The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan – by Hamza Alvi

Thanks: Hamza Alavi Internet Archive

Religious fundamentalism has become a powerful and dangerous force in Pakistan, due mainly to the opportunism of successive political leadership that has pandered to it. Militant sectarian religious groups and parties, led by half-educated and bigoted mullahs,many of them armed to the teeth, are holding our civil society and the state to ransom.

They threaten the very fabric of Pakistan society. Threats of disruption from religious parties have escalated in recent decades. They have steadily grown in strength since the time of General Zia. They now claim that they are thet rue custodians of Pakistan and that it was they, the mullahs, who had fought successfully for Pakistan, to establish a theocratic state for Muslims. Facts contradict such claims.
With the exception of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez’s pro-Pakistan Tulu-i-Islam, group, all religious groups and parties, including the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, the Majli-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami, had all bitterly opposed the Pakistan Movement and abused its leadership which was secular.
The Muslim League, the Party that led the Pakistan movement, was a party of modern educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers (whom, for the sake of brevity, we may call the ‘salariat’). It had little to do with the outlook of bigoted mullahs.

It was free of any millenarian ideological pretences about creating an Islamic state. It was a movement of Muslims rather than a movement of Islam. Behind it was a new class of English educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers that came into being in the 19th century. It got organised politically by the turn of the century, seeking a better deal for themselves vis-à-vis Hindus who were advancing relatively more rapidly in these fields.

When the Muslim League was founded in 1906 at a meeting convened by Nawab Salimullah at Dhaka, the new party was immediately hi-jacked by the Aligarh group led by Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk. Aligarh was at the vanguard of the new Northern Indian Muslim salariat class, the sons of the Muslim Ashraf, who were deeply conscious of the loss of their privileges with the advent of British rule and the relatively more rapid rise of Hindu educated classes. The main base of the Muslim salariat was in UP and Bihar for, at that time, its was relatively weaker in the Muslim majority provinces.

The Muslim League was focused entirely on its secular demands of western educated Muslim professionals and the salariat. Attempts to place the issue of Islamic ideology on the agenda of the Muslim League were both rare and invariably unsuccessful. Arguably, the earliest of such attempts was one by Shibli Numani to Islamise the Aligarh syllabus.

Shibli was explicitly committed to theocratic values and wanted to shift the emphasis of the Aligarh syllabus away from English and modern sciences, towards Islamic learning and the Arabic language. The response of the Muslim salariat class to that attempt is exemplified by the remarks of Sir Raza Ali, who was a close collaborator of Sir Syed’s immediate successors, Muhsin ul-Mulk and Viqar ul-Mulk. With them, Raza Ali was at the centre of the Aligarh establishment. In an article in the daily Statesman opposing Shibli’s move, he remarked that the idea of reviving Arabic knowledge was, of course, beguiling for Muslims. But he warned that they should not ignore the demands of our times, for the most urgent need of Indian Muslims was to be offered education that would be beneficial in the affairs of this world; education that would help their coming generations to earn their livelihood. Sir Raza Ali spelt out the principal concern of the educated Muslim middle class at the time. Their concern was not about a hypothetical return to original Islam and the creation of an ‘Islamic State’, ruled over by mullahs, that Shibli had dreamt about. Shibli had to leave Aligarh, for it was not the place where his theocratic ideas could flourish.

Among the rare attempts to bring the issue of ‘Islamic Ideology’ on to the agenda of the Muslim League was one that was planned for the Delhi Session of the AIML in April 1943. One Abdul Hameed Kazi (backed by ‘Maulana’ Abdul Sattar Niazi) canvassed support for a resolution, which he intended to table. That would commit the Muslim League to an Islamic ideology and the creation of an Islamic state. But pressure from everyone around him forced Kazi to abandon the idea. The resolution was not even moved. The Pakistan movement remained firmly committed to its secular concerns.

