Our quasi-feudal political parties — by Babar Ayaz
There is a wide demand and supply gap in the political market. The political parties that are ill-prepared, power-centric, self-seeking and have failed to fathom the change cannot meet this yawning gap. Their change and growth is quintessential for a democratic Pakistan
Puzzled Pakistanis are asking why the government took an untenable action regarding the appointment of superior courts’ judges that led it to eat humble pie so quickly. Anybody with an ability to read the constitution and the judgments related to this issue was quite clear that the position taken by the government would not stand the test of the existing law.
For the time being, the government has resolved the crisis by stepping back and accepting the public pressure — that is the beauty of democracy. Remember Musharraf did not bat an eyelid despite the best of civil society’s efforts. But, is the final of the government vs judicature match over? I doubt it. Already, the judiciary is being goaded by some towards hammering down the president’s constitutional immunity. Trust me, the media does have an influence, which is not ignored by all the state institutions, the judiciary included.
The debate that the constitution and the subsequent judgments give arbitrary powers to the Chief Justice of Pakistan is healthy but can be held at the parliamentary forum. The Charter of Democracy (CoD), which has been signed by the two major parties, has touched this issue in detail and has suggested an alternate process of appointments. But till the time parliament amends the constitution, the existing law has to be followed whether one likes it or not. PPP’s ex-senator Taj Haider is hopeful that this issue would be resolved by the 18th Amendment, which is being worked out by the parliamentary committee for the last two years. He is sure that the amendment would be put before the house on March 23 this year. If the PPP felt that it was an urgent issue, it should have moved on with the agreed clauses of the CoD first and then worked on another amendment that could have taken care of the contentious issues. Some members of the committee feel that lumping of provincial autonomy issues with this amendment has dragged out the decision. While the opposition calls the inclusion of contentious issues as deliberate delaying tactics, the smaller provinces’ representatives are of the view that they can wrangle more autonomy in the same amendment ‘now’ from the Punjabi establishment. “Right now they need the amendment, so it is the time to strike a bargain,” a Baloch nationalist leader confided.
If all this is so simple, then we have to revisit the first question why the government took the plunge to bite the bullet. Every time the government struggles to gain more political space from other apparatuses of the state, why do the politicians lose? The history of political parties in Pakistan is witness to the fact that right from the very beginning, the civil and military bureaucracy and judicature has dominated them. In Pakistan, the growth of political parties has been retarded because of a predominant role played by other, more organised institutions of the state. Frequent interruption of the democratic process by these institutions in collusion with each other and their mastery in intrigues when a political government is in power, has resulted in this retardation of the political parties and the political process in the country.
On the other hand, the political parties of Pakistan represent a quasi-feudal social structure, which is in line with the demographic profile of the country. In sharp contrast, the civil-military-judicial bureaucracy has grown as the apparatus of a modern industrialised society. The growth of these institutions of our polity has been uneven. That is what gives an upper hand to the establishment over the political parties. While the subject of the changing role of political parties has been scrutinised closely by the political scientists in Western democracies, this subject has received little attention in ‘third-wave democracies’ like Pakistan.
Many agree with political scientists Mainwaring and Scully’s contention that Party System Institutionalisation (PSI) is important for the consolidation of democracy. Nonetheless, the precise nature of the relationship between political party systems and democracy has been difficult to distil. Indeed, scholars have made contradictory claims and reported contradictory findings regarding the effects of the different dimensions of political party systems on the consolidation of democracy.
The Pakistani experience shows that our major political parties fare well when they are in the opposition and perform poorly when they are in government. Why? To investigate this riddle, political scientists should undertake research work. There are a number of reasons that have not allowed our political parties to grow to meet the challenges of the 21st century and acquire a dominant policy making role in a democratic polity.
We can briefly discuss a few here. Let’s first take the two major parties — the PPP and the PML-N. The major support of the PPP has traditionally come from the rural areas and to some extent from the urban lower middle class. Because of the predominant role played by the rural politicians, the party has not developed a strong intellectual base. Many middle class intellectuals do get attracted to this party, because of its left-of-centre programme and Bhutto’s rhetorical radicalism, but they have always been kept at the periphery of the party. Their views are heard but given no weightage. Those who manage to get close to the leadership are mostly those who are intellectually dishonest. Such timeservers always give advice to the rulers that the party leader wants to hear. The party has no think-tank to discuss and prepare position papers, which can provide clarity of thinking. As a matter of fact, all political parties have failed to change and to meet the needs of the information and knowledge age. They are still reeling with their quasi-feudal hangover and aiming to fight the modern state apparatus, which has constantly kept political parties embroiled in one issue or another.
The PML-N is the right-of-centre party that has attracted mainly businessmen of urban Punjab. But, again, the party structure and its functioning are suffering from a feudal value system hangover. The leadership is as autocratic as that of the PPP. The PML-N has no think-tank either, but has some able technocrats to its credit.
Another major reason for these parties’ inability to claim their due space from the developed state apparatus is that they cannot meet the high aspiration level of the people who want an advanced democracy, overnight poverty alleviation and modern infrastructure. These aspirations have been built up by the information explosion. People of emerging countries want to be like a developed Western country now. No government can meet this expectation level. Hence, there is a wide demand and supply gap in the political market. The political parties that are ill-prepared, power-centric, self-seeking and have failed to fathom the change cannot meet this yawning gap. Their change and growth is quintessential for a democratic Pakistan.
The writer can be reached at ayazbabar@gmail.com
Source: Daily Times
The Pakistani Rich are Worse than Animals
=========================================
Taimur Rahman
Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party
Even animals have their limits, but the Pakistani ruling-class,
arguibly the most reactionary ruling-class anywhere in the world (if not
in the history of the world) are worse than animals. In Muzaffargarh
the worst crime imaginable has occurred.
A boy of low class peasant origin was found sitting in a field next to a
girl of the feudal family. The boy was twelve years old and the girl was
about 16. Obviously, these were two kids just playing in the fields.
The feudal lords of the area, who live with a culture of strictly
segregating their women and themselves from the manual workers were
infuriated by the fact that the two were socialising. Feudal lords in
Pakistan think of women as property that might become unclean if low
class people come in contact with their Izzat (honour).
So they kidnapped the boy and raped him.
At first they thought that the 12 year boy would not leak the story. As
it became clear that the boy might leak the story possibly even to the
police, the feudal lords made another attack on the peasants.
To cover up their earlier deed, they called a meeting of the Jirga
(feudal tribal council) and alleged that the two had been found in a
“compromising position” and that justice could only be served by the
rule “an eye for an eye”. 400 peasants were watching the meeting of the
Jirga.
The Jirga ordered the father of the girl to bring his 18 year old
daughter (the sister of the boy) to the Jirga. He complied. She was
taken to a nearby barn and gang raped by four adult men. She was sent
back to her father and parents NAKED.
All the low classes of the village stood-by powerless.
These are the Jirgas and Panchayats that politicians such as Imran Khan
and Karzai (in Afghanistan) so boldy hold up as the model of democracy.
Who order the gang rape of teenagers. Some of the names of those who
committed this crime are: Fayyaz, Manzoor, Allah Ditta, Maulvi Abdul
Razzaq and Mazoor Jatoi. The name of the sixth member could not be
ascertained.
The Punjab police has allegedly arrested some people involved with this
incident. But the fact is that the Punjab police is full of more rapists
than the feudals of Pakistan. In my opinion they have arrested the
perpetrators of this crime to save them from a possible attack by other
people.
There are powerful lessons to be learnt from this incident.
First, this teenage girl (just like your daughter or sister) was not
gang raped by
some frustrated group of youngsters acting on their own (not that this
would have made this henious act any less barbaric), but by the TRIBAL
COUNCIL. To further humiliate the poor peasants, she was sent back home
naked.
This was therefore, a decision taken by the ruling-class against the
poor peasants. Its intention was to “teach them all a lesson”. The
lesson is that the poor are the slaves of the rich ruling-class of
Pakistan. If they mistakenly feel that there is any form of equality,
even socialisation between the rich and the poor, the worst possible and
most humiliating punishment will be metted out against them. Even the
Israeli army has to maintain some semblance of democracy and concern for
human rights in the international media, but the feudal lords of
Pakistan are criminals beyond compare. They are worse than the
zionists.
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that these slave drivers are unwilling
for any form of equality or democracy. Is there any solution open to
the workers and peasants of Pakistan other than a revolution?
No! The slave holders of Pakistan, who have denied the people the
opportunity for freedom and justice have themselves sealed the fate of
the future course of development of Pakistani society. They are the
ones that should be held responsible for violent revolution. They have
denied the people any other course of action. The peace-loving people
have tried every means to achieve some semblance of equality and
democracy but it has always been crushed by the military, the feudals,
and the capitalists.
The time has come for the people of Pakistan to take their destiny into
their own hands. To not wait for the establishment, the police, the
army, the courts, the judiciary, the parliament (which does not exist),
and all these other institutions that are only built to protect the rich
to “deliver” justice. The time has come for the people to create a
peoples justice.
Just like the women of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) are arming
their women, the women of Pakistan should be fully armed to defend
themselves. Not only those who raped the girl, but all those who
participated in anyway in the decision of to rape this girl should be
given the death sentence.
People talk of non-violence, they say we need reform not revolution.
These are the silly dreams of utopians who are totally disconnected and
unaware of the reality of the oppression on the ground. They are
unaware of the barbaric character of the ruling-class of Pakistan.
The first conclusion is that Pakistan needs a peoples-democratic
revolution.
