Prof Asghar Sodai’s verse “Pakistan Ka Matlab Kia – La Ilaha Illallah” was nothing but a cheap slogan and had nothing to do with Pakistan except a Slogan.

The fact is that this oft quoted statement is an election slogan coined by a Sialkot poet – Asghar Saudai. But it was never raised by the platform of the Muslim League. First and the last meeting of All Pakistan Muslim League was held under the chairmanship of the Quaid-i-Azam at Karachi’s Khaliqdina Hall. During the meeting a man, who called himself Bihari, put to the Quaid that “we have been telling the people Pakistan ka matlab kia, La Ilaha Illallah.” “Sit down, sit down,” the Quaid shouted back. “Neither I nor my working committee, nor the council of the All India Muslim League has ever passed such a resolution wherein I was committed to the people of Pakistan, Pakistan ka matlab….., you might have done so to catch a few votes.” This incident is quoted from Daghon ki Barat written by Malik Ghulam Nabi, who was a member of the Muslim League Council. The same incident is also quoted by the Raja of Mehmoudabad. [Ahmad Bashir, Islam, Shariat and the Holy Ghost, Frontier Post, Peshawar, 9.5.1991]

Religious ‘scholars’ who could not even agree on the definition of a Muslim when they were questioned by Justice M. Munir and Justice M. R. Kayani in the court of inquiry into the Punjab disturbances of 1953. The inquiry was launched after the campaign against the Ahmadis was initiated by the then Jamaat-e-Islami chief Maulana Maudoodi.

The Munir Commission Report (Lahore, 1954) states:

“Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulema, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental? If we attempt our own definition, as each learned divine has, and that definition differs from all others, we all leave Islam’s fold. If we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulema, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim, but kafirs according to everyone else’s definition.” The report elaborated on the point by explaining that the Deobandis would label the Barelvis as kafirs if they are empowered and vice versa, and the same would happen among the other sects. The point of the report was that if left to such religious ‘scholars’, the country would become an open battlefield. Therefore, it was suggested that Pakistan remain a democratic, secular state and steer clear of the theological path.

Unfortunately, this suggestion was not heeded and, consequently, the exact opposite happened. Pakistan became hostage to the mullahs and is now paying a heavy price. Our politicians played into the hands of these fanatics for expedient political reasons and overlooked the diminishing returns from such an unwise overture.

The journey of politicising Islam began with the Objectives Resolution. Jinnah envisioned a secular Pakistan, but Liaquat Ali Khan made the mistake of adopting the Objectives Resolution in 1949 that stated, “Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.” This stipulation gave the mullahs the chance they were looking for, a chance to flash their religious card and put fear in the heart of the ignorant masses. After moving the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, Liaquat Ali Khan said, “As I have just said, the people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.” Although he believed in the power of the people and aimed for a secular, democratic rule, yet by bringing the name of religion into the Objectives Resolution, he gave an edge to the mullahs who later claimed it as their licence to impose the Shariah. And so began the rise of the fanatics.

Ulema did not wait long to demand their share of power in running the new state. Soon after independence, Jamat-i-Islami made the achievement of an Islamic constitution its central goal. Maulana Maududi, after the creation of Pakistan, revised the conception of his mission and that of the rationale of the Pakistan movement, arguing that its sole object had been the establishment of an Islamic state and that his party alone possessed the understanding and commitment needed to bring that about. Jamat-i-Islami soon evolved into a political party, demanding the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

It declared that Pakistan was a Muslim state and not an Islamic state since a Muslim State is any state which is ruled by Muslims while an Islamic State is one which opts to conduct its affairs in accordance with the revealed guidance of Islam and accepts the sovereignty of Allah and the supremacy of His Law, and which devotes its resources to achieve this end. According to this definition, Pakistan was a Muslim state ruled by secular minded Muslims. Hence the Jamat-i-Islami and other religious leaders channeled their efforts to make Pakistan an “Islamic State.”

Maulana Maududi argued that from the beginning of the struggle for Pakistan, Moslems had an understanding that the center of their aspirations, Pakistan, would be an Islamic state, in which Islamic law would be enforced and Islamic culture would be revived. Muslim League leaders, in their speeches, were giving this impression. Above all, Quaid-i-Azam himself assured the Muslims that the constitution of Pakistan would be based on the Quran.

This contrasts to his views about the Muslim League leaders before independence: Not a single leader of the Muslim League, from Quad-i-Azam, downwards, has Islamic mentality and Islamic thinking or they see the things from Islamic point of view. To declare such people legible for Muslim leadership, because they are expert in western politics or western organization system and have concern for the nation, is definitely ignorance from Islam and amounts to an un-Islamic
mentality. On another occasion, Maulana Maududi said it was not clear either from any resolution of the Muslim League or from the speeches of any responsible League leaders, that the ultimate aim of Pakistan is the establishment of an Islamic government…..Those people are wrong who think that if the Muslim majority regions are emancipated from the Hindu domination and a democratic system is established, it would be a government of God. As a matter of fact, in this way, whatever would be achieved, it would be only a non-believers government of the Muslims or may be more deplorable than that.

When the question of constitution-making came to the forefront, the Ulema, inside and outside the Constitutional Assembly and outside demanded that the Islamic Shariah shall form the only source for all legislature in Pakistan.

In February 1948, Maulana Maududi, while addressing the Law College, Lahore, demanded that the Constitutional Assembly should unequivocally declare:
1. That the sovereignty of the state of Pakistan vests in God Almighty and that the government of Pakistan shall be only an agent to execute the Sovereign’s Will.

