Muslims are advised to quit living in Fools Paradise because Muslim Societies e.g. Rafizi, Khariji, Nasibi, Wahabis, Sunnis and Shias should first attain unity and consensus on the Definition of Islam and Who is Muslim and then talk about Joint Resources and Borders for UMMAH itching for Islamic Khilafa. We need reforms horizontally and vertically and complete overhauling within our system for example Saudi Arabia should start treating all the Citizens as First Class Citizens and give them the option of Saudi Nationality, Buying Property and Marrying with Local People. I wonder if you have been to Saudi Arabia or any other Arab State of Diaper Heads because as soon as you arrive at their Immigrataion Counter you will know your status…. your real staus and all your pipe dreams of Ummah would crash like C 130 CRASHED ON 17 August 1988, till then this Ummah can ball itself off.

A glimpse of Muslim Ummah

One who criticizes the wrong steps and acts within the system, shouldn’t be taken as an Enemy of the State and this very habit has become a hallmark of Empty and Shallow Pakistani Society and let me make it clear in even more explicit words that our Martial Law Regimes during the Cold War – 1958-1969, 1969-1971, 1977-1988, and after Cold War 1999-2008, discouraged any kind of critical thinking in Pakistan and results are before us. International Politics and Dynamics of Framing National Policies are not just Kiss and Makeup, when you follow and toe the American Policies for a long period and that too for their National Interests then consequences are ultimately to be faced which we are facing and it will take time to change the course of Pakistan’s National Policies and Priorities

I would suggest that you should go and buy some books on Current Affairs and International Politics [relating with Pakistan] to have the basic knowledge of the Dynamics of International Politics. After the death of General Zia in 1988 his policies were carried out by General Aslam Beg and Co. and their tinkering with the system have been proved disastrous for Pakistan. If you want proof then check your archive on the subject of Hamid Gul, Aslam Beg and Asad Durrani.

Sir, you [as per your profile] have covered the Iraq-Kuwait War and you were associated with PTV for its segment World View and also associated with GEO’s Crisis Cell. Therefore, you must know that nice people dont complain. We shouldn’t complain and raise hue and cry!! These articles and columns should have appeared when USA was fighting Afghan Jihad from 1979 till 911.

This may also help in controlling the bouts [Ghashi – Spell] of Patriotism.

Since Pakistani Muslims often itch for Islam and Islamic Law for Governance therefore read the below given History of Pakistan in the light of Quranic Verse and then reach to any conclusion you want and then tell me do we even deserve to complain against the American Colonial Behaviour, and that after we violated a very simple Quranic Verse and this verse violated by General Zia [1977-1988] and his Spiritual God Father that Najis[Filth] Mawdudi and equally Najis [Filth] Jamat-e-Islami.

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ لاَ تَتَّخِذُواْ الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصَارَى أَوْلِيَاء بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاء بَعْضٍ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّهُم مِّنكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنَّ اللّهَ لاَ يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ

O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk. [AL-MAEDA (THE TABLE, THE TABLE SPREAD) Chapter 5 – Verse 51]

“Quote”

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq seized power in Pakistan in a 1977 coup and declared himself president. The US stopped all economic and military aid to Pakistan as a result of the coup and Zia ruled cautiously in an attempt to win international approval. But immediately after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan , the US allies with Zia and resumes aid. This allows Zia to use Islam to consolidate his power without worrying about the international reaction. He passes pro-Islamic legislation, introduces Islamic banking systems, and creates Islamic courts. Most importantly, he creates a new religious tax which is used to create tens of thousands of madrassas, or religious boarding schools. These schools will indoctrinate a large portion of future Islamic militants for decades to come. [Gannon, 2005, pp. 138-142]

Zia also promotes military officers on the basis of religious devotion. The Koran and other religious material becomes compulsory reading material in army training courses. “Radical Islamist ideology began to permeate the military and the influence of the most extreme groups crept into the army,” journalist Kathy Gannon will write in her book I is for Infidel. [Gannon, 2005, pp. 138-142] The BBC will later comment that Zia’s self-declared “Islamization” policies created a “culture of jihad” within Pakistan that continues until present day. [BBC, 8/5/2002]

CIA covert weapons shipments are sent by the Pakistani army and the ISI to rebel camps in the North West Frontier province near the Afghanistan border. The governor of the province is Lieutenant General Fazle Haq, who author Alfred McCoy calls Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s “closest confidant and the de facto overlord of the mujaheddin guerrillas.” Haq allows hundreds of heroin refineries to set up in his province. Beginning around 1982, Pakistani army trucks carrying CIA weapons from Karachi often pick up heroin in Haq’s province and return loaded with heroin. They are protected from police search by ISI papers. [McCoy, 2003, pp. 477]

By 1982, Haq is listed with Interpol as an international drug trafficker. But Haq also becomes known as a CIA asset. Despite his worsening reputation, visiting US politicians such as CIA Director William Casey and Vice President George H. W. Bush continue to meet with him when they visit Pakistan. Haq then moves his heroin money through the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). A highly placed US official will later say that Haq “was our man… everybody knew that Haq was also running the drug trade” and that “BCCI was completely involved.” [Scott, 2007, pp. 73-75]

Both European and Pakistani police complain that investigations of heroin trafficking in the province are “aborted at the highest level.” [McCoy, 2003, pp. 477]

In 1989, shortly after Benazir Bhutto takes over as the new ruler of Pakistan, Pakistani police arrest Haq and charge him with murder. He is considered a multi-billionaire by this time. But Haq will be gunned down and killed in 1991, apparently before he is tried. [McCoy, 2003, pp. 483]

Even President Zia is implied in the drug trade. In 1985, a Norwegian government investigation will lead to the arrest of a Pakistani drug dealer who also is President Zia’s personal finance manager. When arrested, his briefcase contains Zia’s personal banking records. The manager will be sentenced to a long prison term. [McCoy, 2003, pp. 481-482]

US Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) with Afghan Warlords during Afghan ‘Jihad’ in the Northern Area of Pakistan.

