it is making significant steps toward free and fair parliamentary elections in 2007.” The bill also requires that the president submit a report describing the long-term strategy of US engagement with Pakistan.

“The American-supplied military arsenal has been used against Baloch nationalists,” Senator Baloch told ICIJ. He said he and others have gone to the State Department, “and the State Department says [the US has] given military hardware with no conditions.” A former US official, previously based in Pakistan, acknowledged to the ICIJ that in Balochistan “the [Pakistani] army stepped in with a pretty heavy hand last year.”

UNDER GENERAL MUSHARRAF & GEORGE BUSH

Pakistan and Terrorism: A Summary K. Alan Kronstadt Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

This report provides a summary review of issues related to Pakistan and terrorism, especially in the context of U.S. interests, policy goals, and relevant assistance.1 The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies. For a substantive review, see a forthcoming CRS Report entitled Pakistan and Terrorism. This report will be updated periodically.

In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush launched major military operations as part of a global U.S.-led antiterrorism effort. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has realized major successes with the vital assistance of neighboring Pakistan. Yet a resurgent Taliban today operates in southern and eastern Afghanistan with the benefit of apparent sanctuary in parts of western Pakistan. [1 Sources for this report include, inter alia, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, congressional transcripts, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, regional press reports, and major newswires.]

The United States is increasingly concerned that members of Al Qaeda, its Taliban supporters, and other Islamist militants find safe haven in Pakistani cities such as Quetta and Peshawar, as well as in the rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. This latter area is inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns who express solidarity with anti-U.S. forces. Al Qaeda militants also reportedly have made alliances with indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups that have been implicated in both anti-Western attacks in Pakistan and terrorism in India. These groups seek to oust the Islamabad government of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and have been implicated in assassination attempts that were only narrowly survived by the Pakistani leader and other top officials. In fact, Pakistan’s struggle with militant Islamist extremism appears for some to have become a matter of survival for that country. As more evidence arises exposing Al Qaeda’s deadly new alliance with indigenous Pakistani militants — and related conflict continues to cause death and disruption in Pakistan’s western regions — concern about Pakistan’s fundamental political and social stability has increased. In his January 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush said, “We didn’t drive Al Qaeda out of their safe haven in Afghanistan only to let them set up a new safe haven in a free Iraq.” Yet many observers warn that an American preoccupation with Iraq has contributed to allowing the emergence of new Al Qaeda safe havens in western Pakistan.

U.S. Policy and Concerns

South Asia is viewed as a key arena in the fight against militant religious extremism, most especially in Pakistan and as related to Afghan stability. In November 2006, the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, said, “It is in South Asia where our future success in the struggle against global terrorism will likely be decided — in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”2 The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized that mounting large-scale international terrorist attacks appears to require sanctuaries in which terrorist groups can plan and operate with impunity. It further claimed that Pakistan’s “vast unpoliced regions” remained attractive to extremist groups. The Commission identified the government of President Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of “enlightened moderation.”3

In January 2007 Senate testimony assessing global threats, the outgoing Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, captured in two sentences the dilemma Pakistan now poses for U.S. policy makers: “Pakistan is a frontline partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders.” In what were surely well-calculated remarks, he went on to identify Al Qaeda as posing the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests, and warned that the organization’s “core elements … maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hideouts in Pakistan.”4 This latter reference was considered the strongest such statement to date by a high-ranking Bush Administration official. Throughout the opening months of 2007, Administration officials, U.S. military commanders, and senior U.S. Senators issued further incriminating statements about Pakistan’s assumed status as a terrorist base and the allegedly insufficient response of the Islamabad government.

The United States also remains concerned with indigenous extremist groups in Pakistan, and with the ongoing “cross-border infiltration” of Islamist militants who traverse the Kashmiri Line of Control and other borders to engage in terrorist acts in India and Indian Kashmir. Many analysts consider such activities conceptually inseparable from the problem of Islamist militancy in western Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Domestic terrorism in Pakistan, much of it associated with Islamist sectarianism, has become an increasingly serious problem affecting major Pakistani cities. Separatist violence in India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989, with some notable relative decline in recent years. Many experts reject efforts by the Pakistani government and others to draw significant distinctions between U.S.- and Indian-designated terrorist groups fighting in Kashmir and those fighting in western Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in Pakistan’s interior. India blames Pakistan for the infiltration of Islamist militants into Indian Kashmir, a charge Islamabad denies. The United States reportedly has received pledges from Islamabad that all “cross-border terrorism” would cease and that any terrorist facilities in Pakistani-controlled areas would be closed. Similar pledges have been made to India.

