US embassy cables: Diplomats bemoan Bin Laden’s ‘folk hero’ status

Share
4

guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 20.25 GMT
Article history
Tuesday, 26 January 1999, 03:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000495
USIA
FOR NEA, I/GNEA
STATE FOR SA/PAB, D, PA
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/09
TAGS PREL, PTER, KISL, PK, AF
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: USAMA BIN LADIN
REF: PESHAWAR 031

Summary
US officials in Pakistan urge the stepping up of the propaganda war in the press and online against Osama Bin Laden two years before 9/11. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article
1. CLASSIFIED BY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNSELOR RICHARD HOAGLAND FOR REASONS 1.5(D)

2. (C) SUMMARY: IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE USG IS NOT DOING AS WELL AS IT MIGHT PROJECTING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL). WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER A REVIEW OF THIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

———————

PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

———————

2. (C) WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS:

— THE PRO-TALIBAN AL-RASHID TRUST IN KARACHI CONTINUES TO CHURN OUT PRO-UBL — AND CORRESPONDINGLY ANTI-U.S./ANTI-WESTERN — BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, AND POSTERS IN URDU, ENGLISH, AND AFGHAN LANGUAGES AT NOMINAL COST OR FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION. E.G., THE TRUST RECENTLY INTRODUCED A 3′ X 2′ FOUR- COLOR PRO-UBL POSTER WITH PHOTOS, MAPS, AND IDEOLOGICAL TEXTS AVAILABLE FOR 15 RUPEES, ABOUT 30 CENTS — JUST A BIT MORE THAN THE COST OF A SIDEWALK HAIRCUT. THIS POSTER BEAT THE USG’S UBL “WANTED” POSTER TO THE STREET.

— WE FREQUENTLY HEAR REPORTS THAT SOME IN THE LOWER-MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES, BOTH URBAN AND RURAL, CONSIDER UBL AN ISLAMIC HERO BECAUSE THE U.S. HAS NAMED HIM “PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE.” THAT SAID, IT’S OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE MAJORITY OF MUSLIMS, AT LEAST IN PAKISTAN, DO NOT NECESSARILY SUPPORT THIS VIEW. THE PENDING USG DISTRIBUTION OF UBL “WANTED” POSTERS AND MATCHBOOKS IN PAKISTAN MAY INCREASE UBL’S STATURE AS A KIND OF FOLK HERO.

— U.S. AND BRITISH EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TERRORISTS, LIKE BIN LADIN, AND “GOOD MUSLIMS” ARE SOMETIMES PORTRAYED IN THE MEDIA AND BY RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN THEIR WRITINGS AND SERMONS AS ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE ALL MUSLIMS BY CO-OPTING WESTERNIZED — MEANING (TO THEM) “MORALLY CORRUPT” — MODERATES. (NOTE: THIS REPRESENTS THE PHILOSOPHICALLY ROMANTIC VIEW THAT ISLAM PER SE ERASES ALL DIVISIONS, THAT THE MUSLIM UMMAH IS “ONE,” AND THAT AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK ON ALL. END NOTE.)

— IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THEIR ORDINARY EXECRABLE PUBLIC RELATIONS PERFORMANCE ON THE BIN LADEN QUESTION, THE TALIBAN HAVE PRE- EMPTED US CONSISTENTLY SINCE AUGUST, FIRST BY ANNOUNCING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE AFGHANISTAN;S SUPREME COURT EXAMINE THE CHARGES AGAINST BIN LADIN AND THEN BY ANNOUNCING THAT NO “EVIDENCE” (BY WHICH THEY MEANT HARD FACTS IN PROOF OF THE CHARGES) HAD BEEN PRESENTED. OUR RESPONSE IN EACH CASE WAS MUTED AND DELAYED. CONTINUING THIS TREND ON THE TALIBAN’S PART, EARLY IN JANUARY, THE TALIBAN SPONSORED A SEMINAR IN KABUL, REPORTED BY RADIO SHARIA, ON THE LIFE, TIMES, AND THOUGHTS OF UBL (REFTEL).