Second, we must ask ourselves, when Pakistan was created it was said
that this was in order to safeguard the Muslims. Have the Muslims been
safeguarded? On the Khabarnama (news) at 9 pm our government talks of
the rape of Kashmiri women by the Indian soldiers. Are the working-women
of Pakistan safe from the feudals, police, and army of Pakistan? It is
said that the rights of self-determination of the Kashmiri people are
not safeguarded. Are the rights of self-determination of the people of
Pakistan guaranteed?
The answer to all these questions, and many others, is NO!
Today the people of Pakistan are enslaved to the feudals, capitalists,
and the civil military oligarchy.
Therefore, the greatest enemy of the people of Pakistan is not the
Indian aggressor. The Indian aggressor is the greatest enemy of the
people of India. The greatest enemy of the people of Pakistan is the
enemy at home. The ruling-class and rich of Pakistan who thrive on
looting, plundering, and rape.
It is against our own ruling-class that we need to make a
peoples-democratic revolution.
Therefore, I appeal to you:
People of Pakistan, do not be fooled by the nationalist and religious
sloganeering of our ruling-class.
The real enemy of the poor people of Pakistan, the workers and peasants
of Pakistan, the men and women of Pakistan, the Baluchi, Sindhi, Pathan,
Kashmiri, Punjabi is the ruling-class, the class of rich people of
Pakistan.
In what sense can we talk of Independence when our daughters and sisters
raped by jirgas and panchayats. Enough is enough.
Unite the many to fight the few!
Unite the poor to fight the rich!
Unite the people to overthrow the ruling-class!
Inqalab Zindabad
Taimur Rahman
Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party
http://www.left.ru/inter/july/rahman.html
Feudals and Us
Sameer
June 30, 2004
Today’s Balochi society closely resembles native Pakistanis societies through ages, when no distinction between tribal elders and feudals existed. Land belonged to the king during the Islamic Empires period and leased to tribes in exchange for providing soldiers,
horses, grain, etc until after 10 years of Dullabhatti’s rebellion, when Mughal king Akbar accepted the right of tribal elders to own land. However, British Raj began the practice of awarding land titles for the first time in this region.
Not surprisingly, the acceptance of land-owning right brought an end to the first phase of conversion to Islam. The coercion and sweetened deals by Sufis working as front men for rulers in the absence of land owning right carried lot more weight earlier than later when land owned by tribal elders-feudals could not be at risk. From the time of Akbar onward, mostly lower castes were converted to Islam in the second phase while tribal based conversions were mostly to Sikhism. The conversion to Islam on tribal basis made it the majority religion in the region now comprising Pakistan as well as Bengal whereas conversion of lower castes as in the weak-tribal-strong-caste Ganges plains societies, Islam remains a minority religion. The tribal elders-feudals played the most crucial role in making it a Muslim majority region. People with strong tribal affiliations could not and would not have converted without tribal elders first converting. Most Pakistanis are Muslim because of tribal elders-feudals.
Feudals played very significant role in the creation of Pakistan since the early days of Muslim League. Bengali and Uttar Pardeshi feudals were prominent in ML since its inception and resisted the pressure from urban Muslims like Shibli Nomani to make ML an Islamic party instead of party of Muslims. A person with feudal background named Ch. Rehmat Ali coined the name Pakistan. Most of the Muslims in Muslim majority provinces were rural, who were won over to ML with the help of feudals. The road to the creation of Pakistan was finally cleared of hurdles once Punjabi and Sindhi feudals and feudals-cum-pirs joined ML during mid-1940s upon the advice of British, after failing to win British Raj’s support for separate ethnic based regional entities. Pakistanis are Pakistanis, thanks in parts to feudals’ support at that critical juncture in history.
Pakistan was truly a bureaucratic state during the early years until about 1955. Bureaucracy ran Pakistan efficiently despite political turmoil until military started interfering directly in the politics. Ayub Khan introduced large number of feudals directly into active national and provincial level politics in order to win popular rural support and later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto followed same strategy. Rural Pakistanis (feudals territory) did not participate in two movements, to get rid of Ayub Khan in 1969 and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, while urban Pakistanis took part enthusiastically. Later feudals joined hands with Zia Ul Haque and more recently with Musharraf. It turns out that feudals made the right decisions by staying away from movements in 1969 and 1977. Within a short duration of less than 25 years, history has exonerated them from distancing popular urban political movements. The 1969 movement led to Yahya Khan’s rule, political divisions and the cessation of East Pakistan whereas the movement in 1977 gave Pakistanis 11 eleven years of Zia ul Haque rule whose repercussions are likely to be felt for a long time to come. In the case of supporting Zia and Musharraf, it looks bad but Zia did not and Musharraf does not need feudals’ support for the continuation of dictatorships.
Feudals are an essential ingredient of rural culture. They provide order – though imperfect one – in near absence of law enforcing and justice dispensing state apparatus. Yet rural society abides better by the common sense values better than their urban Pakistanis. Fruits are picked after ripening in rural areas whereas fruits from unprotected trees in urban areas are stolen before ever reaching ripened stage. An old bus polluting the atmosphere with smoke runs for years in rural areas whereas new buses are set on fire often in routine Friday demonstrations in urban areas. The presence of tribal chiefs and feudals at the top has definitely contributed to this order. Feudals are deep-rooted in local cultures; they are part of the folklore, traditional songs and festivals. Feudals as a class have contributed more than average in non-feudal fields such as producing poets, writers, professionals, educators, politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, etc. They have definitely contributed below average in producing religious figures, thus serving people instead of religion.
The total number of feudals in Pakistan runs into tens of thousands. About a 1000 of them are politically active at national and provincial levels. Outs of 1000 or so feudals, about 100 are in dominating positions. They are just as corrupt as non-feudals from urban areas, making money through corruption of all kinds with taking out bank loans and then getting them written off being the most common method. Agriculture output generally has not been a source of extensive wealth accumulation; it is more for power and pride.
Feudals are often charged with abusive crimes, cheating in agriculture related taxes, changing parties to side with the governing party and resistance to change traditions for modernity resulting in status quo or snail-paced changes. The frequency of abusive crimes is probably same, if not more, in rest of the society. Poor respect for law and less likelihood of retribution for abusive crimes are pervasive all over Pakistan. The powerful everywhere in Pakistan abuse poor masses. However, in the case of feudals with no sympathy in urban-based print and electronic media, the stories of abuse make headlines and acts of goodwill go unnoticed. Tax evasion is definitely worse in urban Pakistan than rural Pakistan. The tax collecting rural authorities like ‘patwaris’, ‘qanun-goh’ and ‘naib tehsildars’ have seldom become super-rich like income tax, excise and custom officers of major cities. Feudals are not the only ones who recently changed colors at the blink of an eye to side with the rulers but religious MMA and urban MQM did the same. The snail-paced progress to go with status quo is anytime better than urban-based obscurantism and retrogressive tendencies.
Feudalism has no place in a modern liberal, secular and democratic society and feudals know it. They are changing faster than rest of the Pakistani society to cope with the currents of modernity, which are beyond their control. Some have started to act modern without thinking modern but many are also thinking modern along with acting modern, which is highly commendable. Feudals should be judged against the overall conditions and alternates at hand. They stand no chance if judged against modern liberal, secular, humanistic and democratic society with rule of law, liberty, equality and justice for all in full practice. However, only a tiny minority of Pakistanis holds these ideals. Judging without the background of local conditions and probable alternates invariably leads to exaggerated sharpening and highlighting the good and bad extremes. Anyway, it is fair to award an overall “C” grade to feudals’ performance in Pakistan due to abuse of power, changing sides quickly and resistance to change with time due to larger than necessary component of traditions in the collective rural Pakistanis wisdom.
Rest of this write-up deal with establishing the credibility of the accusers or feudals’ substitutes in this case by presenting their credentials. They belong to one big confused mass known as urban Pakistanis. Their confusion knows no boundaries of irrational exuberance, self-righteousness, disorder, disapproval and detesting. Majority of urban Pakistanis is ummites, semi-ummites or quasi-ummites. Ummites (fundamentalists) are dedicated to serving Islam by imposing strict Islamic codes in both public and private arenas, semi-ummites (Islamists) support blending Islam carefully with modern so that Islam remains supreme and quasi-ummites (rightists, centrists, leftists, liberal and secular Pakistanis including Kamal Ataturk wannabe current dictator with his enlightened moderation) believe in bridging Islam with the modern. While they work for bringing, blending and bridging Islam, Pakistan bleeds. Since varying degrees of infatuation exists for broader Islamic brotherhood (ummah) in large majority of them, the collective urban Pakistanis wisdom is arrested more in the past than in the present because some crude forms of ummahs actually existed in the past. Therefore, asking for replacing traditions-heavy feudals with delusions-of-grandeur heavy non-feudals makes no sense.
The common denominator of ummah is depicted well in urban Pakistanis passionate support for the causes that involve Muslims. They have made Abu-Gharib and Deir Yasin more well-known names among well-informed Pakistanis than Toba Tek Singh, Khuzdar, Tharparkar or Parachinar by publicizing them excessively in print and electronic media. They have strange love-hate relationship with foreigners. Muslim foreigners are more admired than Pakistani Muslims even if they came on horsebacks through Khyber pass wielding swords, shouting takbeers and laying waste to everything in the path; in fact they are made heroes. Non-Muslim foreigners who came by ships or planes are detested. The overall impression of the west in urban Pakistanis mind is somewhere between disapproval and detesting yet they love to immigrate to the west.