In his keynote speech before the inaugural meeting of Pakistan’s new Constituent Assembly, on 11th August 1947, Mr. Jinnah spelt out the Pakistan Ideology, namely the secular and tolerant vision of the new state. That speech was not a sudden aberration, as some Islamic ideologists, and General Zia’s hacks, were later to allege. It was consistent with what Mr. Jinnah had been saying for decades. The Muslim League had always been committed to a secular society.
Following Mr. Jinnah, his political successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, too reiterated the Muslim League’s secular values. When Liaquat moved the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 he declared that ‘As I have just said, the people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.’ Despite that clear statement by the mover of the Objectives Resolution, later religious ideologues, notably General Zia and his hacks, have claimed that the Objectives Resolution was a charter for the imposition of the ‘Sharia’ (as they would interpret it) although the word Sharia does not occur anywhere in that Resolution. Their argument is based on some conventional generalities in the Resolution, which said that ‘Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives, in the individual and collective spheres, in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna’.
That, did not amount to a charter for the creation of a theocratic, ‘Islamic’ State. Liaquat’s position on the Muslim League’s traditional secularism was, however, soon to be reversed. Not so very long after the Objectives Resolution was passed, Liaquat began to change his tune for his political base was threatened by of splits in the Muslim League in the Punjab, which was the power-base of Pakistan’s ruling elite. That was due to factional conflict between Daulatana and Mamdot who left the Muslim League to form a rival Party. Liaquat was now in a panic. He decided to exploit Islamic rhetoric, to hold together his crumbling Party. He began to speak of ‘Islam in Danger’. He also began to equate loyalty to the Muslim League with loyalty to the state. Those who opposed him or his party were denounced as traitors.
There was, however, a second and a much more important reason why Liaquat decided to abandon his secular stance. Powerful regional movements had arisen in East Bengal, Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP, whose people felt that they were not being given their due in a Punjabi dominated Pakistan. They demanded regional autonomy and fairer shares of resources. The Centre, which was seen as ‘Punjabi’, was in fact dominated by a cohesive bureaucracy, under Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as Secretary General to the Government. It was the centralised bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan whilst politicians, including Liaquat, went through the motions.

Arguably, it was the challenge to the centre from regional movements which was the more important factor in precipitating Liaquat’s ideological volte-face. Abandoning Mr. Jinnah’s (and his own) firm stand against pandering to the mullahs, Liaquat sought to negate regional demands by issuing calls for ‘unity’ in the name of Pakistan and Islam. We were all Pakistanis and Muslims, it was now argued, and therefore we could not be Bengalis or Sindhis or Baluch.

The bureaucracy, rather than Liaquat, was in effective control, and it was not prepared to make any significant concessions to the mullahs. The mullahs could be given a visible public role, but without any real share in power. For that purpose a Board of Talimaat-i- Islamia, was set up. It provided a few jobs for some senior mullahs, the Ulama. But the Board was to be no more than a façade for the new found religious rhetoric of politicians.

It was not to have any real powers. Its function was purely advisory and that too only on matters that were referred to it. When the Board did make some suggestions they were unceremoniously ignored. Nevertheless, the Ulama seemed to be content with the arrangement. They remained quiescent for nearly two decades. Recalcitrant Mullahs, such as Maulana Maududi, found themselves in jail. The mullahs were under control.

That basically peaceful scene was disturbed only temporarily in 1953, when Islamic militants launched Anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab an d Martial Law was proclaimed. Although religious zealots of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami led the riots, they were in fact being used by cynical political forces, led by Punjab Chief Minister Mumtaz Daulatana. That was done in the context of US attempts to destabilise the Nazimuddin Government at the centre and to counter the Bengal group of MPs in the matter of the proposed Pakistan-US military Alliance which they opposed. That is a long and complicated story.

A decade and a half later, religious rhetoric was indulged in by the illegitimate regime of General Yahya Khan, but without conceding any formal role to the mullahs. General Sher Ali, redefined ‘Pakistan Ideology’ as ‘Islamic Ideology’. The Yahya government’s primary concern was to de-legitimise the increasingly powerful Bengali nationalism. Yahya’s Bengali adviser, Prof. G. W. Choudhury, had persuaded him and his coterie of Generals, that East Bengali nationalism was limited to only a handful of intellectuals, who were in the pay of the Indians and that the vast majority of Bengalis had no sympathy with them. That tragically false picture could account for the ferocity and reckless manner in which Yahya tried to suppress the Bengali people in 1971. Would they have embarked on that policy if Yahya had even the slightest inkling of the depth of Bengali feelings ?

The mullahs were quiescent, however, until they were stirred into action by the foolish populist rhetoric of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who misguidedly decided to exploit religious ideology. Thereby Bhutto sowed the seeds of his own destruction, for the re-activated mullahs became the vanguard of the campaign against him. That set the scene for Gen. Zia’s coup d’etat.

It was under General Zia that narrow and bigoted religiosity became state policy. The General sought the political support of the mullahs for his illegal regime, for he had no other political base. He also sought financial support from the Reagan regime in the US. Both of these objectives, he thought, could be secured through an Islamic Jihad which he proclaimed against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The CIA joined took over the taskof organising armed religious groups in Afghanistan, in cooperation with Pakistani agencies. When the Russians left Afghanistan, however, the CIA was withdrawn precipitately from the scene, leaving it to Pakistan to deal with the mess that they had created. Foolish Pakistani policies since then, especially under Benazir Bhutto and her successor Nawaz Sharif, got Pakistan even more heavily involved with these once US sponsored ‘terrorist groups’. The present government has done little to turn away from these policies to extricate Pakistan from the mess that was inherited from Zia’s Afghan policy.
When he seized power illegally, Zia badly needed some source of legitimacy for his regime. Being politically bankrupt, he decided to exploit the credulity of Pakistani Muslims by invoking Allah. He claimed to have experienced ilham (a divine revelation) in which, he declared, he was enjoined by the Almighty himself to Islamise Pakistan and to transform it into a fortress of Islam. New ‘Islamic Laws’ were promulgated that were crude and cruel distortions of Islamic teachings, such as his Hudud Ordinance which, for example, had the effect of punishing a rape victim (for fornication) while the perpetratorof the rape went scot-free because of impossible conditions of proof now needed to prove his guilt!