In November 1982, US Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) travels to Islamabad, Pakistan, and meets with President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. He promises Zia to deliver a crucial weapons system that has so far been denied by the US—the latest radar systems for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter planes. Wilson also meets with CIA Station Chief Howard Hart, who is in charge of providing support for the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. He urges Hart to expand the program and stresses that vast amounts of money can be made available. [Crile, 2003, pp. 106-129]

The next month, President Zia comes to the US to meet with President Reagan. Zia first meets with Wilson in Houston and expresses his gratitude for helping Pakistan acquire F-16 radar systems. Wilson then broaches the subject of Pakistan secretly purchasing arms from Israel for the Afghan War. Zia agrees to this in principle. [Crile, 2003, pp. 131-132]

Agha Hasan Abedi – Bawaz-e-Baland Naara-e-Salawath – Chief of Crooked Bank BCCI

According to Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin, in 1983 Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq allows Pakistani drug traffickers to deposit their drug profits in the BCCI bank without getting punished. The criminal BCCI bank has close ties to the Pakistani government and the US funding of the Afghan war. It will be shut down in 1991. BCCI also plays a critical role in facilitating the movement of Pakistan’s heroin money. By 1989, Pakistan’s heroin trade will be valued at $4 billion a year, more than all of Pakistan’s legal exports. [McCoy, 2003, pp. 480]

US Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX)

Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) travels to Israel where he meets with Zvi Rafiah and other Israeli officials. From Israel he travels to Egypt and then Pakistan, where he secretly negotiates a major weapons deal with Pakistan (see November-December 1982) on behalf of the Israelis in support of the mujaheddin fighting Soviets in Afghanistan. Among other things, the deal includes the delivery of T-55 tanks. Author George Crile will later comment, “The Israelis were hoping this deal would serve as the beginning of a range of under-the-table understandings with Pakistan that the congressman would continue to quietly negotiate for them.” [Crile, 2003, pp. 141]

In 1984, Senator Paula Hawkins (R-FL) meets with Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan. During the meeting, she mentions that she is concerned about a Pakistani bank that is laundering money out of the Cayman Islands. Her staff later clarifies to Zia that she was referring to BCCI (which technically is not a Pakistani bank, but almost all of its top officials are Pakistani). As a result, Abdur Sakhia, the top BCCI official in the US, meets with Hawkins in the US a short time later and assures her that BCCI is not laundering money out of the Cayman Islands. Then officials from the Justice Department, State Department, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) meet with Hawkins’s staffers and assure them that BCCI is not the subject of any investigation. Weeks later, the State Department formally notifies the Pakistani government that BCCI is not under investigation. As a result, Hawkins drops her brief interest in BCCI. However, by this time the State Department, Justice Department, and DEA have all been briefed by the CIA about BCCI’s many criminal activities. Apparently, this information is deliberately kept from the senator. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 324-325]

NBC News later reports that CIA Director William Casey secretly meets with the head of the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) from 1984 until 1986, shortly before Casey’s death. The NBC report, quoting unnamed BCCI sources, will claim that Casey met with BCCI head Agha Hasan Abedi every few months in a luxury suite at the Madison Hotel in Washington. The two men allegedly discussed the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages transactions and CIA weapons shipments to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. The CIA denies all the allegations. [Associated Press, 2/21/1992]

But books by Time magazine and Wall Street Journal reporters will corroborate that Casey repeatedly met with Abedi. [Scott, 2007, pp. 116] Casey also meets with Asaf Ali, a BCCI-connected arms dealer, in Washington, DC, and in Pakistan. On one occasion, Casey has a meeting in Washington with Abedi, Ali, and Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. [Beaty and Gwynne, 1993, pp. 308]

Pakistan’s president Muhammad Zia ul-Haq is killed in an airplane crash. The plane went into a steep dive, then recovered regaining altitude. Then it dove a second time and crashed. [Yousaf and Adkin, 1992, pp. 91-92]

ISI Director Akhtar Abdur Rahman, US ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel, and other Pakistani and US officials are also killed. A joint US-Pakistani investigation fails to definitively explain what caused the crash. [Coll, 2004, pp. 178-179]

According to Mohammad Yousaf, the ISI’s Afghan Bureau chief, the crash was due to sabotage. Yousaf does not know who was responsible, but later says that the US State Department was instrumental in the cover-up. Yousaf points out several reasons why the State Department might want to cover up the crime even if the US were not involved in the assassination itself. [Yousaf and Adkin, 1992, pp. 91-92]

Richard Clarke, a State Department analyst who later will become counterterrorism “tsar” for Presidents Clinton and Bush Jr., believes that Zia’s death and the destruction of a major weapons stockpile used by the CIA and ISI around the same time were both ordered by the Soviets as revenge for being defeated in Afgnanistan. Clarke says, “I could never find the evidence to prove that the Soviet KGB had ordered these two acts as payback for their bitter defeat, but in my bones I knew they had.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 50]

“UNQUOTE”

Reference: Why CIA Is Engaged In Campaigns Against Pakistan’s ISI, Military?
http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/02/why-cia-is-engaged-in-campaigns-against.html

The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. – 1

Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster [1988]

While revelations of Reagan’s covert war in Nicaragua continue to dazzle the American public, a far bigger and more complex covert program has gone relatively unnoticed in Afghanistan. After nearly nine years of covert involvement, the U.S. has poured over $2 billion into the Afghan war, far more than the total amount that has gone to Nicaragua, Angola, and Kampuchea combined. In fact, the estimated amount of money “lost” in the Afghan pipeline by the CIA’s own estimates easily exceeds the total amount of U.S. support that has gone to the contras.