2. That the Islamic Shariah shall form the inviolable basic code for all legislation in Pakistan.

3. That all existing or future legislation which may contravene, whether in letter or in spirit, the
Islamic Shariah shall be null and void and be considered ultra vires of the constitution; and

4. That the powers of the government of Pakistan shall be derived from, circumscribed by and exercised within the limits of the Islamic Shariah alone. On January 13, 1948, Jamiat-al-Ulema-i-Islam, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, passed a resolution in Karachi demanding that the government appoint a leading Alim to the office of Shaikh al Islam, with appropriate ministerial and executive powers over the qadis throughout the country. The Jamiat submitted a complete table of a ministry of religious affairs with names suggested for each post. It was proposed that this ministry be immune to ordinary changes of government. It is well known that Quaid-i-Azam was the head of state at this time and that no action was taken on Ulema’s demand. On February 9, 1948, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, addressing the Ulema-i-Islam
conference in Dacca, demanded that the Constituent Assembly “should set up a committee consisting of eminent ulema and thinkers… to prepare a draft … and present it to the Assembly.

It was in this background that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, on March 7, 1949, moved the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, according to which the future constitution of Pakistan was to be based on ” the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam.”

While moving the Resolution, he said: “Sir, I consider this to be a most important occasion in the life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence, because by achieving independence we only won an opportunity of building up a country and its polity in accordance with our ideals. I would like to remind the house that the Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam, gave expression of his feelings on this matter on many an occasion, and his views were endorsed by the nation in unmistakable terms, Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.”

The resolution was debated for five days. The leading members of the government and a large number of non-Muslim members, especially from East Bengal, took a prominent part. Non-Muslim members expressed grave apprehensions about their position and role in the new policy.

Hindu members of the Constitutional Assembly argued that the Objectives Resolution differed with Jinnah’s view in all the basic points. Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya said: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honorable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land.” Birat Chandra Mandal declared that Jinnah had “unequivocally said that Pakistan will be a secular state.” Bhupendra Kumar Datta went a step further: …were this resolution to come before this house within the life-time of the Great Creator of Pakistan, the
Quaid-i-Azam, it would not have come in its present shape….”

The leading members of the government in their speeches not only reassured the non-Muslims that their position was quite safe and their rights were not being impaired but also gave clarifications with regard to the import of the Resolution. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, the Deputy Leader of the House, while defending the Resolution said: “It was remarked by some honorable members that the interpretation which the mover of this Resolution has given is satisfactory
and quite good, but Mr. B.C. Mandal says: “Well tomorrow you may die, I may die, and the posterity may misinterpret it.” First of all, I may tell him and those who have got some wrong notions about the interpretation of this resolution that this resolution itself is not a constitution. It is a direction to the committee that will have to prepare the draft keeping in view these main features. The matter will again come to the House in a concrete form, and all of us will get an opportunity to discuss it.”

In his elucidation of the implications of the Objectives Resolution in terms of the distribution of
power between God and the people, Omar Hayat Malik argued: “The principles of Islam and the laws of Islam as laid down in the Quran are binding on the State. The people or the state cannot change these principles or these laws…but there is a vast field besides these principles and laws in which people will have free play…it might be called by the name of ‘theo-cracy’, that is democracy limited by word of God, but as the word ‘theo’ is not in vogue so we call it by the name of Islamic democracy.

Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi further elaborated the concept of Islamic democracy: Since Islam admits of no priest craft, and since the dictionary meaning of the term “secular” is non-monastic — that is, “anything which is not dependent upon the sweet will of the priests,” Islamic democracy, far from being theocracy, could in a sense be characterized as being “secular.” However, he believed that if the word “secular” means that the ideals of Islam, that the fundamental principles of religion, that the ethical outlook which religion inculcates in our people should not be observed, then, I am afraid,…that kind of secular democracy can never be acceptable to us in Pakistan.

During the heated debate, Liaquat Ali Khan stressed:

the Muslim League has only fulfilled half of its mission (and that) the other half of its mission is to convert Pakistan into a laboratory where we could experiment upon the principles of Islam to enable us to make a contribution to the peace and progress of mankind. He was hopeful that even if the body of the constitution had to be mounted in the chassis of Islam, the vehicle would go in the direction he had already chosen. Thus he seemed quite sure that Islam was on the side of democracy. “As a matter of fact it has been recognized by non-Muslims throughout the world that Islam is the only society where there is real democracy.” In this approach he was supported by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: ” The Islamic state is the first political institution in the world which stood against imperialism, enunciated the principle of referendum and installed a Caliph (head of State) elected by the people in place of the king.”

The opposite conclusion, however, was reached by the authors of the Munir Report (1954) who said that the form of government in Pakistan cannot be described as democratic, if that clause of the Objectives Resolution reads as follows: ” Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.” Popular sovereignty, in the sense that the majority of the people has the right to shape the nation’s institutions and policy in accordance with their personal views without regard to any higher law, cannot exist in an Islamic state, they added.

The learned authors of the Munir Report felt that the Objectives Resolution was against the concept of a sovereign nation state. Corroboration of this viewpoint came from the Ulema themselves, (whom the Munir Committee interviewed) “including the Ahrar” and erstwhile Congressites with whom before the partition this conception of a modern national state as against an Islamic state was almost a part of their faith. The Ulema claimed that the Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national state….became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949.

Justice Mohammad Munir, who chaired the committee, says that “if during Quaid-i-Azam’s life, Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister had even attempted to introduce the Objectives resolution of the kind that he got through the Assembly, the Quaid-i-Azam would never have given his assent to it.

In an obvious attempt to correct the erroneous notion that the Objectives Resolution envisaged a theocratic state in Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly returned to the subject during his tour of the United States (May-June 1950). In a series of persuasive and eloquent speeches, he argued that “We have pledged that the State shall exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the people. In this we have kept steadily before us the principles of
democracy, freedom equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam. There is no room here for theocracy, for Islam stands for freedom of conscience, condemns coercion, has no priesthood and abhors the caste system. It believes in equality of all men and in the right of each individual to enjoy the fruit of his or her efforts, enterprise, capacity and skill — provided these be honestly employed.”