Zia also bequeathed to his successors undemocratic Shariat Courts, that are answerable to no one. They issue binding decisions on the state and on the people, in the name of the Sharia. That role, in the name of Islam, is rejected by the philosophy of Sir Syed Ahmad who pointed out that Islam did not decree the office of a Pope with powers to issue binding decrees in the name of the faith. Islam, he said, is a religion of the individual conscience. No person or institution has the right to issue binding fatawa, laying down what Islam is and what it is not. Indeed, no other Muslim country has the equivalent of our Shariat Courts. They were set up by Zia’s illegitimate regime and should be dissolved.

The Shariat Courts are manned by persons who hold rigid religious views. Their most damaging decision so far is an order that requires the abolition of interest, ‘in all its forms’, by 30th June, 2001. This threatens to bring Pakistan’s already very shaky economy to a complete halt. No enemy of Pakistan could have devised a more potent weapon to destroy the country. In arriving at their decision the judges of the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the advice of a very large number of scholars who came before it as witnesses, who resisted this interpretation of the Sharia. Instead, the Court appears to have been misled by bogus claims of ‘Islamic Banking’. They seem to be ignorant of how a modern economy functions and do not seem to have understood at all the obvious implications of their decision in a modern day capitalist economy such as that of Pakistan. They appear to be ignorant of the difference between interest in a modern capitalist economy (sood) and usury (riba) in pre-capitalist economies to which Quranic strictures apply. What the Shariat Courts have produced is a time bomb which, if allowed to go off, threatens to blow up Pakistan’s economy.

The present Government seems to be paralysed in the face of the die hard religious lobby which seems to be triumphant about this. It has poor advisers. As soon as the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court announced it decision, the minister of Finance, who is an ex-banker declared, without pausing to think, that the Court’s decision would be implemented in full. But, after months of deliberations by several high powered committees, the Government still has no idea whatever of what is to be done. It speaks with two voices. At a recent meeting, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs declared that the Government has drafted all required laws and regulations, which are ready to be promulgated and that the Government is ready to implement the Shariat Court’s decision in full, and without qualifications. But at the same meeting, the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (the country’s central Bank) declared that they do not as yet know how the Shariat Court decision can be implemented. He said that the Government needs more time to work out viable solutions and that it has asked for an extension of time. The Government does not seem to understand the gravity of this issue. They should know that they cannot allow the economy to collapse. But they also appear to be too intimidated by religious fundamentalists to overturn the Shariat Court’s decree.

Meanwhile, the top nine religious parties in the country have declared that they will launch a mass anti-Riba movement, on the lines of the movement that brought down Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, if the Government fails to abolish interest by the date laid down by the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court, namely the end of June, 2001. They have declared, ominously, that the time has come for a decisive war between Islamic and secular forces in the country !

A major factor in the present situation is a development since the time of Zia. That is the proliferation of deeni madaris, religious schools, that have spread throughout Pakistan. They receive generous foreign funding, not least from Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia. The deeni madaris have little difficulty in recruiting pupils (taliban), who are turned into fanatics, ready to die for what they are taught to believe are sacred causes. A factor that has greatly helped their recruitment is the creation of a huge number of unemployed families, people without a livelihood and without hope, as a consequence of farm mechanisation, especially in the Punjab. Every tractor displaces at least a dozen families of sharecroppers. Hundreds of thousands of them are now without a source of livelihood. In that context, the appearance of the well financed deeni madaris, who take over their children, give them free ‘tuition’, accommodation and food, cannot appear to be anything other than a great blessing. The enthusiastic young taliban, are taught to recite the Quran. They are also indoctrinated, their minds filled with distorted and intolerant ideas about what Islam is and what it prescribes. The taliban are thus turned into fanatics. Most of the ‘deeni’ madaris also give them military training for jihad initially ostensibly against the Soviets and now for the liberation of Kashmir. But already Pakistan itself is experiencing the inevitable heavy fall out from this. The armed groups, many of them with battle-hardened taliban, are in the vanguard of sectarian killings throughout Pakistan, which are on the increase; killings of members of rival sects, Sunnis against the Shi’a, Deobandi Sunnis against Barelvi Sunnis and so on. They have also begun to issue threats against the state itself and the society in Pakistan.

Instead of a viable policy designed to disarm and liquidate such groups, successive regimes in Pakistan have pandered to them. The current military government, unlike the military regime of General Zia, has not indulged much in religious rhetoric, except for the occasional utterances of its Federal Minister for Religious Affairs. Indeed, the Government’s liberal interior minister, General Moinuddin Haider, has given calls, from time to time, about doing something to bring the so-called deeni madaris under some sort of control, reforming their syllabi to introduce some useful, career related, educational input into their activities. For that he has become the bête noir of the religious parties, who have warned the government, firmly, against meddling in their affairs.