Numerous experts raise questions about the determination, sincerity, and effectiveness of Pakistani government efforts to combat religious extremists. Doubts are widely held by Western experts, many of whom express concerns about the implications of maintaining present U.S. policies toward the region, and about the efficacy of Islamabad’s latest strategy, which appears to seek reconciliation with pro-Taliban militants.5 Islamabad is adamant in asserting that it serves its own self-interests through closer relations with the United States since 2001, that there should be no doubts about the sincerity of its anti-terrorism policies (with a corollary that any failings in this area are rooted in Pakistan’s capabilities rather than in its intentions), and that solely military efforts to combat religious militancy are bound to fail. Instead, Pakistani officials aver, the so-called “war on terrorism” must emphasize socioeconomic uplift and resolution of outstanding disputes in the Muslim world, including in Kashmir, Palestine, and Iraq.6 The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies, including a questioning of a seeming U.S. reliance on the institution of the Pakistani military and on the person of President Musharraf, along with a shifting of considerable U.S. assistance funds toward programs that might better engender long-term stability in Pakistan.7

Congressional Action

In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of $600 million each, split evenly between military and economic aid, began in FY2005. In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), the 108th Congress broadly endorsed the recommendations of The 9/11 Commission Report by calling for U.S. aid to Pakistan to be sustained at a minimum of FY2005 levels and requiring the President to report to Congress a description of long-term U.S. strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. The premiere House resolution of the 110th Congress (H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) was passed in January 2007. Section 1442 of the act contains discussion of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, including a requirement that the President report to Congress a long-term U.S. strategy for engaging Pakistan and making a statement of policy that further waivers of coup-related aid sanctions “should be informed by the pace of democratic reform, extension of the rule of law, and the conduct of the parliamentary elections” scheduled to take place in late 2007. Perhaps most notably, the section includes a provision that would end U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to that country in FY2008 unless the President certifies that the Islamabad government is “making all possible efforts” to end Taliban activities on Pakistani soil.

Many analysts view Section 1442 as a signal that a Democratic-controlled Congress may pressure the Bush Administration to review its Pakistan policy, although many also warn that such overt conditionality is counterproductive to the goal of closer U.S.- Pakistan relations. The Bush Administration explicitly opposes the certification provision on such grounds and it instead urges that the certification be replaced with a reporting requirement.8 A Senate version of the House bill (S. 4) was passed in March, but contains no Pakistan-specific language. In response to U.S. congressional signals of a possible shift in U.S. policy toward Islamabad, the Pakistani National Assembly’s Defense Committee unanimously passed a resolution threatening to end or reduce Islamabad’s cooperation on counterterrorism if U.S. aid to Pakistan were to be made conditional.

U.S. Government Assistance and Policy Options

Direct U.S. Foreign Assistance and Coalition Support Funding. In the years since September 2001, Pakistan has received nearly $1.5 billion in direct U.S. security-related assistance (Foreign Military Financing totaling $970 million plus about $516 million for other programs). Congress also has appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. Some 80% of Defense Department spending for coalition support payments to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations” has gone to Islamabad. At $4.75 billion to date, averaging more than $80 million per month, the amount is equal to more than one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditures. The Bush Administration requested another $1 billion in emergency supplemental coalition support funds for FY2007, however, H.R. 1591, passed by the full House on March 23, 2007, called for only $300 million in such funds. The Administration also has requested another $1.7 billion in coalition support for FY2008. In justifying these requests, the Administration claims that coalition support payments to Pakistan have led to “a more stable [Pakistan-Afghanistan] border area.”