Congressmen who strongly opposed contra aid have not only supported Reagan’s covert war in Afghanistan but have teamed up with Reagan Doctrine advocates to expand the administration’s program. Whereas the war in Nicaragua is now the “bad” war, Afghanistan has from the start been viewed as the “good” war, and as the rebels call it, a “holy” war or jihad. Thus, with their broad base of support and their strategically placed war below the Soviet border, the Afghan rebels have earned the forefront position in President Reagan’s global strategy of “rollback” and billions of dollars in CIA support.

Officially, the Reagan administration’s policy toward Afghanistan is to “seek the earliest possible negotiated political settlement there to effect the withdrawal of Soviet forces.”

This policy, which is a continuation of that set up under Jimmy Carter, is ostensibly pursued along two tracks: covert aid and negotiations. Carter believed that a “modest” amount of secret military aid would enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has reasoned that the more aid the U.S. can provide to the rebels the better the chances are of bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. Even with a Soviet withdrawal assured today, the administration has vowed to pursue this strategy “peace through strength” by continuing its support of the rebels. However, a closer look at the administration’s seven year secret war in Afghanistan reveals that it has been little interested in peace there. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that U.S. policy has been to sabotage attempts at a negotiated settlement until the Soviets have been, in the view of some, had been “sufficiently bled.”

The Policy and the Pipeline

In March 1981 CIA Director Casey proposed to President Reagan that the CIA upgrade and expand the Afghan covert aid pipeline.

Under Carter, the CIA had coordinated the Afghan weapons supply line with Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided the funds, Egypt and China provided the weapons, and Pakistan served as the conduit and sanctuary. Initially the U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided about $30 million each to purchase Soviet-style weapons manufactured in Egypt and China.

Retired American military officers contracted out by the CIA along with Chinese and Pakistani officials, were on hand to the rebels. But the secrecy of foreign involvement was the important element of the program. “The Afghan struggle (was) an ‘Islamic’ struggle,” President Carter told his aides, “and U.S. assistance should not disturb that impression.

Much has changed in the CIA’s Afghan war under Reagan. Most of the same countries are still involved, and the cultivation of the war’s image as a fight between Islam and communism remains crucial to maintaining the rebels’ broad support. But with the rapidly expanding political and financial support for the program, the U.S. Afghan policy and its covert aid pipeline have been significantly altered.

After Casey’s proposal to expand the Afghan program in March 1981, the U.S. looked directly to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. With the promise that Reagan would get Congress to approve the sale of AWACS to them, the Saudis immediately doled out $15 million to the resistance, mainly through private bank accounts in Oman and Pakistan.

In October, when the U.S. delivered the first five AWACS to Saudi Arabia, King Fahd agreed to increase assistance to both the Afghan rebels and the Nicaraguan contras.

The role of Pakistan, which worried about its vulnerable position vis a vis the Soviets, was also enhanced. To allay President Zia’s concerns and to ensure further Pakistani cooperation, the Reagan administration secretly offered to station U.S. troops in Pakistan.

However, Zia stated that he preferred weapons to troops.The next month, in September, the U.S. agreed to a six year, $3.2 billion program of U.S. economic and military assistance.It was also agreed that Pakistan would continue its coordinating role in weapons supply. This agreement, which is still in effect today, went as follows: once in Pakistan, whether at the port of Karachi or the Peshawar airport, the weapons would be handed over to the National Logistics Cell (NLC) of the Pakistani Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the equivalent of the CIA and FBI combined. CIA station officers in Karachi and Peshawar would examine the receipts for the weapons but would not even check the crates to see if they were accurate.

The NLC officials would then drive the weapons to either Quetta in the West or Peshawar in the East. Once there, the ISID, under CIA supervision, would distribute the arms to the seven rebel groups recognized by the Pakistani government. These groups would then drive the weapons to either their arms depots along the border or to the local arms bazaar where they could make a healthy profit selling their new AK 47s and RPG 7s to drug dealers and local tribesmen.

In this early period the CIA looked largely to Egypt and China for supplies. Both countries handed over weapons from their own stocks while CIA supervised factories outside Cairo turned out Soviet style arms to add to the flow. Hughes Aircraft Company was contracted out to upgrade some of Egypt’s weapons, particularly the SAM 7 anti aircraft guns. The Egyptian arms stock was replenished with new American weapons and China earned much needed hard currency, in addition to fulfilling one of its own foreign policy goals of containing the Soviets. A fair amount of the rebels’ weapons were also captured from and sometimes even sold by Afghan government troops.

Still, getting outside weapons to the rebels in Pakistan remained an important task. Eventually China made some use of the newly opened Karokaram highway and continued to load CIA run planes and ships destined for Peshawar and Karachi.