The government, for its part, seems to be intimidated by the militant Islamic groups. In December last, for example, one Maulana Muhammad Akram, leader of the Tanzimul Ikhwan, threatened to march on Islamabad with ‘hundreds of thousands’ of his followers, to force the Government to promulgate the Sharia. The Government’s response was to placate him. It despatched the Punjab Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police to parley with Akram. That was apparently not enough, for it then sent Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, as reinforcement. After long drawn out talks, Maulana Akram ‘graciously agreed’ to defer his plan to storm the capital. It has been suggested by the media that Maulana Akram has ‘a lot of influence among middle-ranking officers of the army’. If that is so, that must surely be extremely worrying. Could it be that which explains the Government’s apparent paralysis in the face of serious threats from fanatical religious groups? It must know that a do nothing policy will not solve anything. Left to itself, the situation can only get worse. Theories of the state, democratic or otherwise, are premised on the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. But here we have a situation where the state’s monopoly of force is undermined by the numerous armed religious groups (who often work in concert) that have agendas of their own.

The Government must realise that the more they try to accommodate religious zealots, the stronger and the more intransigent they become. What the situation demands is a firm and well thought out policy to disarm such groups and bring them under control. It is surprising that Pakistan’s professional military does not yet seem to have realised the very serious threat that this situation poses to itself as well as to the State and society as a whole. In the meantime, until something is done, Pakistan will continue to stagger towards an uncertain future, with contradictory state policies.

9 responses to “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan – by Hamza Alvi”

  1. Excerpts from a book:

    Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror By Hassan Abbas published by An East Gate Book. M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York, London England.

    “The Khomeini revolution in Iran already bolstered the confidence of the Shias, and they were not about to take Sunni dictates in religious matters lying down. Hard-liners among Sunni, for their part, felt that such dictation was their right, and those on the extreme right of the Sunni spectrum simply cut the Gordian knot by taking a position that, correct or not, Pakistan had a Sunni majority and as such it should be declared a Sunni Muslim state in which Shia should be treated as a minority. Since achievement of this holy goal would likely to take some time, some of them decided that the interregnum ought not to be wasted. Thus in 1985 they formed Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) – an organization piously dedicated to ridding the country of the nettlesome presence of the Shias by eliminating them physically. Later, when they realized what the organization’s acronym meant in English, they changed the name to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).”

    “The zealous emissaries of the Iranian Revolutionary Regime started financing their organization Tehreek-e-Nifza- e-Fiqah-e- Jafaria (TNFJ – Movement for the Implementation of Jafaria Religious Law) and providing scholarships for Pakistani student to study in Iranian religious seminaries. For the Zia regime though, the problematic issue was Shia activism leading to a strong reaction to his attempts to impose Hanafi Islam (a branch of Sunni sect). For this he winked to the hard-liners among the Sunni religious groups in order to establish a front to squeeze the Shias. It was in this context that Jhangvi was selected by the intelligence community to do the needful. It is also believed that the JUI recommendation played the decisive part in this choice. The adherents of the Deobandi School were worried about Shia activism for religious reasons anyhow. State patronage came as an additional incentive. Consequently, in a well-designed effort, Shia assertiveness was projected as their disloyalty to Pakistan and its Islamic Ideology.”

    “In a few months, Saudi funds started pouring in, making the project feasible. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution was quite scary, for its ideals conflicted with that of a Wahabi monarchy. More so, with an approximately 10% Shia population, Saudi Arabia was concerned about the expansion of Shia activism in any Muslim country. Hence, it was more than willing to curb such trends in Pakistan by making a financial investment to bolster its Wahabi Agenda. According to Vali Raza Nasr, a leading expert on the sectarian groups of Pakistan, the flow of these funds was primarily routed through the Pakistan Military and the ISI. It is not known whether American support for this scheme was readily available, but the Zia regime knew well that the United States would be glad to acquiesce, given the rising US – Iran hostility. However, some analyst believe that CIA funds were involved in the venture.”