The Objectives Resolution was approved on March 12, 1949. Its only Muslim critic was Mian Iftikhar-ud-din, leader of the Azad Pakistan Party, although he believed that “the Islamic conception of a state is, perhaps as progressive, as revolutionary, as democratic and as dynamic as that of any other state or ideology.”

According to Munir, the terms of the Objectives Resolution differ in all the basic points of the
Quaid-i-Azam’s views e.g:
1. The Quaid-i-Azam has said that in the new state sovereignty would rest with the people. The Resolution starts with the statement that sovereignty rests with Allah. This concept negates the basic idea of modern democracy that there are no limits on the legislative power of a representative assembly.

2. There is a reference to the protection of the minorities of their right to worship and practice
their religion, whereas the Quaid-i-Azam had stated that there would be no minorities on the basis of religion.

3. The distinction between religious majorities and minorities takes away from the minority, the right of equality, which again is a basic idea of modern democracy.

4. The provision relating to Muslims being enabled to lead their life according to Islam is opposed to the conception of a secular state.

It was natural that with the terms of the Resolution, the Ulema should acquire considerable influence in the state. On the strength of the Objectives Resolution they made the Ahmadis as their first target and demanded them to be declared a minority.

After the adoption of Objectives Resolution, Liaquat Ali Khan moved a motion for the appointment of a Basic Principles Committee consisting of 24 members, including himself and two non-Muslim members, to report the house on the main principles on which the constitution of Pakistan is to be framed. A Board of Islamic Teaching was set up to advise the Committee on
the Islamic aspects of the constitution.

In the course of constitutional debates, a number of very crucial issues were raised that caused much controversy, both inside and outside the Constituent Assembly over specific questions such as the following:

1) The nature of the Islamic state: the manner in which the basic principles of Islam concerning state, economy, and society were to be incorporated into the constitution.

2) The nature of federalism: questions of provincial autonomy vis-a-vis federal authority with emphasis on the problems of representation on the basis of population and the equality of the federating units; the structure of the federal legislature — unicameral or bicameral.

3) The form of government: whether it was to be modeled on the British or the U.S. pattern —
parliamentary or presidential.

4) The problem of the electorate: serious questions of joint (all confessional groups vote in one election) versus separate (each confessional group votes separately for its own candidates) electorate.

5) The question of languageboth national and regional. These very fundamental issues divided the political elites of Pakistan into warring factions that impeded the process of constitution-making.

Ulema and Pakistan Movement

Muslim religious organisations of the sub-continent –Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, Majlis-i- Ahrar- i-Islam and Jamat-i-Islami [1]– were politically very active during the struggle for Pakistan but all of them opposed tooth and nail the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims. The opposition of Jamiat and Ahrar was on the plea that Pakistan was essentially a territorial concept and thus alien to the philosophy of Islamic brotherhood, which was universal in character. Nationalism was an un-Islamic concept for them but at the same time they supported the CongressParty’ s idea of Indian nationalism which the Muslim political leadership considered as accepting perpetual domination of Hindu majority. Jamat-i-Islami reacted to the idea of Pakistan in a complex manner. It rejected both the nationalist Ulema’s concept of nationalism as well as the Muslim League’s demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims.

The most noteworthy feature of the struggle for Pakistan is that its leadership came almost entirely from the Western-educated Muslim professionals. The Ulema remained, by and large, hostile to the idea of a Muslim national state. But during the mass contact campaign, which began around 1943, the Muslim League abandoned its quaint constitutionalist and legalist image in favor of Muslim populism which drew heavily on Islamic values. Wild promises were made of restoring the glory of Islam in the future Muslim state. As a consequence, many religious divines and some respected Ulema were won over.[2]

The Muslim political leadership believed that the Ulema were not capable of giving a correct lead in politics to the Muslims because of their exclusively traditional education and complete ignorance of the complexities of modern life. It, therefore, pleaded that the Ulema should confine their sphere of activity to religion since they did not understand the nature of politics of the twentieth century.

It was really unfortunate that the Ulema, in general and the Darul Ulum Deoband in particular, understood Islam primarily in a legal form. Their medieval conception of the Shariah remained unchanged, orthodox and traditional in toto and they accepted it as finished goods manufactured centuries ago by men like (Imam) Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf. Their scholasticism, couched in the old categories of thought, barred them from creative thinking and properly understanding the problems, social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in a post-feudal era. They were intellectually ill-equipped to comprehend the crisis Islam had to face in the twentieth century. [3]

The struggle for Pakistan — to establish a distinct identity of Muslims — was virtually a secular
campaign led by men of politics rather than religion and Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his lieutenants such as Liaquat Ali Khan who won Pakistan despite opposition by most of the Ulema.

Jinnah was continuously harassed by the Ulema, particularly by those with Congress orientation. They stood for status quo as far as Islam and Muslims were concerned, and regarded new ideas such as the two nation theory, the concept of Muslim nationhood and the territorial specification of Islam through the establishment of Pakistan as innovations which they were not prepared to accept under any circumstance. It was in this background that Jinnah pointed out to the students of the Muslim University Union: “What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable element of Molvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Molvis as a whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other, but there is a section of them which is undesirable. Having freed ourselves from the clutches of the British Government, the Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Molvis, may I appeal to the youth to emancipate our women. This is essential. I do not mean that we are to ape the evils of the West. What I mean is that they must share our life not only social but also political.” [4]

The history of the Ulema in the sub-continent has been one of their perpetual conflict with intelligentsia. The Ulema opposed Sir Syed Ahmad Khan when he tried to rally the Muslims in 1857. Nearly a hundred of them, including Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, the leading light of Deoband, ruled that it was unlawful to join the Patriotic Association founded by him. However, the Muslim community proved wiser than the religious elite and decided to follow the political lead given by Sir Syed Ahmad.