Those who succeed in immigrating to the west quickly aggregate into groups headed by urban tribal elders called XYZ bhais (brothers) and congregate in mosques, dividing their time between praying, lamenting about the plight of Muslim world, whining against feudals and frothing against the west. Diaspora Pakistanis in the USA did not vote for Reagan, Clinton and Bush Sr. for being too pre-Israel, too many Jews in the cabinet and first gulf war against Saddam Hussain respectively. They will be voting against President George W. Bush to show sympathy with Iraqi people. The improved credit ratings, infusion of capital in the Pakistani economy, improved balance of payments, soft loans, loans written-off and rescheduled and stock market gains, all resulting directly from the decision of President Bush to bring Pakistan on board in his war on terror campaign, do not matter. If aggregation into urban tribal bhai groups and congregation in mosques are pillars of abroad Pakistanis nationalism then subscribing to Pakistani cable channels, listening to Urdu music by third-rate Pakistani bands and watching live cricket matches are the benchmarks of Pakistani identity abroad. Those who prefer to speak Punjabi with other Punjabis or prefer listening to Punjabi than Urdu music and those who don’t watch cricket are less than perfect Pakistanis. They are quick to assign bigot, racist, ethno-centric, regionalist, RAW-agent and anti-Pakistan labels to any person who deviates from their dubious narrow-minded definitions of nationalism and patriotism, particularly to those who advocate native cultures such as languages. The lifestyles of Pakistanis abroad do not provide any justification whatsoever for criticism of the traditional lifestyle of “paindoos” (rural Pakistanis) and their feudal representatives.
The credentials of urban Pakistanis in Pakistan are equally superficial and irrational. A quick glance through some of the recent landmark events reveals the hollowness and pathetic nature of collective urban Pakistanis wisdom. In 1970’s elections, rural Pakistanis voted for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in hope of better future whereas most urban of the urban Pakistanis voted in Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani group) candidates in hope of bringing back the golden age of Islam. Urban Pakistans passionately participated in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement, not for replacing Bhutto only but for Nizam-e-Mustafa, as the movement was named. To bring Nizam-e-Mustafa, they burned tires on the streets, burned bused on the roads, halted and bombed trains and causing extensive loss to the properties, businesses and economy. This was not the first victory for urban Pakistans. Few years earlier they were successful in getting Ahmedis declared non-Muslim using similar tactics. When finally Z. A Bhutto was overthrown in 1977, they cheered, celebrated and distributed sweets the same way as they did when another army chief committed similar treason on October 1999. Those who cheer, celebrate and distribute sweets upon the treacherous acts of army chiefs do not deserve to be heard or taken seriously in matters of democracy, respect for law, individuals human rights as well as feudals’ role in Pakistan society. Those who consider feudals a menace and biggest evil of Pakistani society have actually behaved worse than feudals.
During late 1970s and early 1980s when feudals were as usual lining up quickly behind Zia and getting the flak from all corners of urabn Pakistanis, the most urban of the urban Pakistanis were busy serving Pakistan by creating MQM. The outcome of this passionate creation over the past 20 years is there for all to see. As if 20 years’ track record was not enough, MQM along with JI candidates were again voted in by the majority of Karachiites during the first fraudulent election of 21st century. Lahore and Islamabad did not leave behind in contributing to this collective urban Pakistanis wisdom. Islamabad voted for a mullah from MMA and in Lahore, another mullah from a sunni group won in additions to voting in a son of a corrupt general who became filthy rich from the plunder during Afghan war against Russians. How can urban Pakistanis vote for MQM, JI, MMA mullahs, corrupts like Humayun Akhtar and obnoxious like Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri? Do they wish rural Pakistan to be like them also by getting rid of feudals. Why does every so-called victory by urban Pakistanis backfires within years?
The urban victories backfire within years due to irrationality-heavy collective urban wisdom. The rationality-heavy move linearly upward with time whereas irrationality-heavy move randomly and the outcome with time can be only good by chance. Based on urban Pakistanis cheering upon the downfalls of Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, Pakistanis must run for cover as soon as urban Pakistanis cheer, celebrate and distribute sweets upon political victories because within few years these victories would come back to haunt them.
One would think that crooked education curriculum, Pakistan ideology and indoctrinating education system contributes to creating this mindset of urban Pakistanis but this mindset dates back to pre-partition days. Even during early part of 20th century, urban Muslims of the area were mostly divided between Khilafat movement, Majlis-e-Ahrar and Khaksar movement with Khilafat movement mainly concerned with Ottoman Empire because Palestininian, Chechniyan or Iraqi problems did not exist then. The hold of these three groups on urban Muslims of the area was so complete that many Hindus and Sikhs started to migrate even before any talk of dividing Punjab. Gandhi had to cobble together and patronized debandi mullahs’ group named Jamiaat-e-Ulema-e-Hind to win indirect support for Congress among urban Muslims but did not succeed. How the Pakistani branch of Jamiaat-e-Ulema-e-Hind since partition, named Jamiaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam played the pivotal role in creating Taliban, sectarian terrorist groups, lashkars and Jihadis is another story. When a rural party of feudals called Unionists was trying to look after the interests of their constituency – rural Punjabis, urban Muslim Punjabis were hard at work trying to smear any trace of native cultures. In their infinite wisdom they came up with wild theories such as Punjabi language is a crude form of Urdu. It appears that access to education and education itself have built-in fatal attraction for Muslims. Some of the confidence gained by education is directed into confidence in the absolute truth of faith, which leads to all kind of wild interpretations of dogma followed by ambitions to see their version of dogma in practice.
The fact is that urban Pakistanis collective wisdom is rotten to the core. It welcomes or is approvingly receptive of obscurantism, retrogressive ideas, irrationality, cheap populism and other myopic visions when such ideas are wrapped in the shroud of Islam. It has not produced a single institution since 1947 that could be presented as pride of Pakistan or pride of collective urban Pakistanis wisdom. It is a straight “F” grades performance any way one looks at collective urban Pakistanis wisdom. They have to get at least few passing grades other than producing better cricket players than rural Pakistan, in order to be heard and taken seriously. Whining and criticizing feudals and advocating agrarian reforms to curtail the power of the feudals in Pakistani society by these people is nothing but straight “F” graders trying to save face by pointing fingers at “C” graders, when collective urban Pakistanis wisdom does not even have a face. Confident and equipped with solid “F” grade credentials, they challenge “C” grade performers, feudals and rural Pakistans, to better reform to degrading “F” level.
Urban Pakistan does not lack well-intentioned, modern thinking, reasonable and rational individuals who believe in true democracy, respect for law, justice, equality and true secularism with religion clearly separated from state as envisioned by the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah. Unfortunately they are a tiny minority and carry no weight in the collective urban Pakistanis wisdom. They are the only ones who should be heard on all important matters including reforming feudals and eliminating feudalism but they know well that replacing “C” graders at current state of urban Pakistanis wisdom would undoubtedly replace them with “F” graders. Replacing traditions-heavy with irrational exuberance-heavy makes no sense to them.