  2. Read the dark pages from the Recent History of Pakistan when Jamat-e-Islami and Mawdudi’s Perverted Breed “Prof Ghafoor and Professor Khursheed were in General Zia’s Martial Law Cabinet: 2nd Presidential Cabinet under President/CMLA General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq
    from 23-8-1978 to 21-4-1979
    1 – Professor Ghafoor Ahmad – Minister for Production and Industries.
    2 – Professor Khurshid Ahmad – Statistics, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission
    You may find many names in the post/link below who also served in General Musharraf’s Martial Law. High Treason Cases against Pakistani Military Dictators & Collaborators/Abettors

    The war in Kashmir is not jihad (May 1948; quoted in M. Sarwar, Maulana Maududi ki Tahrik-I-Islami, Lahore, 1956, pp. 331-332).
    Haider Farooq Mawdudi on Mawdudi and Jamat-e-Islami after Mawdudi.
    Question: But the ‘Jamaat’ of your father, Maulana Abdul Ala Mawdudi declares it as ‘Jihad’.
    Answer: Now, this is no more the ‘Jamaat’ of my father, this is now the ‘Jamaat’ of Qazi Hussain Ahmad. My father had categorically refused to accept the ongoing violence in Kashmir as ‘Jihad’.
    Question: Haider Sahab, Maulana Mawdudi was a giant personality and a great religious scholar. We should talk about present scenario. Jamaat-e-Islami is still spending a lot on ‘Jehad-e-Kashmir’ also rendering sacrifices?
    Answer: Yes, presently the situation is such that Jamaat receives Rs. 60,000/- for every militant killed in Kashmir out this, only 15,000-20,000/- are being given to the families of the martyrs, while as the remaining amount is eaten up by the JEI leaders themselves who have opened a factory of martyrs. JEI leaders have made money by getting others children killed. As far as they themselves are concerned, no son of Qazi Hussain Ahmad was killed either in Afghanistan or Kashmiri, ‘Jihad’ and his children are leading a luxurious life while studying in the United States.

    Ayub’s secularism as part of the military culture of British Indian Army was like an open book without any fine print. Even the prefix Islamic attaching to the Republic of Pakistan was dropped until restored under the writ of superior judiciary.
    That continued to be the case until the fateful day of 1965 when India attacked Pakistan along the international border, with Lahore as its principal target. Even in his first address to the nation within hours of the Indian invasion, Ayub went on to recite the ‘Kalama-i-Tayyaba’ in a stirring, emotion-choked voice.
    His subsequent meeting with religious parties – mainly the Jamaat-i-Islami under Maulana ‘Abul ‘Ala Maududi – marked the beginning of the military-mullah nexus. Yahya would not have much to do with things spiritual until the induction of retired Maj.-Gen. Sher Ali Khan into his cabinet as minister in-charge of information and national affairs. He initiated Yahya into ideological lore and saddled him with the mission of protecting the ‘ideology of Pakistan and the glory of Islam’.
    Yahya’s intelligence chief, Major-(later Lieut.) Gen. Muhammad Akbar Khan made no secret of his close liaison with the Jamaat-i-Islami especially in respect of its pro-active role in East Pakistan. The Jamaat was to go even to the extent of certifying Yahya’s draft constitution as Islamic. The draft was authored by Justice A.R. Cornelius, Yahya’s law minister. As for Zia, he embarked on his Islamization programme even as he assumed his army command.

    The series of assassinations in Former East Pakistan [now Bangladesh] was started from 1969 when a Shams Duaa-Haa, professor of Chemistry in Rajshahi University, was assassinated in daylight. Let me explain what the Al-Badar and Al-Shams were and are? Al-Badar was and is militant wing of Jamait Islami and a paramilitary force formed in Bangladesh in 1971 by General Yahya INC. Al-Badar forget that what the real Jihad is ?
    And fight against the Muslims in Bangladesh, Bengalis use to call Al-Badar as “Butcher of Bangladesh.” The Al Badar was assigned a variety of combat and non-combat tasks including taking part in the operations, spying against Bengali Intellectuals, interrogation, working as the guides for Tikka Khan and Niazi, assassination, detecting and killing Bengali intellectuals. The force was composed of madrassah students-teachers, supporters of Muslim League and Jamait Islami. History tell us that killings which began on 25 March 1971 and sparked the Bangladesh Liberation War and also led to the deaths of at least 26,000 people as admitted by Pakistan on one hand (by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission) and 3,000,000 by Bangladesh on the other hand, (From 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions that at least three million died).
    Doctor Fazl Rabbi was an eye specialist; he was kidnapped by Al-Badar. Next day his body was found from a drainage line. His both eyes were vanished and there were marks of switchblade. “What should we think about such peccadilloes?”
    Ex-militants of Al-Badar are settled in UK and other European countries and they are appointed as cleric of mosques there. And I want to remind the readers that too, “Jamait Islami’s former leader Maulana Modudi had rejected the theory of Pakistan but since 1947, when Pakistan came into being, it is claimed by the leaders of Jamait Islami that they are playing leading role of toady.