The conflict between conservative Ulema and political Muslim leadership came to a head during the struggle for Pakistan when a number of Ulema openly opposed the Quaid-i-Azam and denounced the concept of Pakistan. It is an irony of history that Jinnah in his own days, like Sir Syed Ahmad before him, faced the opposition of the Ulema.

The Ahrar Ulema — Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Habibur Rahman Ludhianawi and Mazhar Ali Azhar – seldom mentioned the Quaid-i-Azam by his correct name which was always distorted. Mazhar Ali Azhar used the insulting sobriquet Kafir-i-Azam (the great unbeliever) for Quaid-i-Azam. One of the resolutions passed by the Working Committee of the Majlis-i-Ahrar which met in Delhi on 3rd March 1940, disapproved of Pakistan plan, and in some subsequent speeches of the Ahrar leaders Pakistan was dubbed as “palidistan” . The authorship of the following couplet is attributed to Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, a leading personality of the Ahrar:

Ik Kafira Ke Waste Islam ko Chhora

Yeh Quaid-i-Azam hai Ke hai Kafir-i-Azam. [6]

(He abandoned Islam for the sake of a non-believer woman [7], he is a great leader or a great
non-believer)

During the struggle for Pakistan, the Ahrar were flinging foul abuse on all the leading personalities of the Muslim League and accusing them of leading un-Islamic lives. Islam was with them a weapon which they could drop and pick up at pleasure to discomfit a political adversary. Religion was a private affair in their dealings with the Congress and nationalism their ideology. But when they were pitted against the Muslim League, their sole consideration was Islam. They said that the Muslim League was not only indifferent to Islam but an enemy of it.

After independence, the Ahrar leaders came to Pakistan. But before coming, the All India Majlis-i-Ahrar passed a resolution dissolving their organization and advising the Muslims to accept
Maulana Azad as their leader and join the Congress Party.[8]

The Jamat-i-Islami was also opposed to the idea of Pakistan which it described as Na Pakistan (not pure).

In none of the writings of the Jama’at is to be found the remotest reference in support of the demand for Pakistan. The pre-independence views of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the Jamat-i-Islami were quite definite:

“Among Indian Muslims today we find two kinds of nationalists: the Nationalists Muslims, namely those who in spite of their being Muslims believe in Indian Nationalism and worship it; and the Muslims Nationalist: namely those who are little concerned with Islam and its principles and aims, but are concerned with the individuality and the political and economic interests of that nation which has come to exist by the name of Muslim, and they are so concerned only because of their accidence of birth in that nation. From the Islamic viewpoint both these types of nationalists were equally misled, for Islam enjoins faith in truth only; it does not permit any kind of nation-worshipping at all.[9]

Maulana Maududi was of the view that the form of government in the new Muslim state, if it ever came into existence, could only be secular. In a speech shortly before partition he said: “Why should we foolishly waste our time in expediting the so-called Muslim-nation state and fritter away our energies in setting it up, when we know that it will not only be useless for our purposes, but will rather prove an obstacle in our path.” [10]

Paradoxically, Maulana Maududi’s writings played an important role in convincing the Muslim intelligentsia that the concept of united nationalism was suicidal for the Muslims but his reaction to the Pakistan movement was complex and contradictory. When asked to cooperate with the Muslim League he replied: “Please do not think that I do not want to participate in this work because of any differences, my difficulty is that I do not see how I can participate because partial remedies do not appeal to my mind and I have never been interested in patch work.”[11]

He had opposed the idea of united nationhood because he was convinced that the Muslims would be drawn away from Islam if they agreed to merge themselves in the Indian milieu. He was interested more in Islam than in Muslims: because Muslims were Muslims not because they belonged to a communal or a national entity but because they believed in Islam. The first priority, therefore, in his mind was that Muslim loyalty to Islam should be strengthened. This could be done only by a body of Muslims who did sincerely believe in Islam and did not pay only lip service to it. Hence he founded the Jamat-i-Islami (in August 1941).[12]

However, Maulana Maududi’s stand failed to take cognizance of the circumstances in which the Muslims were placed [13] at that critical moment.

The Jamiat-i-Ulema- i-Hind, the most prestigious organization of the Ulema, saw nothing Islamic in the idea of Pakistan. Its president, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, who was also Mohtamim or principal of Darul Ulum Deoband opposed the idea of two-nation theory, pleading that all Indians, Muslims or Hindus were one nation. He argued that faith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries but that nationality was a matter of geography, and Muslims were obliged to be loyal to the nation of their birth along with their non-Muslim fellow citizens. Maulana Madani said: “all should endeavor jointly for such a democratic government in which Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Parsis are included. Such a freedom is in accordance with Islam.” [14] He was of the view that in the present times, nations are formed on the basis of homeland and not on ethnicity and religion.[15] He issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from joining the Muslim League.

Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani accepted the doctrine of Indian nationalism with all enthusiasm and started preaching it in mosques. This brought a sharp rebuke from Dr. Mohammad Iqbal. His poem on Hussain Ahmad [16] in 1938 started a heated controversy between the so-called nationalist Ulema and the adherents of pan-Islamism (Umma).