Egyptian weapons continued to be flown directly to Pakistan but were sometimes landed in Oman, from where they were shipped to Karachi to avoid being traced. The Reagan administration was quite impressed with the rebels’ surprising show of force during this first year. Members of the 208 Committee (the restricted inter agency committee that handled covert operations) suddenly saw tremendous prospects in Afghanistan for gaining a global strategic edge on the Soviets. This elite group included Vincent Cannistraro, an ex CIA official who served as White House head of covert operations; Morton Abramowitz, State Department head of intelligence; Bert Dunn, Chief of the CIA’s Near East and South Asia Division; Oliver North, and alternating members from the Defense Department including Elie Krakowski, head of Regional Defense, and Richard Armitage.

These and other administration officials thought that by tying down and “bleeding” the Soviets in Afghanistan the U.S. could divert Soviet attention away from other Third World hot spots like Nicaragua and Angola, making room for the U.S. to maneuver. If the Afghan rebels could keep up their fight for several years (if not decades), the Soviets would eventually incur serious financial, military, and political problems. Little danger was seen in the Soviets expanding their war out of frustration into Iran or Pakistan because of Iran’s intransigence and Pakistan’s beefed up military, not to mention its mutual defense pact with the U.S.

It began to appear, as one Congressman put it, that “the U.S. [had] a real chance to make Afghanistan the Soviets’ Vietnam.”

Sabotaging a Settlement

The only thing standing in the way of creating a morass for the Soviets in Afghanistan was the near term prospect for peace. Although some U.S. officials have, since the beginning of the war, wanted to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the evidence suggests that they were not very influential. Following the first formal U.N. sponsored peace talks in the summer of 1982, U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced that the negotiating parties, Pakistan and the Afghan government, had made important concessions and that he planned to present a broad outline of an agreement that fall.

However, just before Cordovez was to unveil his peace plan, President Reagan ordered the CIA to increase the quantity and quality of weapons to the rebels. The “bleeders” had been at work. Several months later, in December, Yuri Andropov told President Zia at Leonid Brezhnev’s funeral that the Soviet Union would leave Afghanistan “quickly” if Pakistan ceased its support of the resistance.

Subsequently the White House ordered the CIA to immediately provide the rebels with increased amounts of bazookas, mortars, grenade launchers, mines, recoilless rifles, and shoulder fired anti-aircraft guns.

It appears that this trend of sabotaging peace negotiations as long as the resistance was willing and able to fight became the unofficial Afghan policy in the White House. Proof of this policy manifested itself in 1983 when an end to the Soviet occupation seemed as certain as it does today. In late April of that year, the negotiating parties gathered in Geneva to map out another plan for a Soviet withdrawal. To enhance the prospects for a settlement, the Soviets secretly told the Pakistani government in late March that they would begin to withdraw by September if the Pakistanis ceased their support for the resistance.

The Pakistanis took the Soviet pledge seriously and several weeks later issued a directive to the rebels to move their headquarters from Peshawar and to disperse their groups.

The resistance alliance, which has been dominated by the radical fundamentalist factions, was furious. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was only one of their goals; the militant fundamentalists also intended to purge the country of everything that smacked of communism, including anyone who had served the government in any way. For them the war was far from over. These groups had even stated their intention to carry their jihad into the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile U.N. officials Diego Cordovez and Javier Perez de Cuellar shuttled to the Soviet Union and China where they received guarantees for a possible settlement.

By late April, the Pakistani and Afghan governments had “virtually settled” the simultaneous withdrawal of outside support which would begin in September.

But one week later, the White House for the first time leaked to the press the fact that it was covertly aiding the resistance and would continue to do so until the political aims of the resistance alliance were met. Needless to say the talks came to a screeching halt.

Embarrassed, but still hopeful about salvaging a settlement that June, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan scurried to Washington in May to enlist the Reagan administration’s cooperation. Khan told Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan but with minimal humiliation.

Bush and Shultz apparently convinced Khan that the U.S. was not interested in facilitating a graceful Soviet withdrawal. The following next month the U.N. sponsored talks broke down immediately when Khan wanted to re open discussion on clauses concerning non interference.Two weeks later Shultz visited Pakistan to reassure both the resistance and the Pakistani government that the U.S. would not abandon them “in their fight against Soviet aggression.

Congress and the Jihad

With Pakistan now cemented into the “bleeders” camp, the U.S. was well positioned to turn up the heat on the Soviets. Starting in 1984 and continuing to the present, the administration has received continual boosts to pursue this strategy from Congress. Congressman Charles Wilson, (Dem. Calif) a high ranking member of the Defense Appropriations Committee who claims “we owe the Soviets one for Vietnam,” visited President Zia in late 1983 to see what the U.S. could do to strengthen the rebels.

In the spring of 1984 he and his colleagues summoned Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon to explain why the CIA wasn’t doing more for the rebels. McMahon, who was neither interested in providing the rebels with sophisticated weaponry nor in expanding the already large paramilitary operation below the Soviet border, claimed that the rebels were being adequately supplied.

The Congressmen, realizing that they had allies in the State Department (Abramowitz), the White House (Cannistraro) and the Defense Department (Krakowski and Armitage), and that CIA Director Casey was supportive of their cause, proceeded to draft legislation that would force high level bureaucrats like McMahon to cooperate in expanding the Afghan program.

In the Fall of 1984 Congress passed a resolution calling for “effective” aid for the Afghan rebels and immediately doubled the administration’s request for aid. To handle the growing amount of funds, the CIA established a joint bank account with the Saudis in Switzerland. The Saudis promised to match the U.S. funds dollar for dollar and both governments began by pledging $250 million each.