    His legs in grave and “Allah!” on his lips, the noblest of the Islamists continues to lie!
    January 13th, 2010

  3. مودودی دا کھڑاک
    محمد حنیف | 2010-02-08

    آئندہ دس بلاگز میں ہم کوشش کریں گے کہ ان دس تہذیبی سازشوں کا احاطہ کیا جائے جنہوں نے گذشتہ دہائی میں ہماری زندگیوں پر سب سے زیادہ اثر ڈالا ہے۔

    راقم کی کوشش ہوگی کہ اس تذکرے میں اسامہ، ابامہ، یا ان کے بھانجے بھتیجوں یعنی حکیم اللہ محسود اور الیاس کشمیری، یا سب پر بھاری، آصف زرداری یا اس کی بھی نانی جنرل کیانی، یا امت مسلمہ کی عفت مآب مجاہدہ ڈاکٹر عافیہ کا تذکرہ نہ آئے۔ ہم کوشش کریں گے کہ بات گھر سے باہر ہی نہ نکلے۔ ہم ذکر کریں گے ان سازشوں کا جو ہماری ٹی وی سکرینوں پر چلنے والی فلموں میں ہوتی ہے، جن کے تانے بانے باورچی خانے سے ہوتے ہوئے باتھ روم میں جا کر نکلتے ہیں۔

    اس دھائی میں میں پاکستان کی سب سے سپر ہٹ فلم کا نام تھا خدا کے لیئے۔ لیکن اگر کوئی راقم سے پوچھتا تو اس کا نام ہونا چاہیے تھا ۔۔۔۔

    ہمارے بچپن میں سب سے زیادہ ہٹ ہونے والی فلم کا نام تھا مولا جٹ۔ اور اس فلم کا سب سے ہٹ ڈائیلاگ تھا۔
    نواں آیا اے سوہنیا۔

    لکھا تھا ناصر ادیب نامی ایک فلم رائٹر نے جو اس سے پہلے وحشی جٹ جیسا ماسٹر پیس لکھ کر قوم کو آئینہ دکھا چکے تھے اور بڑا نام کما چکے تھے۔

    اس دہائی کی مقبول ترین فلم ہے خدا کے لیے جس کے ڈائریکٹر شعیب منصور اس سے پہلے فوج کے خرچے پر خوبرو فوجی افسران کی معصوم شرارتوں اور ان کے وفادار صوبیداروں اور سپاہیوں کی زندگی پر سوفٹ فوکس ٹی وی سیریل بنا کر کافی مشہور ہوچکے تھے۔ خدا کے لیئے فلم سے زیادہ ایک قوم کی پکار ہے جس میں ہر ایک کو بظاہر اپنا چہرہ دکھائی دیا، اپنے دل کی دھڑکن سنائی دی۔

    اس فلم کا سب سے مقبول ڈائیلاگ وہ ہے جو ہندوستانی اداکار نصیر الدین شاہ کمرہ عدالت میں کہتے ہیں۔
    ‘داڑھی اسلام میں ہے، اسلام داڑھی میں نہیں۔’

    یہ ڈائیلاگ جماعت اسلامی کے بانی حضرت مولانا ابوالاعلیٰ مودودی کا لکھا ہوا ہے۔ اور جب نصیر الدین شاہ اپنی پیٹ تک آئ داڑھی کو سہلا کر یہ ڈائیلاگ بولتے ہیں تو سینما ہال میں دیر تک تالیاں بجتی ہیں۔

    راقم کو کبھی یہ سمجھ نہیں آئی کہ تالیاں اسلام کے لیے بج رہی ہیں، داڑھی کے لیے، ان کے باہمی آسان تعلق کے لیے یا پھر نصیر الدین شاہ کے لیے۔ کیونکہ راقم یہ سوچنے لگتا ہے کہ ہماری ہی زندگی میں یہ کیسے ہوا کہ ناصر ادیب کی بجائے ہمارے پاپولر ڈائیلاگ رائٹر حضرت مودودی قرار پائے۔

    مودودی صاحب کے ڈائیلاگ صرف ہماری فلموں اور ڈراموں میں ہی نہیں ہیں بلکہ ہمارے آئین کا حصہ ہیں، ہمارے عدالتی فیصلوں کی بنیاد ہیں اور ہمارے میڈیا میں بولی جانے والی مستند مباحث کا لازمی حصہ ہیں۔ بچوں کی کتابوں میں شامل ہے اور ہمارے شہروں کی دیواریں تو ان سے محبت کرنے والوں کی نعروں سے بھری پڑی ہیں۔

    حضرت مودودی تو اپنے خواب کی تعبیر دیکھنے کے لیے زندہ نہیں رہے لیکن ہم یقیناً ان کے عہد میں جی رہے ہیں۔ وہ ایک چھوٹی سی فکری تحریک اور اس سے بھی چھوٹی سیاسی جماعت کے بانی تھے لیکن اب ان کی کہی ہوئی بات سن کر اکثر لوگوں کو یہ لگتا ہے کہ گویا یہ بھی میرے دل میں تھا۔

    مودودی صاحب کو یہ مقبولیت ظاہر ہے راتوں رات حاصل نہیں ہوئی۔ اس کا رستہ ٹماٹو کیچ اپ کی بوتل سے ہوتا ہوا جاتا ہے۔ اگلے بلاگ میں آپ کو کیچ اپ سازش کا راز بتائیں گے

  4. Dear Abdul,

    One shouldn’t forget that it was the same Shoaib Mansoor who very innocently Produced and Directed 80’s popular Comedy Sitcom 50 50 wherein very silently several skits were [Ethnic Jokes] injected silently into the psyche of Pakistan which later become a horrible nightmare for Pakistan in the shape of Ethnic Bloodletting in Sindh [during General Zia’s tenure from mid 80s to his death]

    Beard, Mawdudi and Strategy in the light of Expose’ by a Mawdudi Colleague Late. Maznaoor Ahmed Nomani.