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a member of Indian National Congress regrets that he did not accept Congress president ship in 1946, which led Nehru to assume that office and give the statements that could be exploited by the Muslim League for creation of Pakistan and withdrawal of its acceptance of the Cabinet Plan that envisaged an Indian Union of all the provinces and states of the sub-continent with safeguards for minorities. [17] He had persuaded the pro-Congress Ulema that their interests would be better safeguarded under a united India, and that they should repose full confidence in Indian nationalism. However, they should make efforts to secure for themselves the control of Muslim personal law, by getting a guarantee from the Indian National Congress, that the Muslim personal law would be administered by qadis (judges) who were appointed from amongst the Ulema.[18]

In a bid to weaken the Muslim League’s claim to represent all Muslims of the subcontinent, the Congress strengthened its links with the Jamiat-i-Ulema- i-Hind, the Ahrars and such minor and insignificant non-League Muslim groups as the Momins and the Shia Conference.[ 19]

Along with its refusal to share power with the Muslim League, the Congress pursued an anti-Muslim League policy in another direction with the help of Jamiat-i-Ulema- i-Hind . It was not enough to keep the Muslim League out of power. Its power among the people should be weakened and finally broken. Therefore, it decided to bypass Muslim political leadership and launch a clever movement of contacting the Muslim masses directly to wean them away from the leadership that sought to protect them from the fate of becoming totally dependent on the sweet will of the Hindu majority for their rights, even for their continued existence. This strategy — called Muslim Mass Contact Movement — was organized in 1937 with great finesse by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. [20]

Congress leaders …. employed Molvis to convert the Muslim masses to the Congress creed. The Molvis, having no voice in the molding of the Congress policy and program, naturally could not promise to solve the real difficulties of the masses, a promise which would have drawn the masses towards the Congress. The Molvis and others employed for the work tried to create a division among the Muslim masses by carrying on a most unworthy propaganda against the leaders of the Muslim League. [21] However, this Muslim mass contact movement failed.

It is pertinent to note here that a small section of the Deoband School was against joining the Congress. Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863-1943) was the chief spokesman of this group. Later Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Othmani (1887-1949), a well-known disciple of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani and a scholar of good repute, who had been for years in the forefront of the Jamiat leadership quit it with a few other Deoband Ulema, and became the first president of the Jamiat-i-Ulema- i-Islam established in 1946 to counteract the activities of the Jamiat-i-Ulema- i-Hind. However, the bulk of the Deoband Ulema kept on following the lead of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani and the Jamiat in opposing the demand for Pakistan.

Contrary to the plea of the nationalist Ulema, the Muslim intelligentsia was worried that the end of British domination should not become for the Muslims the beginning of Hindu domination. They perceived through the past experience that the Hindus could not be expected to live with them on equal terms within the same political framework. Therefore they did not seek to change masters. A homeland is an identity and surely the Muslims of the sub-continent could not have served the cause of universal brotherhood by losing their identity, which is what would have inevitably happened if they had been compelled to accept the political domination of the Hindus. The Ulema thought in terms of a glorious past and linked it unrealistically to a nebulous future of Muslim brotherhood. This more than anything else damaged the growth of Muslim nationalism and retarded the progress of Muslims in the sub-continent. [22]

The nationalist Ulema failed to realize this simple truth and eventually found themselves completely isolated from the mainstream of the Muslim struggle for emancipation. Their opposition to Pakistan on grounds of territorial nationalism was the result of their failure to grasp contemporary realities. [23] They did not realize that majorities can be much more devastating, specifically when it is an ethnic, linguistic or religious majority which cannot be converted into a minority through any election.[24]

The Ulema, as a class, concentrated on jurisprudence and traditional sciences. They developed a penchant for argument and hair splitting. This resulted in their progressive alienation from the people, who while paying them the respect due to religious scholars, rejected their lead in national affairs. While their influence on the religious minded masses remained considerable, their impact on public affairs shrank simply because the Ulema concentrated on the traditional studies and lost touch with the realities of contemporary life.[25]

Notes:

1. After independence “some of the Ulema decided to stay in India, others hastened to Pakistan to lend a helping hand. If they had not been able to save the Muslims from Pakistan they must now save Pakistan from the Muslims. Among them was Maulana Abul Aala Maududi, head of the Jamat-i-Islami, who had been bitterly opposed to Pakistan.” Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not
Masters, P-202

2 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan, p-66

3. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, p79-80

4. Speech on Feb. 5, 1938

5 Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, p-28

6. Ibid. p-54

7. Alluding to Quadi-i-Azam’ s marriage to a Parsi girl.

8. Munir Report, p-256

9. Maulana Maududi, Nationalism and India, Pathankot, 1947, p-25

10. The Process of Islamic Revolution, 2nd edition, Lahore 1955, p-37

11. Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Tehrik-i-Adazi- e-Hind aur Mussalman (Indian Freedom Movement and Muslims), pp 22-23

12. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, p-368

13. Ibid., p-368

14. Zamzam 17.7.1938 cited by Pakistan Struggle and Pervez, Tulu-e-Islam Trust, Lahore, p-614

15. Ibid. p-314

16. Hasan (rose) from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhaib from Rome, Deoband produced Husain Ahmad, what monstrosity is this? He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by countries, What an ignoramus regarding the position of Muhammad! Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is the totality of Faith, And if thou does not reach him, all (thy knowledge) is Bu Lahaism.

17. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, in his biography, India Wins Freedom, fixes the responsibility for the partition of India, at one place on Jawaharlal Nehru, and at another place on Vallabh-bhai Patel by observing that “it would not perhaps be unfair to say that Vallabh-dhbai Patel was the founder of Indian partition.” H.M. Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality, p-162

18. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, op. cit., p-328

19. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, p-237

20. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics p-334

21. Justice Sayed Shameem Hussain Kadri – Creation of
Pakistan – Army Book Club, Rawalpindi ,1983 — p-414

22. Ayub Khan, op. cit., p-200

23. According to Dr. Mohammad Iqbal, the present state of affairs of the Moslem world. Dr. Iqbal said: “It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a league of nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.” (Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p-159) Dr. Iqbal had apparently in mind the following verse from the Holy Quran: O Mankind ! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other. (49:13)

24. Qureshi, op. cit., p-378

25. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization in Pakistan, p-26