http://www.chowk.com/articles/7675
It seems that the PPP parliamentarians are relatively much more transparent than the PML-N goons:
’پاکستان کے امیر، پاکستان کے غریب‘
الیکشن کمیشن میں ظاہر کیے گئے اثاثوں کے مطابق سینیٹر مولانا گل نصیب کے اثاثے سے سے کم ہیں
الیکشن کمیشن کے اب تک مرتب کردہ گوشواروں کے مطابق وزیرِ خزانہ کے اثاثے سب سے زیادہ اور مولانا گل نصیب کے اثاثے سب سے کم ہیں۔
پاکستان کے الیکشن کمیشن نے چار سو چالیس سے زائد ارکان پارلیمنٹ کے ارکان کے اثاثوں کی فہرست مرتب کرنا شروع کردی ہے۔
الیکشن کمیشن کے اہلکار کے مطابق پاکستانی وزیر اعظم یوسف رضا گیلانی نے جو گوشوانے جمع کروائے ہیں اُن کے مطابق وزیر اعظم کے پاس تریسٹھ لاکھ روپے کا گھر اور ایک کروڑ اکیس لاکھ روپے کا بینک بیلنس ہے۔
قومی اسمبلی میں قائد حزب اختلاف چوہدری نثار علی خان کے پاس لاہور اور راولپنڈی میں رہائشی پلاٹ کے علاوہ اسلام آباد اور چکری میں زرعی اراضی بھی ہے۔
قومی اسمبلی کی سپیکر فہمیدہ مرزا کے کُل اثاثوں کی مالیت ساڑھے پانچ کروڑ روپے ہیں۔ سپیکر قومی اسمبلی کے شوہر ڈاکٹر ذوالفقار مرزا سندھ کابینہ میں وزیر داخلہ ہیں۔
الیکشن کمیشن کے اہلکار کے مطابق اس فہرست کے مطابق حکمراں جماعت پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی سے تعلق رکھنے والے سینیٹرز اثاثے رکھنے کے حوالے سے سب سے اُوپر ہیں۔
الیکشن کمیشن کی جانب سے تیار کی جانے والی فہرست کے مطابق سب سے زیادہ اثاثے پاکستان کے وزیر خزانہ شوکت ترین کے ہیں اور اُن کے اثاثوں کی مالیت اربوں روپے میں ہے۔
شوکت ترین کے پاس چوّن کروڑ پچپن لاکھ کی جائیداد، دو کروڑ اٹھارہ لاکھ روپے کی گاڑیاں اور مختلف مالیاتی ادراوں اور بینکوں میں تین ارب روپے کی سرمایہ کاری بھی ہے۔
ظاہر اثاثوں کے اعتبار سے سینیٹر اور وزیر داخلہ رحمان ملک دوسرے نمبر پر ہیں اور ان کے اثاثوں کی مالیت کروڑوں روپے میں ہے۔
دوسرے نمبر پر حکمراں جماعت سے تعلق رکھنے والے سینیٹر اور وزیر داخلہ رحمان ملک ہیں جن کے اثاثوں کی مالیت کروڑوں روپے میں ہے۔
وزیر داخلہ کے پاکستان میں دو گھر ہیں ایک گھر کراچی میں ہے جس کی مالیت چھ لاکھ روپے ہے جب کہ دوسرا گھر صوبہ پنجاب کے شہر سیالکوٹ میں ہے جس کی مالیت ایک کروڑ روپے ہے۔
اس کے علاوہ اُن کے پاس بی ایم ڈبیلو گاڑی ہے جس کی مالیت اکتیس لاکھ پچاس ہزار روپے ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ ایک لاکھ چوراسی ہزار روپے کا بینک بیلنس ہے۔
وزیر داخلہ کی لندن میں جائیداد کی مالیت اُنتیس کروڑ پچاس لاکھ روپے ہے جب کہ بیرون ملک تین لاکھ ڈالر کا کاروبار ہے جو اُن کی اہلیہ کے نام ہے علاوہ ازیں پچاس تولے زیورات بھی اُن کی اہلیہ کے نام ہیں۔
مذکورہ دو نوں وفاقی وزرا کے اثاثوں کی تفصیلات پہلی مرتبہ سامنے آئی ہیں۔
سابق وزیر اعلی پنجاب چوہدری پرویز الہی کے اثاثوں کی مالیت اکتیس کروڑ روپے ہے۔
سینیٹ کے چئرمین فاروق ایچ نائیک کا تعلق بھی حکمراں جماعت پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی سے ہے اور اُن کی جائیداد اور دیگر اثاثوں کی مالیت تیرہ کروڑ سے زائد ہے۔
قائد حزب اختلاف چوہدری نثار علی خان کے پاس لاہور اور راولپنڈی میں رہائشی پلاٹ کے علاوہ اسلام آباد اور چکری میں زرعی اراضی بھی ہے۔
الیکشن کمیشن کے اہلکار کے مطابق اس فہرست میں سب سے غریب مولانا گل نصیب ہیں جن کے پاس آٹھ مرلے کے گھر کے علاوہ ساٹھ گرام سونا بھی شامل ہے۔
سابق وزیر اعظم اور پاکستان مسلم لیگ قاف کے سربراہ چوہدری شجاعت حسین کے لاہور اور اسلام آباد میں واقع دو گھروں میں آدھا حصہ ہے جن کی مالیت 72 لاکھ روپے ہے جبکہ تین کروڑ اڑسٹھ لاکہ روپے بینک بیلنس ہے۔
مسلم لیگ قاف کے ایک دھڑے ہم خیال گروپ کے سربراہ سیلم سیف اللہ خان کے اثاثوں کی مالیت آٹھارہ کروڑ اکیس لاکھ ہے اس کے علاوہ بارہ لاکھ روپے کی گاڑیاں اور بارہ لاکھ کے طلائی زیورات بھی ہیں۔
سینیٹ میں پاکستان مسلم لیگ نون کے چئرمین راجہ ظفرالحق کی بیس لاکھ روپے کی جائیداد کے علاوہ تین لاکھ پچھتر ہزار روپے بینک بیلنس ہے۔
قومی سلامتی کے بارے میں پارلیمنٹ کی مشترکہ کمیٹی کے چئرمین رضا ربانی کا کراچی میں ایک گھر ہے جس کی مالیت پچپن لاکھ روپے ہے۔ لاہور میں بھی اُن کا ایک گھر ہے جس کی مالیت پچاس لاکھ روپے ہے اس کے علاوہ بیس لاکھ روپے کا بینک بیلنس بھی ہے۔
حکمراں اتحاد میں شامل متحدہ قومی موومنٹ کے سینیٹر احمد علی کی ایک کروڑ پینتالیس لاکھ روپے کی جائیداد ہے اس کے علاوہ پچاس لاکھ روپے کی دو گاڑیاں بھی اُن کی ملکیت ہیں۔ احمد علی خزانے سے متعلق سینیٹ کی قائمہ کمیٹی کے چیئرمین بھی ہیں۔
جماعت اسلامی سے تعلق رکھنے والے سینیٹر پروفیسر خورشید احمد کے پاس چالیس لاکھ روپے کے گھر کے علاوہ چالیس لاکھ روپے کی اراضی بھی ہے۔
حکمراں اتحاد میں شامل عوامی نیشنل پارٹی کے مرکزی سیکرٹری اطلاعات زاہد خان کے پاس پچاس لاکھ روپے کی جائیداد کے علاوہ چار لاکھ روپے کا بینک بیلنس بھی ہے
حکمراں اتحاد میں شامل عوامی نیشنل پارٹی کے مرکزی سیکرٹری اطلاعات زاہد خان کے پاس پچاس لاکھ روپے کی جائیداد کے علاوہ چار لاکھ روپے کا بینک بیلنس بھی ہے۔
حکمراں اتحاد میں شامل ایک اور جماعت جمعت علمائے اسلام (ف) سے تعلق رکھنے والے سینیٹر طلحہ محمود کی جائیداد کی مالیت ساڑھے چار کروڑ روپے ہے جبکہ بتیس لاکھ روپے کا کاروبار اور اُناسی لاکھ روپے بینک اکاؤنٹ میں ہیں۔
طلحہ محمود داخلہ کے بارے میں سینیٹ کی قائمہ کمیٹی کے چئرمین بھی ہیں۔
پاکستا ن پیپلز پارٹی سے تعلق رکھنے والے سینیٹر فیصل رضا عابدی کے پاس اٹھانونے لاکھ کی جائیداد کے علاوہ اُنتالیس لاکھ روپے کی گاڑیاں اور ستر ہزار روپے کا بینک بیلنس بھی ہے۔
الیکشن کمیشن کے اہلکار کا کہنا تھا کہ قومی اسمبلی اور تین صوبائی اسمبلیوں کے ارکان کے اثاثوں کی فہرستیں مرتب کر لی گئی ہیں۔
سیکرٹری الیکشن کمیشن اشتیاق احمد خان سے اس ضمن میں متعدد بار رابطہ کرنے کی کوشش کی گئی لیکن اُن سے رابطہ نہیں ہوسکا۔
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2010/02/100222_assets_ec_sen.shtml
Clueless, car-less millionaire MNAs declare their peanuts
Monday, February 22, 2010
Jamshed Dasti a pauper; Maulana Attaur Rehman almost poor
By Tariq Butt
ISLAMABAD: We may find them clueless at times but according to their own affidavits, the majority of our MNAs is also carless. Unbelievable as it may sound, but according to the annual statements of assets and liabilities filed with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the majority of our Rolex-sporting and 10-carat ear-tops flaunting multi-millionaire members of the National Assembly don’t even own a car, let alone any other mind dazzling assets.
Going by the filed statements, an overwhelming majority of our elected representatives is definitely way less financially blessed than most of us and appear people of modest means. But thank heavens for the exception of some who do own cars. President Asif Ali Zardari’s close aide Farahnaz Ispahani has declared owning a BMW sedan (model 2007) worth $30,400. She stated in her declaration that her spouse (Ambassador Husain Haqqani) resides in the USA where most of the couple’s assets are situated.
Her other assets are: Apartment No 3005, at 4301 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington DC 20036, bought in 2004 at $600,000, currently assessed value of $675,000; outstanding mortgage against the apartment $255,000 (it was $555,000 last year); investment in the form of stocks and shares $180,000 (it was $120,000 in the last declaration); balance in foreign currency account $46,000 and other balance of Rs60,000, Haqqani’s bank balance $94,000; furniture and fixture of $36,500; jewellery of $24,000; Haqqani’s gifted house No 135, St 65, F-10/3, Islamabad in 1997 to Hadia Nusrat (wife), Huda Haqqani, minor daughter and Muhammad Hammad Haqqani, minor son, acquitted in 1992 at Rs27,00,000.
President’s political secretary, Rukhsana Bangash, also an MNA, owns a house (no address given either in this year’s declaration or the previous one) worth Rs42,500,000 but otherwise she is not a rich lady. She owns 18 tolas of gold and other jewellery worth Rs370,000; has cash in hand of Rs20,000 and furniture and fixture of Rs130,000. She has no car.
PPP Information Secretary Fauzia Wahab also doesn’t appear to be a woman of huge financial means. She has shown 16 acres of land in the name of her spouse valuing Rs320,000; advance of Rs53,000 paid for 114-M-4 in China Shopping Centre, Karachi, House No 70-G/11 PECHS Karachi for Rs65,000, Hundai car of Rs528,577 now valued at Rs420,000; 25 tolas of gold that she got at the time of her marriage valuing Rs825,000 and cash at hand and bank balance of Rs38,12,186.
Celebrated columnist Ayaz Amir is also a man of small financial means. He made interesting remarks like “alas”, “wish I was that lucky” in his declaration. He has an old house in his village in Chakwal district built in 1938, which is valued at Rs300,000; has 1997 model Prado on lease from a company; has bank balance of Rs51,439 and Rs3,593, old furniture not worth any name, old market in Chakwal in children’s name, and also a house in Chakwal in the name of son.