    Late. Maulana Muhammada Manzoor Naimani was one of the founders of Jamat-e-Islami and one of the reason of his leaving Jamat-e-Islami [many giant Islamic Scholars left Jamat-e-Islami e.g. Maulana Waheeduddin Khan, Maulana Abul Hassan Nadvi, Ameen Ahsan Islahi, Maulana Masood Alam Nadvi, Naeem Siddiqui, Dr Israr Ahmed (he is mystrey like his name) and countless others] was the comrpomise of Late Maulana Mawdudi on Religion and Manhaj [Islam and Manhaj] for the sake of Electoral Politics.

    Late. Maulana Muhammad Manzoor Naumani in his book

    Meri Rafaqat Ki Sargazasht – Maulana Madudoodi Kay Kay Sath Meray Shab O Roz [My Life with Maulana Mawdoodi] preface by Maulana Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi published in 1997 by Majlis-e-Nashariyat-e-Islam, Nazimabad, Karachi – Sindh Pakistan.

    while narrating as to why he quit Jamat-e-Islami, wrote, that in the name of Modus Operandi and Strategy [Tareeqa-e-Kaar and Hikmat-e-Amali] Maulana Mawdudi had compromised on many salient features of Islam like any other Secular Political Party. On this Maulana Naimani said Islam’s Basic Priniciples cannot be compromised for worldly benefit what to talk of Political Strategy and Maulana Mawududi’s wrong step would open the doors of Anarchy [Fitnah] in Pakistan.

    There was an adult male cook in Mawdudi House who didn’t follow any Islamic Instruction of Veil. If you would read the description of Prophet Mohammad [PBUH] and his Companions [May Allah be pleased with them], given in History Books like Ibn-e-Khaldun, Tabari, Ibn-e-Kathir’s Al Bidaya Wal Nihaya, Tabaqat by Ibn Saad then you may note that minus very few all of them had flowing beards so much so that Hazrat Ali [May Allah be pleased with him]’s beard used to cover his whole chest. Therefore, we don’t need ISPR Financed Film “Khuda Kay Liay” to understand Islamic Commandments. If I don’t have any beard then it should be my choice and I don’t have any right to tamper with the “Sunnah” [like Mawdudi did] to justify for not having beard.

  5. Radical Islam casts shadow over Central Asia

    Tuesday, 09 Feb, 2010

    Muslims attend Friday prayers under a snowfall at the Central mosque in Almaty February 5, 2010. – Reuters
    A small victory
    A small victory
    ALMATY: Long ignored as a myth whipped up by the authorities to justify political repression, a surge in radical Islam in the former Soviet region has become a reality for the West fighting an increasingly tough war in next-door Afghanistan.

    Analysts say long-defunct groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are regaining force in the impoverished region where ethnic tensions have long simmered under the surface.

    “They (militants) are preparing the ground for a long, sustained military campaign in Central Asia,” said Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistan-based expert on Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    “There is now a real threat because the Islamist surge is combined with an economic and political crisis.”

    A vast region wedged between China, Iran, Afghanistan and Russia, Central Asia found itself on the frontline of global affairs last year when it agreed to host a vital new supply route for Nato forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.

    Gripped by deepening gloom about economic stagnation and poverty, the mainly Muslim but secular region has become increasingly susceptible to extremist ideas in past years.

    Security analysts say militants, who had long left Central Asia to fight alongside the Taliban, are seeping back into the region to take advantage of its fragile state.

    A growing sense of frustration with the lack of basic freedoms has given political undertones to the rise of Islamism in a region which still has no influential opposition parties even after two decades of independence from Soviet rule.

    The trend is particularly alarming because of recent parallels with the situation in Yemen, where growing instability has led to fears it may become al Qaeda’s next hunting ground.

    Acknowledging these risks, Nato Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has urged for more engagement with Central Asia.

    “If Afghanistan becomes a safe haven for terrorists they could easily spread through Central Asia to Russia,” he said last weekend. “Of course Afghanistan is not an island. There is no solution just within its borders.”


    First alarm bells rang in Central Asia last year when Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz troops fought gangs they described as terrorist – around the time when the security situation in northern Afghanistan deteriorated sharply.

    “It does not matter who exactly was behind those attacks. It still means instability, that something’s going on,” said one Western diplomat. “It is certainly something we are watching.”

    Who are these militants and why are they coming back?