The CIA began to upgrade the quality of weapons for the rebels. In January 1985 it purchased 40 Oerlikon anti aircraft guns from the Swiss firm Oerlikon Buhrle at a cost of $50 million. Also, many of the Chinese weapons destined for the rebels were being upgraded. Some were sent to Egypt while many were flown to a CIA weapons plant somewhere in the midwestern United States. In addition, a New Jersey company was contracted to make explosives for the rebels.

As the CIA upgraded the covert pipeline, the Soviets again began to hint that they wanted out of Afghanistan. In March 1985, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told Pakistani President Zia at Konstantine Chernenko’s funeral that the war could end as soon as Pakistan ceased its support of the rebels.

But in keeping with U.S. policy, President Reagan several weeks later signed National Security Decision Directive 166 cafling for efforts to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan “by all means available. One of the “bleeders,” Morton Abramowitz, succeeded in inserting language into the directive calling for an expansion of the program every year.

Thus, with $250 million in newly appropriated funds, the CIA’s mission was clearer than ever. The only problem was finding the weapons to spend all the new money on. Neither the Chinese nor the Egyptians could fill the increasing requests. So to quickly expend a large portion of the new money and to satisfy the constant demand for better anti aircraft guns, the CIA in late 1985 purchased 300 British made Blowpipe missiles from Short Brothers Company in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Since the United Kingdom has had no official policy to militarily support the rebels, the weapons were sold to a third country who then handed them over to the CIA for a profit.

But the rebels were still in need of more AK 47 rifles and SAM 7s, among other types of unsophisticated weaponry. The problem was finding another supplier. Someone suggested Poland, and judging by documents from the Iran/contra hearings it was probably the ever present John Singlaub. Through the GeoMilitech Corporation, Singlaub and his associate Barbara Studley had arranged to get Polish weapons to the contras. And Studley had proposed a plan to DCI Casey in December 1985 for GeoMilitech to facilitate the supply of weapons to the rebels.

By early 1986 weapons were being purchased in Poland and quietly shipped out of the northwest port of Stettin. To handle the increasing flow of weapons into Pakistan, the Pakistani government built a new network of roads from Peshawar and Quetta to the small border towns that act as arms depots.

To transfer the weapons from these towns over the border into Pakistan, the Afghans initially had to rent mules and trucks. In order to cover the rebels’ transportation expenses the CIA counterfeited and provided to the rebels millions of dollars worth of Afghan currency.

Leaks in the Pipeline

As the pipeline was expanded it began to spring big leaks. Problems with the pipeline had existed from the beginning, but by 1985 they were becoming more obvious. Twenty nine of the forty Oerlikon anti aircraft guns the CIA had purchased in Switzerland at over $1 million a piece never made it to Afghanistan. Somewhere along the line these and many other weapons were put to other uses by either the Afghans, the Pakistanis, or the CIA itself. A significant amount of the leaking was (as it stiff is) coming from within Pakistan, where corrupt government and rebel officials have suddenly become quite rich. Pakistani General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, head of the ISID up to 1987, and his successor, General Hamid Gul, are suspected to have been prime benefactors of the pipeline. They and their subordinates within the ISID’s National Logistics Cell (NLC) could easily have made a fortune off CIA supplies.

Since the genesis of the pipeline, the NLC has had the sole responsibility of transporting newly arrived weapons from Karachi to Quetta and Peshawar (weapons that come by plane, especially those that are American or British made, are flown directly to these cities).

NLC trucks have special passes that allow them to travel unharassed by customs or police officials on their several hundred mile drive. Along the way it is very easy for the NLC officials to exchange the new weapons and other supplies for old ones from the government’s stock.

Widespread corruption also exists among the rebel leaders but has gone practically unnoticed in the U.S. thanks to CIA propaganda. The same kinds of things that tarnished the contra’s image, such as killing civilians, drug smuggling and embezzlement are practiced by many Afghan rebels. Taking no prisoners, assassinating suspected government collaborators, destroying government built schools and hospitals, killing “unpious” civilians are just a few of the inhumane acts they have carried out. But the picture we receive of the rebels in the U.S. is of an uncorrupt, popular group of freedom loving people who aspire toward a democratic society.

The CIA and the State Department have worked hard to project this image. In 1984 Walter Raymond, on loan to the NSC from the CIA, “suggested” to Senator Humphrey (RNH) that Congress finance a media project for the rebels that would shed favorable light on the rebels’ side of the war.

Humphrey got Congress to easily approve the new “Afghan Media Project” which was handed over to the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Boston University. AA Boston University the project was headed up by a man named Joachim Maitre, an East German defector who had close connections with International Business Communications and the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation (both of which served important roles in illegally raising funds for the Nicaraguan contras). He also had worked closely with Oliver North to make TN’ commercials attacking Congressmen who had opposed aid to the contras.

Maitre escaped criticism for his contra connections and proceeded to train Afghan rebels to report on and film the war. Since it is illegal for the USIA to disseminate information in the U.S., the Afghan Media Project’s films and reports were to be sold only to foreign news agencies. However, American journalists who have a quick story to write or don’t want to enter Afghanistan have often found the rebels’ information too tempting to pass up. CBS, the station that has covered the Afghan war the most and in a very pro-rebel light, may have been one guilty party. CBS used footage provided by the rebels claiming that it was taken by its cameraman, Mike Hoover.

Corruption surrounding the CIA’s Afghan program has begun to surface during the last several years. For example, the fact that the rebels have been harvesting a large amount of opium was brought to light by the New York Times in 1986.