26. Ayub Khan, op. cit.,p-202

27. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963, p-173

28. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p-29

29. Qureshi, op. cit., p-383

30. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in History, p-215

31. Munir Report, p-205

32. Ibid. p-218

33. Ibid. p-219

34. Anita M. Weiss, Reassertion of Islam in Pakistan, p-2

35. Leonard Binder, Islam and Politics in Pakistan, University of California Press, 1961, p-29

36. Anita M. Weiss, p-21

37. Ibid. p-21

38. When Pakistan appeared on the map, they (Ulema) found no place for themselves in India and they all came to Pakistan and brought with them the curse of Takfir (calling one another infidel). Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, p-38

39. Prof. Rafi-ullah Shehab – The Quaid-e-Azam and the Ulema – The Pakistan Times, Islamabad 25.12.1986.

40. Ahmad Bashir, Islam, Shariat and the Holy Ghost, Frontier Post, Peshawar, 9.5.1991

41. Ibid.

COURTESY: MR. ABDUS SATTAR GHAZALI.

Dear Mughal,
The information you provided is extremely useful. I consider it much more valuable than the article. I will request you to combine the whole parts and write a complete article on LUBP.

Mr.Khan :
Dear Mughal,
The information you provided is extremely useful. I consider it much more valuable than the article. I will request you to combine the whole parts and write a complete article on LUBP.

Dear Moderators,

Please compile it as a separate post as seconded by Ms. Rabia and suggested by Mr. Khan.

Reagrds

Dr. M. Akbar Hussain :
@Aamir Mughal
So Mr Mughal, are you suggesting that Pakistan was acceptable to the Muslims of Indian Subcontinent ONLY if it was in the name of Islam? Then where is the problem?

Dear Dr Sahab,

I haven’t suggested anything rather I have presented key notes on the Pakistan’s History and Hypocrisy of Pakistan’s Founding Fathers and Mullahs as well. You can draw whatever conclusion you like.

My conclusions are as under:

1 – Secular Founding Father= Muslims are different than Hindus therefore Pakistan is a must. Slogan of Religion [for name sake] was hurled to get quick support [what a joke A Shia Founding Father [Jinnah was acceptable to Deobandis and even Wahabis but Shia community is not very welcome], First Foreign Minister was Ahmedis [since it was Jinnah’s decision so Quadiyani was accepted but not after Jinnah] above all what was the purpose of making a country when Barrister had no sense of either the history and psyche of the Muslims of the sub-continent who ruled over the Majority for 700 years].

2 – Not so Secular Founding Fathers: Inserted Objective Resolution in a country which was made by Shia Founding Father and above all Anti Pakistan Mullahs were imported from India to baptized Jinnah’s Secular with Islam.

3 – Mullahs: Opposed Pakistan by tooth and nail and all ended up in Pakistan to hijack it [Yaani Marnay Kay Liay Yahan Aagay] e.g. Mawdudi, hijackers Deobandi, and Khaksar like Inayatullah Mashriqi etc.etc.

4 – Founding Father VS Bengalis: Bengalis/Baluchs and Sindhis were thoroughly fingered by Jinnah himself and Jinnah was fingered by Liaquat and other Muslim League Stalwarts Jinnah – Liaquat Relations. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2008/10/jinnah-liaquat-relations.html and then Liaquat was fixed list goes on and on and DROP SECENE 1971 FALL OF DHAKA

4 – Mullah fights Pakistan’s Nation State Status: First Quadiyani, nowadays Shias, let me tell you next is Barelvi and then Next is Deobandi and list goes on and on and on….

For me this is Pakistan’d Definition.

Dear Moderator,

I was very surprised that my article ‘The Fundamentalist Dimension in the Pakistan Movement’ published in the Fridays Times, 22-28 November 2002, which I present below by Mr Aamir Mughal without any acknowledgement. I wonder if this is ethically justifiable.
Friday Times, Pakistan’s First Independent Weekly Paper – Nov 22 – 28, 02 P2222akistan’s First Independent Weekly Paper – Nov 22 – 28, 02
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/