Hamza Shahbaz Sharif at least is a rich man on paper as well. He has a total of Rs70,098,850 investments – Chaudhry Sugar Mills (Rs6,238,850); Ramzan Sugar Mills (Rs1,160,000), Hamza Spinning Mills (Rs1,162,000); Muhammad Buksh Textile Mills (Rs3,443,000), Kalsoom Textile Mills (Rs50,000), Hudabiya Paper Mills (Rs3,030,000), Hudabiya Engineering Co. (Rs875,000), Khalid Siraj Industries (Rs100,000), Madni Trading Limited (Rs10,000), Madina Construction Company (Rs10,000), Sharif Feed Mills (Rs54,010,000), and Sharif Poultry Farms (Rs10,000).
He has shown unsecured loans of Rs138,237,028. Their details are: Mrs Shamim Akhtar Rs1,000,000, Mian M Shahbaz Sharif Rs500,814, Mrs Javeria Ali Rs588,735, Sharif Feed Mills Rs119,009,279, Sharif Poultry Farms Rs6,000,000, Madni Trading Limited Rs5,246,600 and Madina Construction Rs5,871,600. He has cash and bank balances of Rs3,668,912. Their details are: cash in hand 1,805,112, Bank Alfalah Limited Rs1,182,541, Habib Bank Rs452,182, Silk Bank Rs46,655, Faysal Bank Rs75,129, Samba Bank Rs8,477 and Allied Bank Rs98,816. He has shown the value of his assets at Rs211,984,790. His net wealth comes to Rs211,269,589 after deducting liabilities of Rs715,201 of Ramzan Sugar Mills.
Hamza’s wife has 50 tolas of jewellery valuing Rs900,000, cash and bank balance of Rs1,000,000 and furniture and fixture of Rs600,000.
Leader of the opposition Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan owns two plots each one kanal in DHA Rawalpindi; two plots each one kanal in SNGPL Society Lahore; advance paid for one kanal plot in the Senate Housing Society Islamabad; residential House 99-Faizabad Rawalpindi; 42 kanals and five marlas farmhouse with agriculture land at Chakri; 420 kanal and 13 marlas of agriculture land at Chakri; tractor model 2009; Pajero jeep model 2005, nine residential flats at Dhamial Raod, Rawalpindi; cash at hand and bank balance of Rs64,22,053, Rs10,00,812 and Rs87,82,449 (last year he had Rs43,63,091, Rs158,633 and 41,58,445) and furniture and fixture of Rs235,000. His wife has one kanal of plot in Pir Sohawa, Islamabad, a plot of eight kanals at Raiwind Road, Lahore, shares in Ferozesons Laboratories, KFW Factories, Umar Fabrics, Mecedez 2004, motor car Mark 2005 and jewellery 10,00,000. Their four children own 821 kanals of land in Chakri.
Federal Minster Raja Pervaiz Ashraf has shown in his statement an amount of Rs80,00,000 as receivable from his brother, which was not present in the previous declaration. His cash at hand and bank balance has gone up to Rs15,00,000 as against last year’s Rs400,000. A plot valuing Rs2 million at Gujar Khan that he had earlier declared is no more in new statement. The value of his vehicles has shown an increase of Rs300,000. Similarly the value of his wife’s jewellery has doubled to Rs300,000. His other assets declared last year remain the same.
Jamshed Ahmed Dasti, known for his wild outbursts against everybody who comes in his way, is a pauper; has no car, no house, no cash at hand, no bank balance. He maintains only one bank account at the Parliament building for his salary that he gets as MNA.
Asfandyar Wali owns a residential house valued at Rs3 million, 67 acres of agriculture land of Rs26.8 million; prize bonds of Rs400,000, 1988 Toyota car worth Rs500,000, 50 tolas of jewellery valuing Rs1.5 million; bank balance of Rs39,000 and furniture and fixture of Rs300,000.
Minister Maulana Attaur Rehman has 1/5th portion of house in Dera Ismail Khan district valuing Rs100,000, 50 tolas of gold and furniture and fixture of Rs20,000. He has no car, no cash in hand, no bank balance, not even a bank account.
His brother, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, is better off compared to him. He has 1/5th share in house valuing Rs100,000, another house valued at Rs2 million, and five kanals of land valuing Rs500,000; 25 tolas of gold of Rs550,000, has a bank balance of Rs400,000 and furniture and fixture of Rs50,000. He also owns no car.
Minister Lal Mohammad Khan is a rich man. He owns four plots, three houses, 1240 kanals of land valuing over Rs500 million; has business capital of Rs250 million (the name of his business is not readable), has 2004 model Land Cruiser and two Toyota cars, value not mentioned, has 300 tolas of gold, has cash in hand of Rs2.7 million and cash at bank Rs4 million.
Dr Tariq Fazal of Islamabad is a wealthy man but has no car. He has a share of Rs2 million in property in Sadiqabad Rawalpindi gifted by his father, share of Rs4,000,000 in a plot in Poultry and Vegetable Scheme II, Extension Suhan, Park Road, Islamabad, owns a plot in Poultry and Vegetable Scheme II, Extension Suhan, Park Road, Islamabad valued at Rs20,000,000, has share of Rs2,500,000 in a plot in Poultry and Vegetable Scheme II, Extension Suhan, Park Road, Islamabad, agriculture land in Tarlai Kalan Islamabad valuing Rs3,000,000, share in a F/8-3 house of Rs1,250,000, share in a house in Murree of Rs800,000, 300 kanals of agriculture land in Maira Negwal Islamabad and share of Rs600,000 in a shop in the Fruit and Vegetable Market of Islamabad.
Khawaja Asif has shown $88,243 under the head of assets brought or remitted from outside Pakistan. He has Zen Japanese Restaurant business outside Pakistan in which he has a capital of $25,000; has PTCL shares of Rs327,756, 90 tolas of gold worth Rs2,538,000, Rs210,000 cash in hand, two mortgaged residential houses of Rs2,500,000 and 20,000,000, a plot in DHA Phase V Lahore valuing Rs6,000,000, which was allotted in lieu of 4 kanals in Ravian Cooperative Society which has been taken by DHA Lahore; advance of Rs100,000 paid for a plot in Abdalian Society (possession not yet taken); advance of Rs535,700 for a plot in Senate Secretariat Cooperative Housing Society Islamabad; advance of Rs2,300,000 for a plot in Sui Northern Gas Cooperative Society Lahore; and a plot in DHA Phase VII Lahore Rs4,300,000.
He owns six cars including Honda Civic (Rs416,098), two Suzuki Mehrans (Rs757,000), Toyota Mark (Rs2,200,000), Toyota Prado (Rs1,800,000) and Honda Accord (Rs2,000,000). He has bank deposits of Rs110,379, Rs431,100, Rs3,122, Dharams 36,613.17, Rs87,585, Rs1,359,775 and $25,907.06 in different Pakistani and foreign banks. His liabilities are: KASB Bank Sialkot Rs52,591,739 (mortgage of residential house), Standard Chartered Bank DHA Lahore Rs20,886 (mortgage of residential house), Standard Chartered Bank Lahore Cantonment Rs3,151, Alflah Bank Islamabad Rs750,685 (car lease), Alfalah Bank Rs93,975 (unsecured) and Citi Bank Rs11,247 (unsecured).
http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=27415
Why are we forgetting Military???
Book shines light on Pakistan military’s ‘£10bn empire’ Declan Walsh in Islamabad The Guardian, Thursday 31 May 2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/31/books.pakistan
· Business interests range from cement to cornflakes
· Little transparency into officer-led conglomerates
The Pakistani military’s private business empire could be worth as much as £10bn, according to a ground-breaking study. Retired and serving officers run secretive industrial conglomerates, manufacture everything from cement to cornflakes, and own 12m acres [4.8m hectares] of public land, says Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. The book tackles a previously taboo subject – the range and depth of the military’s business interests – considered a major factor in the ambitions of the generals who have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 60-year history. “It feeds directly into the military’s political power; it’s an expression of their personal and organisation strength,” said Ms Siddiqa, a former director of research at the Pakistan navy.
Five giant conglomerates, known as “welfare foundations”, run thousands of businesses, ranging from street corner petrol pumps to sprawling industrial plants. The main street of any Pakistani town bears testament to their economic power, with military-owned bakeries, banks, insurance companies and universities, usually fronted by civilian employees. Ms Siddiqa estimates that the military controls one-third of all heavy manufacturing and up to 7% of private assets.
Profits are supposed to be pumped back into schools, hospitals and other welfare facilities – the military claims it has 9 million beneficiaries – but there is little transparency. “There is little evidence that pensioners are benefiting from these welfare facilities,” she said.
Of the 96 businesses run by the four largest foundations, only nine file public accounts. The generals spurn demands by parliament to account for public monies they spend.
The military’s penetration into society has accelerated under President Pervez Musharraf, who has also parachuted 1,200 officers into key positions in public organisations such as universities and training colleges. The military boasts that it can run such organisations better than incompetent and corrupt civilians.
In a 2004 speech to open a new industry owned by the Fauji (“Soldier”) Foundation, General Musharraf boasted of “exceptional” military-owned banks, cement and fertiliser plants. “Why is anyone jealous if the retired military officers or the civilians with them are doing a good job contributing to the economy?” he said.
But Ms Siddiqa says the military businesses thrive, thanks to invisible state subsidies in the form of free land, the use of military assets, and loans to bail them out when they run into trouble. “There are gross inefficiencies and the military is mired in crony capitalism. The primary purpose of a trained military is war fighting. They are not designed for the corporate sector.”
Her £10bn estimate of military wealth is a “rough figure”, she says, split between £6bn in land and private military assets.