— ACCORDING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, PAKISTANI TALIBS WHO HAVE SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN, ALONG WITH AFGHAN TALIBS, ARE BEGINNING TO ENFORCE THEIR DOGMAS AND SOCIAL CONTROLS IN PAKISTAN’S TRIBAL TERRITORIES AND IN SOME PLACES IN BALOCHISTAN AND NWFP PROVINCES. ALSO, LAST WEEK, THE GOP ENFORCED ISLAMIC LAW BY DECREE IN MALAKAND DIVISION AND IN A PART OF KOHISTAN. ALTHOUGH THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED AS YET, THEY SUGGEST A DISTURBING TREND. INDEED, THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE PAKISTANI CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHING SHARIA AS THE SUPREME LAW OF PAKISTAN — AN AVOWEDLY HIGH PRIORITY OF THE NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT — HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND IS PENDING BEFORE THE SENATE.

——————–

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

——————–

4. (C) WE ARE UNLIKELY EVER TO MAKE MUCH INROAD WITH UBL’S HARD-CORE SUPPORTERS BECAUSE THEY ARE TRUE-BELIEVER ABSOLUTISTS AND TEND TO THINK AND REACT LARGELY EMOTIONALLY: FACTS ARE LESS IMPORTANT TO THEM THAN EMOTIONS. THEY ARE NOT OPEN TO PERSUASION. FURTHER, WE FACE A FORMIDABLE FOE AMONG THOSE WHO ARE CHURNING OUT AND WIDELY DISSEMINATING PRO-UBL PROPAGANDA AND TAKING OTHER ACTIVE MEASURES.

5. (C) HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A LARGE MIDDLE GROUND, IN PAKISTAN AND IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ANTI- U.S./ANTI-WESTERN AND WHICH IS NOT IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED TO UBL AND HIS PAN- ISLAMIST REVOLUTION. THIS MIDDLE GROUND, SOMEWHAT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REASON, OR AT LEAST TO OTHER INFORMATION, SHOULD BE OUR PRIMARY TARGET. THE MESSAGE CRAFTED FOR THEM WOULD ALSO BE WELCOMED BY THE EDUCATED, WESTWARD- LOOKING ELITE OF BOTH PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN WHO FEEL THREATENED BY UBL’S ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE AND THEOLOGICAL OBSCURANTISM.

6. (C) THE FOCUS OF ANY ENHANCED USG PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO PORTRAY UBL AND OTHERS AROUND HIM AS CRIMINALS, BOTH BY INTERNATIONAL AND BY ISLAMIC STANDARDS. WHERE POSSIBLE, RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MOVEMENT “AL-QAIDA” SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED, NOT JUST UBL AS AN INDIVIDUAL.

— WHEN WE FOCUS ON BIN LADIN, AND ESPECIALLY FOR AFGHAN CONSUMPTION, WE SHOULD MAKE THREE POINTS: 1) THE U.S. IS NOT AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, 2) THE U.S. IS NOT AGAINST ANY PARTICULAR AFGHAN POLITICAL FACTION, AND 3) THE U.S. WANTS UBL EXPELLED FROM AFGHANISTAN TO A PLACE WHERE HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

— THE BROADER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT COULD INCLUDE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, A “CHARGE SHEET” OF THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY UBL, BY HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES, AND BY HIS FOLLOWERS, NOTING THE FACT THAT MANY OF THEIR VICTIMS HAVE BEEN MUSLIMS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES.

— RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS AND NOT TO COMPROMISE ON-GOING INVESTIGATIONS AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES, WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM BOMBINGS, AS WELL AS ABOUT UBL’S AND HIS MOVEMENT’S OTHER CRIMES.

— THIS INTENSIFIED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE VALIDATION FROM ISLAMIC SOURCES THAT THESE CRIMES ARE INDEED RECOGNIZED AS CRIMES UNDER ISLAM. RATHER THAN STATEMENTS BY U.S.- OR UK-BASED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS, IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE TO USE THE TEACHINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF MAJOR ISLAMIC SCHOLARS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT, AND ELSEWHERE. IN SELECTING/ELICITING SUCH CITATIONS, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT UBL AND THE PAN- ISLAMISTS DISMISS SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT AS ONLY NOMINALLY ISLAMIC STATES CAPTIVE TO U.S.-TOADYING, DESPOTIC, AND APOSTATE LEADERS.

— KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN HIS DECEMBER 23 INTERVIEW UBL JUSTIFIED KILLING MUSLIMS IN HIS JIHAD AGAINST “CRUSADERS AND JEWS,” AND RECOGNIZING THE EMOTIONAL ASPECT OF OUR TARGET AUDIENCE, WE SHOULD PREPARE FOR DISSEMINATION MORE HUMAN INTEREST STORIES OF UBL’S VICTIMS, ESPECIALLY HIS MUSLIM VICTIMS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES. U.S. MEDIA REPORTS OF BLINDED KENYANS, FOR EXAMPLE, RECEIVED GOOD COVERAGE IN THE PAKISTANI PRINT MEDIA.