And DEA officials have privately admitted recently that the shipment of CIA weapons into Pakistan has allowed the trade in heroin three tons of which reaches the U.S. every year to flourish as never before.

One DEA official noted that virtually no heroin was refined in Pakistan before 1979, but “now Pakistan produces and transships more heroin than the rest of the world combined.” Neither U.S. nor Pakistani drug enforcement officials are any match for these heavily armed drug dealers.

In spite of these problems, from 1986 to the present, the CIA has expanded the pipeline to handle over $1 billion in new monies. As part of this package the CIA is sending the rebels highly sophisticated American made weaponry. Ironically, the CIA particularly its former Deputy Director John McMahon originally opposed this idea and insisted on continuing the supply of average Soviet styled weapons.

But by March 1986 the impasse was broken. On March 4, McMahon resigned from the CIA; one week later UN negotiator Diego Cordovez announced that he had “all the elements of a comprehensive settlement of the Afghan problem.”

With McMahon gone and the prospects for peace again on the horizon, members of the 208 Committee, with the President’s approval, decided immediately to send the rebels several hundred of the world’s most sophisticated anti aircraft gun, the American-made Stinger.

Although the Stingers are delivered more carefully than other weapons (they are flown on U.S. airplanes through Germany en route to Pakistan), once in Pakistan they can easily fall into dangerous hands. Initially the Stingers were safeguarded by keeping them from the rebels. Although the media began in April 1986 to report on the rebels’ immediate successes with the Stingers, the rebels hadn’t even touched one yet. Ethnic Pushtuns in the Pakistani Special Forces, disguised as rebels, were the ones firing the Stingers then, and many probably still are today.

Meanwhile, a group of “ex-Army specialists” hired by the CIA were training the rebels to use the new weapon. Once the rebels were adequately trained, the politics of the pipeline began to come into play. The ISID distributed a disproportionate amount of the Stingers to the more radical fundamentalist groups.

ISID has skewed the distribution of weapons to favor the fundamentalists all along, but it took the Stinger issue to highlight this fact. These are the groups that were responsible for selling nearly a dozen Stingers to Iranian Revolutionary Guards in July 1987 and who are stockpiling their weapons to continue their jihad if and when the U.S. cuts off its supply.

The CIA was aware of the Iran connection two months before it was revealed and before Congress approved sending more Stingers. It is also aware now that by arming these same groups, the U.S. is setting the scene for a major post withdrawal bloodbath.

But today President Reagan is flaunting the covert operation in Afghanistan as the prize of the Reagan Doctrine. The Soviets are finally negotiating in “good faith,” he claims, because U.S. aid allowed the “freedom fighters” to keep up their fight. Although the War has had its costs, the benefit of driving the Soviets out will make them worth it. The costs of intentionally prolonging the Afghan war have been a flourishing drug trade, an estimated one million dead, and the provisions for a bloody Islamic revolution. Unfortunately, in light of the administration’s hardening stance in the current negotiations, we must wonder whether the “bleeders” are really ready to end it now.

References:

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28, 1988.

Newsweek, March 23,1987

United States Department of State Special Report, no. 112, December 1983.

See James Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Bantam: New York, 1982), pp. 473,475.

Miami Herald, June 5, 1983.

Boston Globe, January 5, 1980; Daily Telegraph (London), January 5, 1990.

Wall Street Journal, April 19,1994.

Washington Post, February 2, 1979; Maclean’s (Toronto), April 30, 1979.

ABC News, “20/20,” June 18,1981.

Sam Bamieh told of this deal during his sworn testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs committee in July 1987; also see. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 202; the information about the Omani and Pakistani bank accounts came from several confidential sources.

See Bamieh testimony, ibid.

Baltimore Sun, April 4,1982.

Richard Cronin, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts,” Congressional Research Service, July 20,1987, p. 2.

This inadequate accounting process was discovered in January 1986 when, at the request of Senators Humphrey (Rep. New Hamp.) and Chic Hecht (Rep. Nev.), a group of Senate intelligence staffers visited Pakistan (Confidential Source).

Philadelphia Inquirer. February 29, 1988; The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1987.

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 29,1988.

Washington Post, September 25,1981.

Classified State Department Cables, May 14 and August 9, 1979, Spynest Documents, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29; Selig Harrison, “The Soviet Union in Afghanistan in Containment: Concept and Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 464

New Republic, July 18,1981; Daily Telegraph, January 5,1980.

Le Monde, in Joint Publication and Research Service (JPRS) (U.S. Gov.), October 9, 1981; Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1981.

New York Times; May 4, 1983; Eight Days (London), in JPRS, October 31, 1981.

Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1, 1988.

New York Times, July 24,1982.

New York Times, May 4,1983.

Richard Cronin, “Afghanistan: United Nations Sponsored Negotiations,” Congressional
Research Service, July 23, 1986, p. 8.

New York Times, May 4, 1983.

Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1983.

Some of the more radical fundamentalist groups have already succeeded in carrying out cross border attacks against the Soviets and have vowed to continue (Arab News, April 6,1987). For a more thorough discussion of the goals of the resistance see Olivier Roy, Islam and the Afghan Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

Washington Post, March 30, 1983.

This news was leaked by the Soviets to the United News of India, cited in Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1983.

New York Times, May 4,1983.

New York Times, May 27,1983.

Washington Post, December 29,1983.

New York Times, July 4,1983.

Washington Post January 13, 1985.

This was the Tsongas resolution which was finally passed on October 4,1994.

Washington Post, January 13, 1987.

Afghan Update (published by the Federation for American Afghan Action), July 13,1985.

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 29,1988.