“Military Inc.” comes at a sensitive time for Gen Musharraf, who is struggling to rebuild his popularity after the botched dismissal of the chief justice, Muhammad Iftikhar Chaudhry, in March. The move sparked nationwide demonstrations that have snowballed into a powerful protest movement. The furore has offered an insight into the raw power wielded by the generals. This week, Justice Chaudhry told the supreme court how military intelligence chiefs spent hours trying to pressure him to quit on March 9, before placing him under effective house arrest.
Ms Siddiqa fears her book, which names names and pours cold water on boastful claims, may step on some powerful toes. “Over the past three years a lot of my friends have advised me not to publish this book. They think I have suicidal tendencies.”
But Talat Hussain, a retired general and political analyst, said Ms Siddiqa was a “courageous” researcher. “This area has always been considered a sacred cow in our society,” he said.
The book will be launched in Islamabad today. The main military spokesman, Major General Waheed Arshad, said he had not yet obtained a copy. “Let me read it and then I’ll get back to you,” he said.
Backstory
The 650,000-strong military has been at the heart of power since Pakistan was carved from northern India in 1947. Generals seized power in 1958 and have ruled intermittently since. The main intelligence service, the ISI, has consistently meddled in politics. Three-quarters of all army recruits come from Punjab, reflecting a similar imbalance in the country’s power structures. The army’s reputation for professionalism stretches back to colonial days, but has been eroded by business-related corruption allegations and three wars with India, including the loss of its eastern half, with the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.
Cover Story The New Land Barons? By Ayesha Siddiqa Abdul Karim waited in the heat outside the Supreme Court for his case to be heard. Sitting miles away from his village in Bahawalpur, the poor peasant was contesting his right over three kanals (0.375 acres) of land that had already been awarded to him through an administrative decision. He had tilled the land for years and he was deemed to be the rightful owner.
However, the land was subsequently transferred to Brigadier (Retd.) Muhammad Bashir, through another administrative order. The transfer of land to the army brigadier was part of the 33,866 acres of land given to the Army GHQ in 1993 in Bahawalpur by the provincial government. The Punjab government had transferred the land without checking its title. Out of the total land given to the army, the said brigadier got 396 kanals (49.5 acres) of land, out of which about three kanals belonged to Abdul Karim.
Brigadier Bashir contested Karim’s ownership in the High Court, but the court upheld Karim’s title. Not satisfied with the court’s decision, Bashir filed an appeal with the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan also upheld Abdul Karim’s ownership.
In its eagerness to favour military authorities, the district government representatives had given Abdul Karim’s land to the army. Moreover, the local administration sided with the brigadier to disprove the respondent’s claim over the stated land.
The Supreme Court admonished the district collector for acting capriciously and for arbitrarily transferring land that was marked as land not available for allotment. While upholding Abdul Karim’s right to cultivate the land, the court also reproached the retired brigadier for impinging upon the rights of a poor peasant. In a historic judgment passed in September 2003, the Supreme Court bench warned against greed and forcibly and illegally depriving poor people of their rights.
Amazingly, Abdul Karim received justice not because he had the means to take legal action, but because Brigadier Bashir wanted his land and took the case to court. It’s unlikely that this historic judgment will help many other poor villagers, though, as the only way for them to benefit from this landmark judgement would be to initiate expensive legal proceedings.
The people of the small fishing village of Mubarik were not as fortunate as Abdul Karim. Situated near the Sindh-Balochistan border, their village adjoining the sea was once their territory. For over five years now, they have watched as their land has been slowly pulled away from under their feet. Generations of their families have lived there peacefully as fishermen, but no longer. A few years back, the villagers found that they could no longer move freely on their own land. The Pakistan Navy (PN) ordered the residents of Mubarik village to limit themselves to a small area. But that wasn’t the only restriction. They were also told not to construct houses on the land because the adjoining land fell within the range of the navy’s target-practice range.
The villagers claim that the PN broke a promise and extended its presence beyond a point that was previously assured by the navy to be the limit of their expansion. In fact, the PN has continued to expand its presence despite the fact that there is no provision in the existing rules for a naval cantonment. Meanwhile, the uneducated villagers are unable to contest their rights: they neither know the law, nor have the money to take legal action.
They are not the only ones in this country in the same predicament. Up against elite groups, like the armed forces, poor villagers neither have the means nor the knowledge to defend their own property, the land they inhabit and cultivate. Despite the efforts of some parliamentarians to flag the issue of the military land ownership in the country, there is insufficient information available on the issue. However, one thing is clear: over the years, the armed forces have become major players in Pakistan’s real estate business.
The military, including its serving and retired members, own massive tracts of land in rural as well as urban centres. They believe that the distribution of land amongst military personnel, particularly within the various housing schemes, denotes the defence establishment’s superior capacity at managing resources. However, the mechanics behind the issue are not so simple. Is the allocation of military land nothing more than a tradition inherited from the British to reward defence services personnel? Or should the acquisition of land by the military be viewed in the larger perspective of the power the armed forces wield over the state and its resources?
Since the early 1950s, the military has acquired millions of acres of land throughout the country for distribution to serving and retired armed forces personnel. According to one estimate, the armed forces control about 12 million acres, constituting about 12 per cent of total state land. Out of this, 62 per cent is in the Punjab, 27 per cent in Sindh and 11 per cent in NWFP and Balochistan. About seven million acres of the total is agricultural land and has an estimated worth of Rs700 billion. Interestingly, only about 100,000 acres are directly controlled by the armed forces and its subsidiary companies, the Fauji Foundation, the AWT and the Bahria Foundation, and distributed amongst serving and retired personnel. The remainder was given (at highly subsidised rates) to army personnel as awards to be used for their personal gratification.
Granting agricultural land as a reward to individuals is a tradition inherited from the British. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 ensured the use of canal colony land as a means to reward those serving British interests. According to Imran Ali, professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, in his book, The Punjab Under Imperialism, land was granted to indigenous communities under various schemes, such as offering land grants to raise horses that could then be acquired by the British cavalry. Following the principle of rewarding the ‘faithful,’ the Alienation of Land Act specifically stipulated allocation of 10 per cent of colonised land to the armed forces. This process of land development was incorporated later in another law known as the Colonisation of Land Act, 1912, which was updated by the Pakistan government in 1965. The law had a feudal underpinning and was based on perpetuating various local social classes that would guarantee the interests of the imperial masters. Today, the land distribution policy is still deeply rooted in this colonial logic, with the military monopolising the state’s resources and continuing to offer land in exchange for allegiance to the state. Moreover, this policy is central to the problematic centre-provinces relations. The smaller provinces, in particular, are wary of the land distribution scheme that empowers Punjab versus other provinces.
For decades, land has been transferred to military personnel under the aforementioned law. The military was given 10 per cent of the approximately nine million acres of land reclaimed due to the construction of the Kotri, Guddu and Ghulam Mohammad barrages in Sindh. The government also gave land to some senior civil bureaucrats, who were the military regime’s partners. Some of the prominent beneficiaries of the land reclamation scheme from the armed forces included General Ayub Khan (247 acres), General Muhammad Musa (250 acres), and Maj. General Umrao Khan (246 acres). After the military’s takeover in October 1958, more land was allotted to army officers in the Guddu Barrage area. Also, agricultural land was given in the Punjab. What is even more important, however, is the fact that the land alloted to military officers was developed with foreign aid – military and economic aid from the US. Reportedly, the finance minister of Punjab, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, justified the use of foreign aid for land development because the money was meant for the army.
The stated logic says that armed forces personnel will be more dedicated towards developing land. This, however, has not been the case. In south Punjab, where land is often awarded to officers and soldiers that do not hail from the area, the tendency is to engage in absentee landlordism or sell the land to the highest bidder. The buyers are usually local landlords. Thus, there is no incentive to reduce the strength of the big landlords, a major problem associated with the continuation of feudalism in the country. Naturally, many big farmers do not object to the military’s rural land acquisition.
However, the distribution of land alone does not empower people unless they are also provided access to three additional resources: water, farm-to-market roads and equipment to develop the land. Such facilities are only provided to senior military officers or the civil bureaucracy. In the case of south Punjab, senior military officers monopolise the three resources to their advantage. A number of army, naval and air chiefs even had serving armed forces personnel guard their lands. They, like the big land owners, use influence to gain access to the road networks and water. Lower ranking soldiers tend to leave their lands barren or sell them to the local landlords. In any case, the senior officers get more land than the junior officers and the jawans.
Any way one looks at it, this monopolisation of resources is unfair in a country where there are about 30 million landless peasants. Obviously, providing land to the landless and empowering them through provision of land developmental facilities has not been a priority of the state. In any case, as pointed out by economist Akbar Zaidi in his book, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy, the land reforms during the Ayub and Bhutto eras did not benefit the poor. About 39 per cent of the land recovered during the Bhutto land reforms was never distributed among the landless.
The military’s control of land feeds the largest social injustice in the country: widespread poverty. Like the feudal class, the military has been known to use its power to redistribute land amongst its own without any regard for the country’s poor ethnic populations. In Bahawalpur, there are instances when land developed through years of hard work by landless peasants has been snatched away for distribution to the military bureaucracy. In the tehsil of Nawazabad, the government awarded about 2,500 acres to various military personnel. Hundreds of landless peasants were evicted from state lands after occupying it for years without incident. In an interview, these peasants protested against being evicted from the land they had partially developed and reclaimed from the desert without even a fair hearing. When the peasants took their case to court, junior military officers threatened them, ridiculed the law and advised the peasants that even the courts could not save them from the army’s authority. To the villagers of Nawazabad, there was no difference between the dominant feudal lords and the praetorian military. One local woman bitterly demanded, “If there is no place for us here then [the authorities] should put us on a truck and drop us in India.”