The fundamentalist dimension in the Pakistan Movement Advertise Here
It is not sufficient to say that Pakistan succumbed to fundamentalist ideology because the Quaid’s pledge was betrayed by his unworthy followers. An analysis of the role of ideas and mass mobilising campaigns laced with fundamentalist symbols and imagery in the run up to partition provides a more sophisticated, reliable and comprehensive explanation, argues Ishtiaq Ahmed
________________________________________
n the Prof. Karrar Husain Memorial Lecture entitled ‘Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan’ delivered in Karachi on 2 November 2002 the veteran Pakistani sociologist and political historian Hamza Alavi has argued that Pakistan was not meant to be a fundamentalist Islamic state. He shows through a review of important stages in the evolution of the Muslim League that the main leadership, particularly Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was opposed to Islamic ideology. Thus, for example, when at the All-India Muslim League’s Secession in Delhi in 1943 one Abdul Hameed Kazi tried to canvass support for a resolution that would commit the Muslim League to Islamic ideology and the creation of an Islamic state he was immediately pressured to withdraw the resolution. Alavi’s concluding remarks are the following:
Whatever may be said about limitations of the ideology of the Western educated Muslim Professionals and the salariat (and of the feudals in the final round) who mobilised support for the creation of Pakistan, religious ideology was never a part of it … Fundamentalist Islamic ideology has played no part in the origins of Pakistan.
He blames the emergence of fundamentalism to the unworthy successors of Jinnah who from 1952 began to use Islam to stifle the opposition by raising the slogan ‘Islam is in danger’. I think Alavi is correct in evaluating the ideological preferences of Jinnah and some of his immediate disciples, though not of all. He makes a big point of the role of Raja Sahib Mahmudabad in the Pakistan movement, but fails to mention that Raja Sahib, a Shia, wrote in 1939 to the historian Mohibul Hassan:
When we speak of democracy in Islam it is not democracy in the government but in the cultural and social aspects of life. Islam is totalitarian—there is no denying about it. It is the Koran that we should turn to. It is the dictatorship of the Koranic laws that we want—and that we will have—but not through non-violence and Gandhian truth. (quoted in Hasan, 1997: 57-8)
Raja Sahib was severely reprimanded by Jinnah, but the point is that such ideas were not altogether alien to Muslim League stalwarts. I think an additional reason why the Muslim League could not have allowed such ideas to be associated with its ideology and objective, at least at the highest formal level, was that they would have undermined its position as the moderate voice of Muslims vis-à-vis the Indian National Congress and the British government. The great skill of Jinnah was that until the last moment he did not explain what his idea of Pakistan was. It is not surprising that his 11 August 1947 speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in which he spelt out the vision of a secular and democratic Pakistan surprised many of his followers. His sympathetic biographer Stanley Wolpert has recorded this point succinctly (Wolpert, 1993: 340).
The strategy not to discuss the ideology of Pakistan provided Jinnah with considerable flexibility and room to manoeuvre his campaign for Pakistan as and when the situation required. The task was formidable and the adversaries strong and well organised. Thus in late January 1947 when the Muslim League launched its direct action campaign in the Punjab against the government of Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, met the visiting all-India Muslim League leader Khawaja Nazimuddin on 18 February and later wrote in his fortnightly report to the viceroy:
In our first meeting Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din admitted candidly that he did not know what Pakistan means, and that nobody in the ML knew, so it was difficult for the League to carry on long term negotiations with the minorities. (March 1947: L/P & J/5/250, p. 3/79).
The major flaw in Alavi’s analysis is that he does not attempt an in-depth analysis of Muslim League politics after the 23 March 1940 Lahore Resolution in which the idea of Pakistan was publicly put forth. Such a resolution shifted decisively the focus of Muslim politics from the Muslim minority provinces to the Muslim majority provinces of north-western India. In particular, the rapid changes that took place in that key province of Punjab need to be analysed. Under the rule of the Punjab Unionist Party, the Muslim proportion of the government services had been rising sharply, although in the 1940s Hindus and Sikhs were still ahead of them. However, the Unionist Party remained biased in favour of rural interests, whereas it was the towns and cities of Punjab that produced most of the Muslim intelligentsia and they flocked to the Muslim League. It is true that the powerful landowning Muslim classes of Punjab and Sindh began to shift their loyalties from regional parties to the Muslim League mainly to protect their vested interests since Congress was determined to abolish landlordism. The logical implication is that the Muslim League did not pose a threat to such interests and that is why they joined it.
However, the fundamentalist dimension in the Pakistan movement developed most strongly only when the Sunni ulema and pirs were mobilised to prove that the Muslim masses wanted a Muslim/Islamic state. While the central leadership at Deoband indeed allied itself to Congress, some prominent dissidents such as Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmed Usmani and their factions rallied around the Muslim League. Also, the fact that the central Deoband leadership was allied to the Congress meant that the Muslim League was rendered attractive to their much bigger and more influential rivals, the Berelawis, who entertained their own ambitions of establishing an Islamic state. The tables were turned when the Berelawi ulema and pirs of Punjab, NWFP and Sindh joined the Muslim League. David Gilmartin (1989) has documented the important role that some leading pirs in Punjab played in popularising the idea of Pakistan.
The strength of the Muslim League in the Muslim-majority provinces was going to be put to the test during the 1945-46 election campaign. Consequently in the public meetings and mass contact campaigns the Muslim League openly employed Islamic sentiments, slogans and heroic themes to rouse the masses. This is clearly stated in the fortnightly confidential report of 22 February 1946 sent to Viceroy Wavell by the Punjab Governor Sir Bertrand Glancy:
The ML (Muslim League) orators are becoming increasingly fanatical in their speeches. Maulvis (clerics) and Pirs (spiritual masters) and students travel all round the Province and preach that those who fail to vote for the League candidates will cease to be Muslims; their marriages will no longer be valid and they will be entirely excommunicated… It is not easy to foresee what the results of the elections will be. But there seems little doubt the Muslim League, thanks to the ruthless methods by which they have pursued their campaign of *Islam in danger* will considerably increase the number of their seats and unionist representatives will correspondingly decline. (L/P & J/5/249, p. 155).
Similar practices were prevalent in the campaigns in NWFP and Sindh. In his doctoral dissertation, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? Erland Jansson writes:
The Pir of Manki Sharif…founded an organisation of his own, the Anjuman-us-asfia. The organisation promised to support the Muslim League on condition that Shariat would be enforced in Pakistan. To this Jinnah agreed. As a result the Pir of Manki Sharif declared jehad to achieve Pakistan and ordered the members of his anjuman to support the League in the 1946 elections (p. 166).
Jinnah’s letter to to Pir Manki Sharif in which he promised that the Shariah will be applied to the affairs of the Muslim community is quoted in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume 5, 1949, p. 46. Thus from 1940 onwards, the distinction between a Muslim national state and an Islamic state became increasingly blurred, and in the popular mind such distinctions did not matter much. In any case, while the non-Muslims viewed with great apprehension the possibility of a Muslim state that would reduce them to a minority, the minority Shia and Ahmadiyya communities were fearful that it would result in Sunni domination. This is obvious from the correspondence between the Shia leader, Syed Ali Zaheer and Jinnah in July1944 (Allana, 1977:
. Moreover, it is to be noted that the Council of Action of the All-Parties Shia Conference passed a resolution on 25 December 1945 rejecting the idea of Pakistan. Similarly the Ahmadiyya were also wary and reluctant to support the demand for a separate Muslim state (Report of the Court of Inquiry, 1954: 196). It is only when Sir Zafrulla was won over by Jinnah that the Ahmadis started supporting the demand for Pakistan. To all doubters, Jinnah gave assurances that Pakistan will be a modern Muslim state, neutral on sectarian matters.
Whether the only reason why Pakistan succumbed to fundamentalist ideology is that the Quaid’s pledge was betrayed by his unworthy followers, or, an analysis which incorporates, besides the betrayal of incompetent successors, the role of ideas and mass mobilising campaigns laced with fundamentalist symbols and imagery, provides a more sophisticated, reliable and comprehensive explanation is something which we need to continue discussing.
[The author is Associate Professor Department of Political Science at Stockholm University]
References
Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation, London: Hurst & Company, London, (1997).
David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, Delhi: Oxford University Press, (1989).
Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?, Uppsala: Acta UniversitatisUpsaliensis, (1981).
Political and Judicial Records L/P & J/5/249, p. 155, London: British Library, (March 1946).
Political and Judicial Records L/P & J/5/250, p. 3/79, London: British Library, (March 1947).
Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (also known as Munir Report), Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954.
‘Resolution adopted by Council of Action of the All-Parties Shia Conference’, held at Poona, 25 December 1945, in S.R. Bakshi, The Making of India and Pakistan: Ideology of the Hindu Mahasabha and other Political Parties, Vol. 3, New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications, 1997.
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University Press London, (1993).
The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates,Vol. 5, 1949, Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, (1949).
Syed Ali Zaheer, ‘Letter to Quaid-e-Azam by Syed Ali Zaheer, July1944 and the Quaid’s reply’ in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, Lahore: Islamic Book Service, (1977).