Arms Transfers. Major U.S. defense sales and grants in recent years have included advanced aircraft and missiles. The Pentagon reports Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements with Pakistan worth $836 million in FY2003-FY2005. In-process sales of F-16 combat aircraft raised the FY2006 value to nearly $3.5 billion. (In June 2006, the Pentagon notified Congress of a planned FMS for Pakistan worth up to $5.1 billion. The deal involves up to 36 advanced F-16s, along with related refurbishments, munitions, and equipment, and would represent the largest-ever weapons sale to Pakistan.) The Pentagon has characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, and anti-armor missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications, a claim that elicits skepticism from some analysts.

Security Assistance. Security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said to be aimed especially at bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism and border security efforts, and have included U.S.-funded road-building projects in western Pakistan and the provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, and transport helicopters and aircraft. The United States also has undertaken to train and equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements. U.S. security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian sector is aimed at strengthening the country’s law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group. U.S. efforts may be hindered by Pakistani shortcomings that include poorly trained and poorly equipped personnel who generally are underpaid by ineffectively coordinated and overburdened government agencies.

Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs. Many commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan have recommended making adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to military versus economic aid and/or to the objectives of such programs. Currently, funds are split roughly evenly between economic and securityrelated aid programs, with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund and most of the latter financing “big ticket” defense articles such as airborne early warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor missiles. It may be useful to better target U.S. assistance programs in such a way that they more effectively benefit the country’s citizens. One former senior Senate staffer has called for improving America’s image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis.9

An idea commonly floated by analysts is the “conditioning” of aid to Pakistan, perhaps through the creation of “benchmarks.” For example, in 2003, a task force of senior American South Asia watchers issued a report on U.S. policy in the region which included a recommendation that the extent of U.S. support for Islamabad should be linked to that government’s own performance in making Pakistan a more “modern, progressive, and democratic state” as promised by President Musharraf in January 2002. Specifically, the task force urged directing two-thirds of U.S. aid to economic programs and one-third to security assistance, and conditioning increases in aid amounts to progress in Pakistan’s reform agenda.10 A more recent perspective is representative of ongoing concerns about the emphases of U.S. aid programs:

[T]he United States has given Musharraf considerable slack in meeting his commitments to deal with domestic extremism or his promises to restore authentic democracy. The U.S. partnership with Pakistan would probably be on firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the country’s political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership.11 Other analysts, however, including those making policy for the Bush Administration, believe that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan has a past record failure and likely would be counterproductive. Some add that putting additional pressure on an already besieged
Musharraf government might lead to significant political instability in Islamabad. The Bush Administration has come under fire from some quarters for overemphasizing its relationship with the person of Pervez Musharraf — an army general who came to power through extra-constitutional means — at the expense of democratization processes in Pakistan and, further, for maintaining a single-minded focus on anti-terrorism that has “given a pass” to Musharraf and the Pakistani military in the areas of nuclear proliferation, rule of law, and human rights. For several years, veteran Pakistan watchers have been calling attention to the potential problems inherent in a U.S. over-reliance on President Musharraf as an individual at alleged cost to more positive development of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civil society.12 In 2006, two former senior U.S. diplomats jointly urged the Bush Administration to move beyond its fairly limited focus on the person of Pervez Musharraf by creating better links with a wider array of pro-democracy civil society elements there.13

More substantive military-to-military relations could be of significant benefit to overall U.S.-Pakistan relations and the attainment of U.S. goals in South Asia. Related sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1990 were in some respects harmful to subsequent U.S. interests in the region. For example, the suspension of military training (IMET) programs meant that for more than a decade there was no exchange between the Pakistani and U.S. militaries. A Washington-based expert on the Pakistani military has insisted that such exchanges are crucial in encouraging a liberal, secular outlook among Pakistan’s officer corps, and provide the United States unique access to that country’s leading institution.14 In apparent response to growing concerns about the course of events in Pakistan and in U.S.-Pakistan relations, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with top Pakistani leaders in Islamabad in mid-March, where he lauded Pakistan’s role as a vital U.S. ally and announced a new five-year, $750 million aid initiative for development programs in Pakistan’s western tribal regions. The Administration also will seek Pentagon authority to spend $75 million in FY2007 funds to improve the capacity of Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps.

SOURCE: US Congress.

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