The case of Nawazabad is not an anomaly. Other places and people have also experienced the use of force by the military to obtain land for personal or operational purposes. In Yunisabad, near Karachi, the Pakistan Navy took forcible possession of the floating jetty – and the land on which it was built – that belonged to the village and was used to transport locals, especially the sick. For villagers from nearby Shamspir, the jetty was their only access point to land. A writ petition was filed with the Sindh High Court against the “illegal act of the navy” and several letters were written to the district administration highlighting human rights abuses by the PN.
Reportedly, there were occasions where local villagers were harassed and beaten up. The Navy failed to honour the court order not to interfere with public traffic.
Across the country, there are many examples of the military wielding absolute authority to suppress landless peasants in areas where they directly control the land. In Okara, a conflict ensued between local tenants and the army that had unilaterally decided to change the terms of contract from share-cropping to rent-in-cash. While share-cropping pertains to an arrangement whereby the tenants share both the input and the output with the owner or whoever controls the land, the rent-in-cash arrangement dictates that land is cultivated in exchange for money, or rent. The additional benefit of share-cropping to the tenant is that his right over the land is recognised by law. The Okara farm tenants, who had resided on the land and were responsible for tilling it, feared the new system of contract would empower the army, who were not even the owners of the land, to displace the poor tenants from their homes.
The Okara farms are part of the military farms group, Okara and Renala, which comprise 16,627 acres of land consisting of two dairy farms, seven military (oat-hay) farms and 22 villages. The prime proprietor is evidently the Punjab government, which leases the land to other people or institutions. In this particular case, the army had changed the terms of contract for land it did not own. Moreover, the land lease had expired before Partition in 1947 not to be renewed again. To enforce its authority, the Rangers besieged the villages twice, imposed curfew, restricted freedom of movement, stopped supply of medicine, food and vegetables, and used numerous other pressure tactics. The report of Human Rights Watch has detailed testimonials of villagers victimised by the military authorities that were generally dismissive of the protest. Army personnel claimed that, rather than being a human rights issue, this was a local law and order issue incited by some NGOs.
Commenting on the Okara farms case, the Director-General, Inter-Services Press Relations (ISPR), Maj. General Shaukat Sultan, said, “The needs of the army will be decided by the army itself, and/or the government will decide this. Nobody [else] has the right to say what the army can do with 5,000 acres or 17,000 acres. The needs of the army will be determined by the army itself.”
However, the Okara incident was not an issue of how the army determined the usage of its land. This, like many other cases, is about the illegal use of military authority to change the legal nature of the land under its control. The army follows the practice of changing the usage of A-1 land specifically meant for operational purposes, to profit-making or for personal gratification of the officer cadre and other elite. In the Punjab, farm land has been turned into golf courses and residential housing schemes. Debates in Parliament over the past couple of years have shown that some camping grounds that the army had arbitrarily turned into golf courses were not designed for public use, but only to please a select few.
In its official response to parliamentary questions regarding the misuse of state land by the military, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not challenge the army’s authority. The ministry upheld the army’s jurisdiction over land under its control. This was done in other cases as well, such as the conversion of the firing range in Nowshehra into a citrus farm. The army vociferously defends its power over these assets and even controls information regarding these agricultural assets.
Since 9/11, there has been a noticeable boom in the value of urban real estate in the country. One of the largest beneficiaries, of course, is the military, which has engaged in the practice of converting land titles from state land to private property. It does this via two methods.
Firstly, there is the conversion of state land for private usage. A large amount of state land designated as A-1 land in various cantonments is distributed to military personnel. Here, it must be mentioned that the beneficiaries are the officers and not the soldiers. The 27 housing schemes built on state land in different parts of the country are reserved for the officer cadre, not the jawans.
The practice of urban land grabbing began soon after 1947 when military officers acquired evacuee property in the cantonment areas. During the days of the British, all cantonments were private property or owned by the provincial governments. It was mostly the land where the barracks were built that was owned by the MoD. The officers acquired the land on a transferable lease for a period of 99 years. The 99-year lease is extendable, especially in cases where military officers own the property.
According to a report submitted by the MoD to the Senate, about 78,292 square yards, or16.3 acres, totalling 130 residential plots, were given to an equal number of officers in different cities in a period from October 1999 to 2003. The report highlighted a series of cases where residential plots were carved out of state land meant for operational purposes. The cities included Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, as well as smaller towns such as Kharian and Jhelum. The ranks of the beneficiaries varied from a full general to a captain. Quantitatively, the distribution was fairly even, with senior, middle-ranking and junior officers getting 46, 36 and 48 plots respectively. However, the plot sizes for senior officers were much bigger than what junior officers received. Generals of all categories received plots of 800 square yards, while plot sizes for captains were less than 500 square yards.
The cantonment area in Lahore, which, up until the early 1980s, comprised a large segment of army training grounds and firing ranges, was almost entirely converted into a residential area. In effect, army exercise and training grounds were converted from public to private use without the consent of the government or the public for whose safety the land was initially provided. This was, of course, done through an internal decision-making process rather than through consultations with the government. In fact, a major complaint is that decisions involving major military housing projects are always made when Parliament is not in session.
Such arbitrary redistribution raises concerns about misuse of state land, especially cantonment land. Major cantonments include Lahore (12,000 acres), Karachi (12,000 acres), Rawalpindi (8,000 acres), Kamra (3,500 acres), Taxila (2,500 acres), Peshawar (4,000 acres) and Quetta (2,500 acres). The fear is that most will ultimately be commercialised. In fact, Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Peshawar cantonments are no longer restricted army areas. Much property has already been resold to civilians. In Lahore, officers were given ownership of large residential properties in the cantonment area. A conservative estimate of the worth of the cantonment land in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta is approximately 300 billion rupees.
The transfer of one portion of Karachi’s National Stadium to the Karachi Cantonment Board is a prime example of military land-grabbing. The Corps Commander Mangla, Lt. General Tauqeer Zia, who was also the Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Control Board (PCCB), was responsible for transferring the said land during his tenure as head of the PCCB. The financial dividends were superb. A minimum investment of 600,000 rupees netted a profit of about 15 million in a quick 60 to 90 days. Such manipulative capacity is only available to the most influential institutions or individuals in the country.
President Pervez Musharraf, however, claims that all is fair in real estate and military governance: “So, what is the problem if they [the armed forces] are contributing to town development here, or anywhere in Pakistan, for that matter? In Lahore, in Rawalpindi – their output is the best. The defence societies everywhere are the top societies of Pakistan…now, why are we jealous of this? Why are we jealous if somebody gets a piece of land, a kanal of land, cheap when it was initially, and because of the good work done by the society, the price rises by 100 times, and the man then earns some money. What is the problem? Why are we jealous of this? There’s no problem at all.”
The General conveniently forgot a certain key fact. The officer cadre pays minimum charges for this urban property. For housing schemes built on state land, in particular, the deduction from the salaries of officers goes towards subsidising construction. The officers are charged a minimal price for the value of the land itself – nothing even remotely close to the market value. It must be noted that contrary to the view that urban land is given when the city is underdeveloped, the land in large urban centres of Karachi and Lahore were given long after the cantonment areas had been developed and property prices had appreciated.
The military land manual is very specific about the use of the land falling in the cantonments or around it. There are about seven types of land managed by the Department of Military Lands and Cantonments. Most of the land mentioned is A-1. This category of land is defined as land meant purely for military purpose such as fortification, barracks, stores, arsenals, aerodromes, housing for military, parade grounds, military recreation grounds, rifle ranges, grass and dairy farms, brick fields, hospitals and gardens for use by the armed forces. Then there is A-2 category of land not actually used or occupied by the military, but used for non-essential activities such as recreation. The ‘B’ type lands are again divided into four sub-categories: B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4. The B-1 type lands are owned and controlled by the federal government but used for churches, mosques, cemeteries and other ecclesiastical affairs. B-2, on the other hand, is owned by the provincial government and used to generate revenue. The last type, B-3, is private land, but where bazaars, religious buildings, or communal graveyards can also be built. The military land manual stipulates due compensation to the owner in case of acquisition of land by the government. B-4 comprises all such land not falling in any of the above three types. Finally, there is ‘C’ class and that contains drains and roadside plots. The categorisation of the land cannot be changed without the authority of the actual owner. That, in any case, is not a major issue. Given the military’s power, such transformation of land usage has never been seriously challenged.
Interestingly, senior generals tend to ignore the legal debate. Instead, they believe that the armed forces have a right to use the land under their control in whatever manner the organisation deems fit. In the words of Maj. General Shaukat Sultan, “We don’t build houses or other projects on state land but on military land.” The general seems conveniently oblivious to the fact that all military land is essentially state land with specific rules governing its usage.
Consequently, most major cantonments have got into the habit of making markets and commercial plazas on state land for lease. Several senior retired generals have justified these ventures on the grounds that other armed forces, such as China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), are also involved in profit-making ventures. The PLA, however, was ordered to divest its commercial interests in 1998 to restore professionalism in the armed forces. Moreover, unlike the Pakistan military, the Chinese military is a revolutionary force that had to make ‘both ends meet’ since Beijing did not provide it with the requisite financial resources.