Thank you very much. I happened to arrive at your website just by chance but will try to follow the discussions on it.
Best regards,
Ishtiaq

Ishtiaq Ahmed says: – June 17, 2010 at 1:07 am Dear Moderator, I was very surprised that my article ‘The Fundamentalist Dimension in the Pakistan Movement’ published in the Fridays Times, 22-28 November 2002, which I present below by Mr Aamir Mughal without any acknowledgement. I wonder if this is ethically justifiable.
=============
Dear and Respected Prof Ishtiaq Sahab,

Please accept my apology for not mentioning the original author and it must’ve been unintentional mistake and not the intentional one as you can see that I always mention my source. Pardon Again.

Best Regards.

Glimpse of Deviation from the Basic Law!

The principle that Islamic injunctions can be amended to suit changes dictated by time and social development has been upheld by a long list of Islamic scholars, from Ibnul-Qaiyyam Jauzia and Ibn Khaldun to Allama Iqbal and that makes a strong case for Islam’s compatibility with secularism. (Falsafa Shariat-i-Islam, Majlis Taraqqi-i-Adab).
In Pakistan the advocates of secularism rely mostly on the Quaid-i-Azam’s dictum that religion has nothing to do with the business of the state. Actually, the subcontinental Muslims’ contribution to secularism has a much longer history, beginning (if not earlier) with Allauddin Khilji’s refusal to follow Qazi Mughis’s plea to convert or kill the more numerous non-Muslims. Babar advised Humayun to treat people’s religious affiliations as changing seasons and Aurangzeb scolded his teacher for making him waste his time on Arabic grammar while he should have been taught governance in a world that was larger than Shah Jahan’s kingdom. All these ideas bore the stamp of secularism. Spectre of secularism By I.A. Rehman Thursday, 02 Sep, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/i-a-rehman-spectre-of-secularism-290

SC’s responsibility? Dawn Editorial Wednesday, 18 Aug, 2010
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/19-scs-responsibility-880-hh-07 On Monday, during the ongoing hearings on challenges to certain parts of the 18th Amendment, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry posed the question: “Should we accept if tomorrow parliament declares secularism, and not Islam, as the state polity?” That the question was asked in a rhetorical way was relatively clear: several judges indicated that such a move was even beyond contemplation. That is a troubling position.

Pakistani Judiciary is law unto themselves! Isn’t it strange that Ansar Abbasi, The Jang Group and their Mediocre “Analysts” openly discuss cases under trial???? In Accordance with the Law & Constitution: Justice (R) Rana Bhagwandas http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2010/02/in-accordance-with-law-constitution.html

Main thrust of CJ LHC was that Muslims and Pakistan cannot do it? But Muslim Military [Pakistan conducted Operation Cleanup [at least 5 in Baluchistan starting from Jinnah, one in Former East Pakistan, two in Sindh, One is going on in NWFP] and all were happened to be Muslims.

CJ LHC’S BIASED AGAINST NON-MUSLIMS.

BARELY days after the Punjab chief minister was caught playing to the Taliban gallery, another high official from the province is in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons. This time, Lahore High Court Chief Justice Khawaja Mohammad Sharif has sparked outrage for reportedly saying that Hindus were responsible for financing acts of terrorism in Pakistan. The remarks came while the judge was hearing two identical petitions against the possible extradition of Afghan Taliban suspects. It may well have been a slip of the tongue by Mr Sharif, who might have mistakenly said ‘Hindu’ instead of ‘India’ — nevertheless it was a tasteless remark to say the least. Although such remarks warrant criticism what makes them worse is the position of the person who makes them. These sort of comments are the last thing one expects to hear from a judge, that too the chief justice of a provincial high court. What sort of message are we sending to our minorities, as well as to the world, when the holder of such a respected public office makes comments that come across as thoughtless? The Hindu members of the National Assembly walked out of the house on Tuesday to protest the remarks. The members said the comments had hurt the feelings of Pakistani Hindus — and there is no doubt that they had. REFERENCE: Tactless remarks Dawn Editorial Thursday, 18 Mar, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/14-tactless-remarks-830-zj-10

Judge not lest ye be Judged – Code of Judicial Ethics. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2010/02/judge-not-lest-ye-be-judged-code-of.html

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