Confidential source who travelled with the resistance and showed the author photographs of explosives with the name of this company on them.

FBIS, May 14,1985.

New York Times, June 19,1986.

Wall Street Journal, February 16,1988.

Thames Television (London), “The Missile Trail” on This Week, September 17,1987.

Rumor has it that Nigeria was the third country, but it could have been Chile who sold Blowpipes to the CIA for its operation in Nicaragua.

Joint Senate Congressional Hearings on the Iran Contra Affair, May 20,1987; Exhibit
JKS 6. The proposed plan would allow the CIA to acquire Soviet bloc weapons for the Afghan rebels, the contras, UNITA and other “freedom fighters” without Congressional appropriations or approval.

The Wall Street Journal on February 16, 1988 revealed that weapons for the rebels had been purchased from Poland. A confidential source informed the author that Stettin was the port they were being shipped out of.

The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1987.

Jack Anderson in the Washington Post, May 12,1987.

Washington Post, January 13,1987.

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28, 1988.

The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1988.

Columbia Journalism Review May/June, 1987; it is also worth noting that Maitre was a senior editor for CIA connected Axel Springer Publishing Company in Germany. He also, for no apparent reason, has military clearance. After the bombing of Libya, Maitre was one of the people who debriefed the American pilots.

Announced at USIA conference on Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., May 5,1987.

Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1988. CBS contract journalist Kurt Lohbeck also has strong ties to “Behind the Lines News Service,” an operation set up by arch conservatives Hugh Newton and Antony Campaigne.

New York Times, June 6,1986.

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28,1988.

McMahon was the focus of attacks by rebel supporters on the CIA’s Afghan program (especially by the Federation for American Afghan Action which claimed responsibility for McMahon’s eventual resignation). Also see Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981 1997 (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

FBIS, March 18,1986.

Warren Carroll, “The Freedom Fighter,” (Heritage Foundation), cited in Afghan Update, May 27, 1986.

Washington Post, February 8, 1987.

Strategic Investment Newsletter, March 9, 1987; Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1, 1988.

Independent (London), October 16, 1987.

Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28,1988

REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. – 1 http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2008/10/afghan-pipeline-by-steve-galster-1.html

The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. – 2 http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2008/10/afghan-pipeline-by-steve-galster-2.html

Lies of Ansar Abbasi on ISI: It is very disgusting that Prejudice take you to a level when you blatantly lie and distort history. Mr Ansar Abbasi just did that in today’s Jang Monday, January 04, 2010, Muharram 17, 1431 A.H in his alleged column wherein he says that Political Cell of ISI was formed by Bhutto whereas in reality it was formed by General Ayub Khan. Read Ayub Khan’s Information Secretary’s Late Altaf Gauhar’s Column on ISI published in The Nation in English 17 Aug 97 p 4. After reading the last paragraph of Ansar Abbasi’s Lies on ISI. Ansar Abbasi and Jang Group have no shame left in them they forget while lecturing PPP and Zardari about No First Strike, Patriotism and National Security that Ansar Abbasi’s very own Jang/The News and GEO are running the campaign “Joint statement by editors of the Jang Group and Times of India Friday, January 01, 2010 Aman Ki Asha”. http://www.jang.com.pk/jang/jan2010-daily/04-01-2010/col14.htm

Read Ayub Khan’s Information Secretary’s Late Altaf Gauhar’s Column on ISI published in The Nation in English 17 Aug 97 p 4

“QUOTE”

Title: Pakistan: Writer Exposes ISI’s Role in Politics

Document Number: FBIS-NES-97-230
Document Date: 18 Aug 1997
Sourceline: BK1908021197 Islamabad The Nation in English 17 Aug 97 p 4 Subslug: Article by Altaf Gauhar:

“How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics”

I had an opportunity to watch quite closely the working of our intelligence agencies during the 1965 war with India. At that time the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was headed by Brigadier Riaz Hussain, who later became the Governor of Balochistan, the Military Intelligence (MI) was under Brigadier Muhammad Irshad and A.B. Awan was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB). Each agency had its own sphere of duties but they had a common goal — preserving the national security. Since there is hardly any significant political activity, domestic or foreign, national or international, which does not, directly or indirectly, impinge on national security, there was much overlapping in the work of the three agencies.
Despite the all-embracing definition of national security unnecessary conflict in day to day working was avoided as the lSl and the MI confined themselves to matters of direct military interest and the IB concentrated on domestic political activities. The DIB reported directly to the Prime Minister and the two military agencies to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army (C-in-C).

It was left to the C-in-C to bring all matters of interest to the notice of the Prime Minister through the Ministry of Defence. This arrangement continued fairly smoothly until the imposition of Martial Law in 1958. I was in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat during the last days of parliamentary government in 1957-58 and Malik Feroz Khan Noon used to get reports of the contacts which military intelligence agencies were making with the political leaders of different parties. There was little that he could do about it since President Iskander Mirza was drawing up his own plan of action to put an end to parliamentary rule in collusion with the C-in-C, General Ayub Khan. Noon was resisting Mirza’s pressure to
grant a four-year extension of term to Ayub Khan. I remember Ayub Khan bursting into my office one afternoon in full, uniform. I was relieved when he said: “Since the Principal Secretary has gone for lunch I thought I would ask you to request the Prime Minister to stay with me in Rawalpindi when he comes on a formal visit next week.” He left the room before I could recover my breath. When I conveyed the message to the PM he said: “I know he wants me to give him an extension of term. His term does not end till 1959. Why is he in such a hurry?” Years later when I mentioned this incident to Ayub Khan he said: “The fellow was under the influence of his wife. He wanted to promote General Sher Ali. My boys were keeping tabs on him.”