The defence housing authorities in major cities, or the housing schemes run by the Bahria and Fauji Foundations, represent yet another method of dabbling in real estate. Contrary to the view held by military personnel that these housing schemes are welfare or private ventures that basically show the superior management skills of the armed forces, there is a lot of manipulation involved in the acquisition of land. The DHA in Lahore, which came under a lot of flak due to the stories of rampant corruption, acquired land through offering plots to the owners of farm land. Of course, the owners of the land had to pay development charges to get ownership of the newly developed urban property. The DHA, meanwhile, did not have to pay money to purchase the land.
In the ever-growing DHA in Rawalpindi, there were even reports of the owners being forced to sell their land. The tehsil office refused to issue land revenue documents to the owners even six months before the land was finally purchased for the extension of the DHA, which is now worth billions of rupees. The dividends are phenomenal. In the case of DHA, Rawalpindi, land totaling 3,375 acres was acquired at a total cost of about Rs11 billion and later sold for approximately Rs135 billion.
However, the infrastructure of these elite schemes is not integrated with planning in the rest of the town. The disparity between elite versus ordinary urban planning is noticeable. It could be argued that such disparities are found across the world, but it becomes more pronounced where elite structures are combined with disproportional political power. While rural areas are being lost to urban centres, there is no effort to create opportunities for the lower middle or the middle class. These housing schemes create opportunities for the elite to make money rather than generate employment opportunities for other social classes. The elite town schemes are primarily residential areas with no provision for industrial or business infrastructure. Moreover, such schemes do not solve the shortage of six million houses presently required in the country, but denote financial investment aimed at filling the pockets of those who have the money to invest.
Referring to the compensation of land, private owners would, perhaps, consider themselves relatively lucky as compared to the state itself. The governments have not been able to exercise control over the transfer of land to the military at very low compensation. Referring to agricultural land, it is usually acquired at the rate of Rs 50 per acre. Similarly, very little is paid in the urban centres.
One of the most recent examples pertains to the acquisition of 1,165 acres of land in 2005 for the Army’s GHQ in Islamabad. The land was acquired at the throwaway price of Rs 40 per square yard, which, as the MoD clarified, was legally considered the right compensation for acquisition of land for official purposes. Compensation at market rates would bloat the cost substantially.
It is also worth remembering that the transfer of land to the military deprives the state of a valuable asset. The transfer of state land to individuals, especially, constitutes an expensive subsidy from the state to the defence sector that is never recorded in the financial books.
Surely, it will be difficult to force the senior generals to give up subsidies. In fact, the issue of strengthening democracy in the country is pegged to the question of the economic interests of the senior echelons of the defence services, which have grown fat on such economic benefits.
Urban and rural real estate is one sector used for personal gratification. The military’s perspective is that it uses a system of merit to reward lands to individuals. This might be true, but the system does not explain how most senior officers end up piling up numerous properties worth millions of rupees.
The power and authority of the armed forces is central to the redistribution of land, while its political power is central to acquiring state land or private property. Given the history of land distribution in the country, it can be argued that the 93 million acres of state land are under constant threat of occupation by the military and other elite groups.
Monopolisation of state land by a favoured few is counter-productive to the development of the state and the well-being of the general public. This is an issue that demands a serious debate and re-consideration of policies related to the distribution of national resources.
In the historic Abdul Karim Supreme Court judgement, the judges endorsed the following quotation from John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath and cautioned against accumulation of property in the hands of a few:
“And the great owner, who must lose their land in an upheaval, the great owners with access to history, with eyes to read history and to know the great fact: when property accumulates in too few hands, it is taken away. And that companion fact: when a majority of people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need. And the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed. The great owners ignored the three cries of history. The land fell into fewer hands, the number of the dispossessed increased, and every effort of the great owners was directed at repression. The money was spent for arms, for gas to protect the great holdings, and spies were sent to catch the murmuring of revolt so that it might be stamped out. The changing economy was ignored, plans for the change ignored; and only means to destroy revolt were considered, while the causes of revolt went on.”
While Abdul Karim got justice, this decision of the Supreme Court was not used as a precedence to be applied in other cases as well.
Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent defence analyst and author of the upcoming book, Military Inc. The Politics of Military Economy: A Case Study of Pakistan. REFERENCE: Cover Story The New Land Barons? By Ayesha Siddiqa http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJul2006/cover1jul2006.htm
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2009
Martial Law, NRO, NAB & Across The Board Accountability.
General Pervez Musharraf & Co. [now Retired] after imposing Martial Law in Pakistan on 12 Oct 1999 by violating article 6 of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, in his address to the nation had said: http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/11/martial-law-nro-nab-across-board.html
I agree with every thing you’ve stated, however such as you mentioned at the end, I at all times end up going back to how I used to do things. It’s a by no means ending circle. Writing issues down is a superb idea. I’ve just lately starting storing changes in daily processes in spreadsheet information, so I can use them like a examine list. The one problem then is that the list gets too lengthy and I begin missing bits out! Getting right into a rountine when one thing is changed is the very best recommendation I can give.
and we can just watch and enjoy it without having to think too hard. As world bronze medallists, TE 2 30 15. K 1 1 23 0 0 Interceptions Tampa BayIntYdsLngTD —– AtlantaIntYdsLngTD —– Kick Returns Tampa BayRetYdsLngTD ,000 a year in Australia dying because of smoking. “So that might be achieved by for example, on the verge of Thanksgiving and the obviously important shopping season leading up to the holidays,The Republican proposal called for cuts in entitlement programs like the Medicare health plan for seniors to replace two years of the automatic spending cuts known as “sequestration” agreed to last year by Congress.Eric Page return for 26 yards to TB38. Tackled by Johnthan Banks. what are you going to do? He did threaten to do it to the Boston Bruins, even though economics is arguably as important in contemporary culture as the physical and biological sciences, in the same way that his Scottish contemporaries were in the realm of history,11:582nd and 1 @ Was43WASRobert Griffin III rush to the left for 4 yards to the Was47.14:311st and 10 @ Was20WASRobert Griffin III pass to the right to Leonard Hankerson for 5 yards to the Was25.
And, He currently has66 percent of his portfolio in low-cost, fixed income and cash investments to matchyour goals, one candidate or both has sought political advantage by assailing China for its political system, you could credibly say that there were three pillars of the global economy.a graphic or a script. Our independence stems not only from the structure of Reuters but also from our duty as journalists to avoid conflicts of interest or situations that could give rise to a perception of a conflict. and Syria?
institutional investors are still increasing the amount of money they’re allocating to hedge funds. and once they start on a course of action they tend to be committed to it for the long term. a social network or in a person-to-person phone call. and all must be re-configured for this new OS. which was to tell Wall Street that Apple has always had internal discussions on the best use of its cash.Bear would make deals with the sellers of mortgages in which it would force them to make a payment for failed mortgages, largely ignored the defects that their limited review did uncover, But I think there’s another good reason for Apple to be cash-rich: it allows the company to continue to play the long game, it would surely do so with the cash it has on hand — with its opportunity cost of “next to nothing” — rather than borrowing it at 5.
were among 43 longtime U. I was brought up around the right stuff.Lauren said Barbara and Kenneth Atkinson had sold her to pedophiles. They’re a hard team to play against, 7, NAPOLEAN B.One day while kayaking up White Rock Creek, the stadium has been visited by people from 20 or 30 different countries, My guest chose a burrito bowl ($6. so that could make it tougher to redeem the lower Mileage Plus awards for domestic travel.The school’s number of students, makes it . which is closer to her father’s new workplace. tamales and more. Physical activity may be “a preventive way to address dementia instead of addressing the costs of a disabled elder. of course, ” said Dr. Aaron Donald and Stephon Tuitt andends Kony Ealy,” attorney Karen Crawford said. science and math.
50.”We need to be vocal about the problem because the state Liberal Party have very little opposition in this region. Mr Hesketh says the city needs a public hospice with specialist palliative nurses and a doctor, D. J. waves of immigration to Toronto have brought new cultures to Highland Creek’s doorsteps, (runs 6:15)Matt Galloway spoke with John Campbell. suburb and state, Complaints, .
Akan ku pertahankan cinta ini agar sentiasa mekar
Director of Liverpool Biennial, Sally Tallant, said it was a tough time for anyone working in the public sector.
But it still doesn’t look good. Even though British forces have fought heroically to capture and hold Sangin these past four years -?losing 99 soldiers and many more seriously wounded in the process – we have never been able to dominate the surrounding area. Central Sangin itself has been transformed by the stability British forces have provided, with markets opening and commerce returning, as I discovered when I visited the town earlier this year.
Sinton
Over the last two ye
“Developing new technologies that increase the efficiency of rare earth metals and that allow for better recycling of rare earths is another way for the U.S. to decrease its dependence on China,” the organization advised. American Security Project noted the U.S. Department of Energy is currently working on new recycling techniques for rare earths, which could “significantly lower world demand for newly extracted materials.”
Ruling: Dietz agreed, saying that the constitution’s requirement for adequacy of funding was being violated. “We either want the increased standards and are willing to pay the price or we don’t,” he said.
On Friday, Flemmi will likely be asked to name Bulger as a killer and the man who he watched strangle two 26-year-old women.
” bukan masa untuk kenangan lalu, masa untuk membersih semua ini” bisik dalam hati aku. Aku mengemas semua kotak yang telah aku buka itu, hampir empat jam baru semuanya terkemas susun di dalam bilik aku. Selama minggu aku berada di kampung aku, namun aku tidak sempat untuk mengemas bilik aku sendiri. Aku bukan tidak mahu kemas, tapi kerana kerja yang bertimbul membuat aku tidak mampu untuk mengemasnya, namun hari ini aku mengambil kesempatan untuk bercuti dan mengemas bilik aku yang berselerak itu.