7. (7) EFFECTIVE METHODS WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE THE TRADITIONAL USG PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOOLS: VOA LANGUAGE SERVICES, INCLUDING INTERVIEWS WITH UBL’S MUSLIM VICTIMS; CAREFULLY TARGETED WORLDNET INTERACTIVES; WIRELESS-FILE TEXTS AND FACT SHEETS FOR TRANSLATION INTO LOCAL LANGUAGES; AND COMMISSIONED ARTICLES FOR PRESS PLACEMENT.

8. (C) CONSIDERATION COULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO PRODUCTION OF A BOOKLET IN LOCAL LANGUAGES ON THE CRIMES OF BIN LADIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES, ALONG WITH VICTIMS’ STORIES, FOR NON- CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN MOSQUES, MADRASSAS, ISLAMIC STUDY CENTERS, ISLAMIA DEPARTMENTS OF UNIVERSITIES, AND BOOKSTORES.

9. (C) A NON-USG-IDENTIFIED WEB SITE COULD ALSO BE CREATED TO POST THE ABOVE MATERIAL AND THE URL WIDELY DISTRIBUTED. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE COUNTER-INTUITIVE — THAT THE MASSES DON’T USE THE INTERNET — ALMOST ALL ISLAMIC AND ISLAMIST GROUPS DO INDEED HAVE INTERNET ACCESS AND USE IT EXTENSIVELY.

HOAGLAND

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/987

Thursday, 19 February 2009, 16:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 000365
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI’S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

3. (C) But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan’s Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI Chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the area after the “peace deal” inevitably fails.

The Big Strategic Questions

—————————

11. (S) Zardari and Gilani agree that Pakistan’s biggest threat comes from a growing militant insurgency on the Pak-Afghan border. The military and ISI have not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principle threat and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy tool.

12. (S) The single biggest message Kayani should hear in Washington is that this support must end. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan’s own interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan–where Haqqani is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians–and the region–where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers.

13. (S) Kayani will want to hear that the U.S. has turned the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to redeploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.

Pakistani Will. . . .

———————

14. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in Bajaur and Mohmand, FATA. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits “the militants are

ISLAMABAD 00000365 003 OF 006

after me and my job.” The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda.

15. (C) The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue, deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.

16. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari’a law with the Taliban. This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings, closure of girls’ schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end. Under international pressure, Zardari has not yet signed off on the deal pending assurances it really will deliver peace; a similar negotiation in 2008 failed.

17. (C) Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue that he does not have the forces to battle on multiple fronts, so he is picking his battles and negotiating to preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that it will be difficult for international donors to support a government that is not prepared to go all-out to defend its own territory.

. . .vs Capability

——————

18. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against formidable militants, Pakistan’s Frontier Corps (FC) and military finally have begun to accept more USG training and assistance in support of counter-insurgency (COIN). Kayani will appreciate U.S. recognition of the casualties his men have suffered, and this is an opening we should exploit to press for expanded FC and special forces (SSG) training. Kayani remains leery of too large a USG military footprint in Pakistan, but to win he must be able to fight without creating the level of civilian casualties his forces’ blind artillery and F-16 bombardments are now producing. We are responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air Support training to improve the precision of F-16s they are using in FATA. We should probe for the possible introduction of U.S. military observers/advisors to improve the COIN capability of this 1940’s force.

19. (S) Kayani will repeat his requests for increased intelligence sharing, notably SIGINT, in support of ongoing military operations in FATA. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and this month we will expand real-time tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. We continue to work on delivering Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial capability (two B350-ERs) that Kayani has raised with all his high-level visitors.

20. (C) The Bush administration’s commitment to provide Pakistan with $300 million annually in FMF expires in 2009, and we need to come to agreement with Pakistan on how to restructure its FMF program to meet its long-term COIN needs. The Pakistan military has requested $1B per year for five years (FY10-14) in FMF.