Once the Martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence agencies came under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The maintenance of national Security, which was the principal function of these agencies, came to mean the consolidation of the Ayub regime; any criticism of the regime was seen a threat to national security. The three intelligence agencies started competing with each other in demonstrating their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his system of government. Since Ayub Khan was reluctant to increase the military budget, neither the ISI nor the MI could post their officers in the districts and because of that limitation their domestic activities remained quite restrained. But they continued to be assigned specific duties to keep a watch on ‘undesirable’ politicians and civil servants. When I came to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, I found a psychological warfare unit under operation in the office of the Secretary. It was, headed by Col Mujibur Rahman, who later became the Secretary of the Ministry in the Ziaul Haq regime. Was it an intelligence plant meant to keep an eye on the working of the civil government? Whatever its purpose, I found it a complete waste of time and I was able to persuade the President to have it recalled by the GHQ.

The President used to receive regular reports on the political situation in the country from the ISI and the MI. These reports in sealed envelopes marked ‘Eyes Only’ were usually handed over to the President by the C-in-C. On a few occasions the President gave me these reports and it seemed to me that the agencies were keeping the politicians, particularly the East Pakistanis, under close surveillance. I rarely found anything insightful in these reports. The DIB had direct access to the President and his weekly reports used to be fairly exhaustive. It was during the presidential election in l964 that the ISI and the MI became extremely active.. While the DIB gave the President a detailed, assessment of his
prospects in the election the ISI and the MI kept him informed of the trend of public opinion based largely on gossip. The election results showed that the three agencies had seriously under estimated the popularity of Mohtrama Miss Fatima Jinnah and given Ayub Khan too optimistic a picture of his prospects.

The crisis of intelligence came during the 1965 war. Brigadier Riaz was good enough to show me his set-up, an impressive affair judging by the sophisticated equipment and the operators at work. He told me that he had contacts inside the Occupied Kashmir and in other major Indian cities. “I will flood you with news. Don’t worry”. When the war started there was a complete blackout of news from all the intellience agencies. When I got nothing out of the ISI for two days I went to Brigadier Riaz only to learn that all his contacts had gone underground. The performance of the MI was even more frustrating. The mobile transmitter which the MI had acquired to broadcast the Voice of Kashmir conked out and Brigadier Irshad came to me to find him a spare transmitter. When I told him that it would take at least a month to import another transmitter he pleaded with me to take over the broadcast part of the operation. “How can I do that I know nothing about the operation?” I protested. “But that is the beauty of it.” said Irshad, “even I know very little about it.” It did not take the Indians long to extract the whole operational plan out of the ‘infiltrators’ whom they captured the moment they entered the Indian occupied territory in Kashmir. Four of them were put on All India Radio to make a public confession. I heard the details of the operation on the air in utter disbelief. I rushed to Muzaffarabad to acquaint Irshad with what I had heard. He fell back in his chair and moaned: “The bastards have spilt the beans.”

After the cease-fire I brought these incidents to Ayub Khan’s notice and urged him to review the working of these agencies. “They have no idea of intelligence work,” I submitted “all they can do is investigative work like sub-inspectors of police, tapping telephone conversations and chasing the suspects.” Much later Ayub Khan set up a committee to examine the working of the agencies under General the Yahya Khan. Both A.B. Awan and I
were members of the committee. The GHQ tried to put all the blame on IB for their own incompetence. Yahya wanted the committee to recommend that officers of ISI and the Ml should be posted at district headquarters. Awan strongly opposed the idea and I backed him. We could not understand the purpose of getting the military agencies involved in domestic administration. As we left the meeting Awan said to me “They are planning to impose martial law.” He proved right though it took the Army quite some time to get rid of Ayub Khan after unleashing a popular campaign against him.

The intelligence agencies got even more deeply involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan. The ISI jumped headlong into the Political crisis in East Pakistan. A National Security Council was created under the chairmanship of General Yahya Khan with Major General Ghulam Umar as second in command to control the intelligence operation which was meant to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general election. An amount of Rs 29 lac was put at the disposal of General Umar for the purpose. Before the Army action General Akbar, who was the head of the ISI and with whom I had good relations when I was in service, requested me that I should introduce him to some Bengali academics and journalists. The ISI was trying to infiltrate into the inner circles of the Awami League. Had I given him any names they too have been put on Rao Farman Ali’s hit list of Bengali intellectuals. The operation proved a total disaster. Lawrence Ziring says: “New efforts at a political solution might have been attempted later, but army intelligence failed time and again to correctly assess the situation, and the demeanor of the generals
was hardly conducive to rational decision-making.” (Lawrence Ziring, The Tragedy of East Pakistan, OUP, 1997). For General (retd) Aslam Beg to claim on solemn oath before the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the ISI got involved in the internal politics of the country only after a special cell was created by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1975 is a culpable attempt at concealing the truth and distorting the record of the operations of the military intelligence agencies since independence. The present government has only to report to the Supreme Court that the ISI deals with matters relating to Pakistan’s national security and that would be the end of Asghar Khan’s writ petition against Aslam Beg. Who will provide a definition of national security to rule out the involvement of the ISI and the MI in domestic politics which is seen as the biggest threat to the security and solidarity of Pakistan?

“UNQUOTE”

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cartier trinity コピー,カルティエ ダブルリング,カルティエ マイヨン&チェーンブレスレット