21. (C) Kayani may request additional U.S. support for Pakistan’s F-16 program, the flagship symbol of post-9/11 re-engagement. We are about to send to Congress notification for an additional $142 million in FMF support for one part of this complex program. But we do not believe Pakistan can afford to complete a $2 billion plus program to buy 18 new F-16s, upgrade 35 older aircraft, upgrade a new base, and fund a munitions package. Given the funding and production

ISLAMABAD 00000365 004 OF 006

line implications of either bailing out the GOP or canceling the program, U.S. agencies are reviewing our options.

22. (C) We could not agree more with Kayani on the need to modernize Pakistan’s helicopter fleet; on any given day, they have perhaps 2-3 attack helos flying in support of COIN operations. We now are delivering spare parts for their Cobra and Bell 412s, overhauling and upgrading their MI-17s, and assessing ways to improve overall helicopter maintenance.

U.S. Strikes

————

23. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has eliminated 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan over the last year. However, the strikes have put increasing political pressure on the Pakistani government, which has struggled to explain why it is allowing an ally to violate its sovereignty. The GOP so far has denied recent media reports alleging that the U.S. is launching the strikes from bases in Pakistan. Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans. He will argue, however, that they undermine his campaign plan, which is to keep the Waziristans quiet until the Army is capable of attacking Baitullah Mehsud and other militants entrenched there. In recent meetings with Special Representative Holbrooke, a variety of Pakistani interlocutors (and now the press) suggested that the U.S. work jointly with Pakistan and target Mehsud or other militants who are killing Pakistanis.

Afghanistan

———–

24. (C) Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has improved dramatically in recent months. This includes exchanges of tactical intelligence that allows NATO forces to block passes in support of Pakistani operations and has helped lower attacks on U.S./NATO forces. In recent meetings with ISAF Commander McKiernan, Kayani raised concern about the effect of a U.S. troop build-up in southern Afghanistan, which could push militants and refugees across the border into Balochistan and prompt an influx of foreign fighters. Pakistan currently has only one Army brigade and perhaps 15 Frontier Corps wings stationed along the vast and largely unpopulated Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan.

25. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces in Afghanistan. The troop surge will require us to send additional supplies through the Chaman (Balochistan) border crossing in Afghanistan; CENTCOM is now evaluating ways to improve delivery of supplies through Pakistan.

Bio Notes

———

29. (U) General Ashfaq Kayani was born in Punjab in 1952, grew up in a working-class family and is the son of a former junior officer. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army after graduating from the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971. His long career has included command at every level from Company to Corps. He has served in key staff positions, to include Military Assistant to the Prime Minister under Benazir Bhutto from 1988-1990, Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), 2000-2003, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) from 2004-2007, and Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2007. In November 2007, he became Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He is the only officer ever to have served as both DG-ISI and COAS. His term as DGMO coincided with the intense military standoff with India of 2001-2002.

30. (C) C) In interactions with post, Kayani is often direct, frank, and thoughtful. He has fond memories of his IMET training at Fort Leavenworth and values his personal relationships, particularly with U.S. military leaders. Kayani is married and the father of two children, a son and a

ISLAMABAD 00000365 006 OF 006

daughter. An avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan Golf Association. He smokes heavily and can be difficult to understand as he tends to mumble.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/192895

US embassy cables: Punjab, ISI and a distracted president trouble Pakistan

Share
10

guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 30 November 2010 21.59 GMT
Article history
Wednesday, 04 February 2009, 10:40
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 000236
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/24/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, MARR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY HOLBROOKE
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

Summary
The Islamabad ambassador sweeps over Pakistan’s troubled political and security landscape for incoming envoy Richard Holbrooke. It is not a failed state but confronts “dire” challenges including an under-equipped army and a distracted president, she says. Young Punjabi men are joining the extremists, and ambiguity persists about the role of the ISI. Key passages highlighted in yellow.

Read related article
1. (C) Summary. Mission Pakistan warmly welcomes your arrival; your appointment comes as Pakistan grapples with internal change and hopes the Ombama administration can support regional solutions to development and counter-terrorism challenges. After eight years of military rule, the civilian government is working, so far successfully, to re-shape civilian-military relations. Although not a failed state, Pakistan needs international help to stabilize civilian rule by building democratic institutions and delivering relief to a population suffering from food inflation, electricity blackouts, high unemployment and deteriorating law and order. Passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill and delivery of U.S. assistance at the upcoming IMF Donors’ Conference offer new avenues to combat extremism inside and outside of the tribal areas and reduce anti-Americanism across Pakistan.

2. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against a formidable militant enemy, Pakistan’s military finally has begun to accept more USG training and assistance in support of counter-insurgency. Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has improved dramatically in recent months and will be even more important if the U.S. raises troop levels in Afghanistan. A surge of U.S. troops across the border may push more militants into Pakistan, creating new challenges especially if Pakistan must defend a new front in Balochistan. As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful over the past year in disrupting the al-Qaida network based in Pakistan’s tribal areas; we can discuss this issue in greater detail with you. A friendly Zardari-Karzai relationship is creating new opportunities to improve cross-border trade and build an energy corridor that could eventually link Central and South Asia. Improved Pak-Afghan ties offer new prospects for outreach to Taliban reconcilables on both sides of the border.

3. (C) Indo-Pakistan relations are still simmering. In the wake of Mumbai and accelerating militant control of Pakistani territory, the military/ISI faces the need to re-evaluate its historic use of proxy tribes/militant groups as foreign policy tools. Although the conventional wisdom says that Mumbai closed the door on Kashmir discussions, there is no doubt that Pakistan believes tackling the Kashmir issue remains the key to regional security. We offer a detailed update below. End Summary

Domestic Politics

—————–

4. (C) The civilian government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, is now stable. Zardari’s position currently is secure, and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces and effectively control all three branches of federal government. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. Instead, Nawaz is rebuilding his party’s structure in preparation for the next election and appealing directly to street. Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can avoid another election until he receives international assistance to address food and fuel inflation, electricity blackouts and high unemployment.

5. (C) While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American and anti-extremist; we believe he is our best ally in the government. Clearly, Zardari runs the show, and Gilani has at times chafed at public acknowledgment of this fact. We believe, however, that reports of Zardari-Gilani tensions are exaggerated; Gilani knows his place and will tow Zardari’s line.

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX The PPP may also make a power play to take over the Punjab government, which now is ruled by Shahbaz Sharif. During your visit you no doubt will

ISLAMABAD 00000236 002 OF 005

hear rumors the Army is unhappy with Zardari and may step in to oust him, particularly if it is needed to restore order.

7. (C) The premise behind these rumors is that Nawaz-inspired street demonstrations timed to coincide with indirect Senate elections and another lawyers’ “Long March” on March 9 may get out of hand. We see little evidence this scenario will get out of control; so far, we are encouraged by Chief of Army Staff General Kayani’s determination to have the civilians succeed. Kayani dislikes Nawaz far more than he mistrusts Zardari.

Not A Failed State

——————

8. (C) This is not a failed state. Pakistan has solid albeit weak institutions, a robust if often irresponsible media, established although under-equipped police forces, an increasingly strong civil society, and a population with a proven resiliency to withstand everything from earthquakes to kleptocracy. However, Zardari is more adept at political maneuvering than governing; we believe he is spending too much time on his rivalry with Nawaz and too little time on rolling back a spreading insurgency and improving a weak economy.

9. (C) Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges it confronts are dire. The government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and domestic militant groups; deteriorating law and order in turn is undermining economic recovery. The bureaucracy is settling into third-world mediocrity, as demonstrated by some corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate policy.

Security

——–

10. (C) The good news is that the government has the will to fight extremism and the Army/Frontier Corps is now actively engaged in combat, particularly in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat. Faced with its weaknesses against a formidable enemy, the Frontier Corps is now accepting USG training, and that is giving us new access and opportunities to improve Pakistani counter-insurgency capability. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and this month we will expand tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. The military remains reluctant to expand the U.S. military footprint, but we now have the basis for increased cooperation. We are also delivering Cobra spare parts and upgrading their MI-17 and Bell 412 helicopters so the Pakistanis can operate more than two Cobras on any given day.

11. (C) The bad news is that the militants are driving the agenda; the Pakistan military has too few forces to fight too many battles at one time. They have more troops on the Indian border but felt the need to transfer 5,000-7,000 troops from FATA to the eastern border in the wake of increased Indo-Pak tensions after Mumbai. The latest territorial loss has been in Swat, in the “settled area” of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) about 90 miles from Islamabad, where local/taliban militants are closing schools, beheading opponents, and operating a parallel justice system. The police cannot cope and largely have abandoned locals to their fate.

12. (C) The military’s decision in 2008 to strike a deal with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan helped to reduce the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan but gave Mehsud free rein to infiltrate his forces throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He has exploited Sunni-Shi’a tensions in places like Kurram and sent his fighters into Bajaur via Afghanistan to attack government positions. This has eroded Chief of Army Staff General Kayani’s strategy to gradually regain control of the FATA agency by agency.

13. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting al-Qaida operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the past year, 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives, including those responsible for the East

ISLAMABAD 00000236 003 OF 005

Africa embassy bombings in 1998 and tied to Islambad’s Marriott bombing, have been eliminated. We can discuss this issue in more detail during your visit.

Solutions

———

14. (C) The government has a strategy of “dialogue, deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants. Many Pakistanis have been closely following reports of Saudi-brokered intervention with Taliban “reconcilables” in Afghanistan and many believe a similar strategy is needed in Pakistan.

15. (C) We share the government’s belief that there is no all-military solution to containing extremism. We are implementing a strategy of concurrently building the counter-insurgency capability of the Army and Frontier Corps, providing the police/FATA law enforcement forces with training and equipment, and delivering economic development to raise poor socio-economic indicators in FATA. Security concerns are limiting our ability to operate, but today USAID contractors are building schools and wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs, training teachers and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to deliver services that demonstrate the writ of government in FATA. Through USAID, DOD and USG donations to UN agencies, we have provided over $10 million in aid to help up to 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons who fled fighting in Bajaur and Swat and now are living in and out of camps, primarily near Peshawar.

16. (C) Extremism, however, is no longer restricted to the border area. We are seeing young Punjabi men turn up in FATA and Afghanistan as fighters recruited from areas of southern Punjab where poverty, illiteracy and despair create a breeding ground for extremism. The phenomenon is spreading into northern Sindh as well. Pashtuns fleeing military action in FATA are destabilizing the always volatile ethnic mix in Karachi. Taliban leaders have been based in Quetta since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad, but they now are expanding their presence in Balochistan. In response, we are redirecting USAID programs geographically to concentrate on areas where the nexus of poverty and extremism is growing.

17. (SBU) Including FATA, USAID will program approximately $500 million in 2009 for Pakistan; if Kerry/Lugar is approved and funded, this will increase to $1.5 billion per year in primarily economic assistance. We have provided over $40 million in equipment to the Frontier Corps and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police; we are in the midst of programming another $15 million for the NWFP police and await the results of a police assessment team to reprogram another $85 million for law enforcement. Given the urgent requirement to address the absence of law enforcement capacity in the NWFP and FATA, we are proposing that $100 million for law enforcement assistance be included in the Kerry-Lugar legislation.

Afghanistan

———–

18. (C) Benazir Bhutto met with President Karzai the morning of her assassination; Karzai attended Zardari’s inauguration and the two have met repeatedly under much improved bilateral relations. They have signed new economic cooperation agreements, are considering a new transit trade treaty and have tentatively scheduled another round of the peace jirga. We continue to see potential for expanded economic relations and the prospect of building a trade and energy corridor that can link Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the rich markets of South Asia.

19. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces in Afghanistan. Cooperation and coordination

ISLAMABAD 00000236 004 OF 005

between Pakistani and NATO/Afghan forces across the border have dramatically increased since October. This has reduced cross-border attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This cooperation will be even more important if the U.S. executes a planned troop surge in Afghanistan. Such a surge, particularly if it is employed along the Helmand-Kandahar/Balochistan border, may send additional fighters into Pakistan and create another front for the Pakistan military to defend.

India

—–

20. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to show progress on prosecuting those responsible for the Mumbai attacks. Interior Minister Malik will outline to you his plan to prosecute Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JUD) suspects now in custody. The key will be whether the military/ISI is ready to turn the Mumbai suspects over to civilian law enforcement, and whether India considers Pakistani actions adequate. Kayani, in particular, wants to avoid a reckoning with his past leadership of ISI. Despite arrests of key LeT/JUD leaders and closure of some of their camps, it is unclear if ISI has finally abandoned its policy of using these proxy forces as a foreign policy tool; we need to continue pressing them to realize this strategy has become counter-productive in Kashmir, Afghanistan and FATA.

21. (C) The Foreign Ministry quashed National Assembly debate of a resolution signed by leaders of most of the political parties urging the U.S. to appoint a special envoy on Kashmir, or add that portfolio to your plate. However, privately, Zardari and FM Qureshi have indicated they would welcome your engagement on Kashmir. Although the conventional wisdom says that Mumbai closed the door on Kashmir discussions; from Pakistan’s perspective, there is no doubt that tackling the Kashmir issue remains the key to regional security.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/190330