    “The reason is that they (have), first of all, done enough fighting for other people. They now want to fight for their own country ,” said Rashid, the Central Asia analyst.

    “The real threat now is the fact that they are trying to infiltrate back into Central Asia…They are trying to infiltrate weapons, ammunition and men back into Central Asia.”

    The IMU is shrouded in secrecy and its size is unclear. Its goal is to topple Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who has tolerated no opposition during his two decade long rule.

    Another target is Tajik leader Imomali Rakhmon who led pro-Russian forces against Islamists in a civil war in the 1990s. In the West, both are accused of mass rights violations.

    The Internet abounds with video clips, some as recent as this month, by groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union, believed to have been founded by breakaway IMU fighters.

    One Uzbek-language video, posted on YouTube, shows a desert training facility where dozens of children in black Taliban-style turbans, clutching AK-47s, learn how to shoot.

    “Oh children of mujahideen! You are the future warriors of Allah!” says the narrator. Complete with Russian subtitles, it clearly targets the Russian speaking audience of Central Asia.

    Anything from the death of long-serving leaders to natural disasters can prompt fighters into action, analysts say.

    “We should be looking at potential triggers,” said Rashid. “The death of Karimov or Rakhmon, or a power struggle in either of these countries, a major natural disaster, growing hunger or an economic collapse. These could prove the trigger for social unrest which the IMU would take advantage of.”


    Hizb ut-Tahrir is another group accused of terror activities in Central Asia. It says it has tens of thousands of members in the region but stresses its methods are entirely peaceful.

    “It is the Central Asian regimes that continue terrorising their people,” said Taji Mustafa, its representative in London. “Since the declaration of the West’s so-called ‘war on terror’, Central Asian governments have used it as a convenient umbrella to pursue, arrest and torture their political opponents.”

    Central Asia-watchers believe home-grown fundamentalism has been on the rise for some years, spurred by the latest economic crisis which has left millions of migrant workers without jobs.

    Official data for the entire region is not available but in Tajikistan, the poorest ex-Soviet republic, economic growth more than halved in 2009 to 3.4 per cent from 7.9 per cent in 2008.

    In Kyrgyzstan, another potentially volatile nation, economic growth fell to 2.3 per cent last year from 8.4 per cent in 2008.

    “The financial crisis and the return of labour migrants sparked predictions of unrest, intensifying the concern that radical Islamists had been making inroads into the labour diaspora,” the International Crisis Group said in a report.

    “Insecurity is growing, in part domestically generated, in part because of proximity to Afghanistan; infrastructure is collapsing, weak economies are slipping still further.”

  6. The rise of extremism —Dr Manzur Ejaz

    After the Afghan war ended, the US left in haste, leaving behind the mess of several hundered thousand jihadis. The Pakistani establishment, intoxicated by the routing of the Soviets, undertook ventures to conquer Afghanistan and Kashmir, and destabilise India. The mullah-military nexus was further strengthened

    The rise of the right wing
    conservative religious forces in Pakistan was due to a combination of factors. A changing economy, military adventures and backward state institutions played a main role in giving rise to jihadism, etc. It was not dictator Zia or other military rulers who were the only players in such an outcome. The evolution of Pakistan has to be reviewed in a broad historical perspective.

    The 1965 war had done irreparable damage to Ayub Khan’s regime; the economy started sagging, food shortages became common and prices of necessities saw a steep rise. In such a depressing environment, Ayub Khan and his son’s corruption scandals became the diet of daily political discussions. In a shrinking job market and increasing population, the post-partition born educated work force was seeking jobs with no success. Later on, Zulifqar Ali Bhutto’s breaking away and his exploitation of the Tashkent Agreement further undermined the Ayub regime.

    Around 1965-66, on the surface, Ayub Khan was very strong because there was no credible opposition to his rule except in East Pakistan. It appeared that Ayub and his descendants were set to rule forever, but from within the regime had been hollowed out by incurable termites and pests. The internal corrosion of the regime and the overall system was not being noticed by anyone.

    The parties on the left — National Awami Party along with the newly founded Pakistan People’s Party (in 1967) and Awami League — apprehending the weakness, had started raising the heat. Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and other right wing parties were active as well, but they had not much public following. By 1968, when Ayub Khan was celebrating his ‘Golden Decade of Progress’, a strong anti-regime movement was taking root both in East and West Pakistan. When the riots broke out in both units (more ferocious in East Pakistan), Ayub Khan, by now in declining health, gave in to General Yahya Khan in 1969.

    Yahya Khan’s regime, incensed by the rising tide of the left, the popularity of PPP’s roti, kapra aur makan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s six point agenda for East Pakistan’s autonomy, had reverted to taking help from religious conservatives, particularly the JI. Yahya Khan’s confidant General Sher Ali Khan was deputed to undertake the ideological cleansing of the media and educational institutions. Mian Tufail Mohammad is on record as saying that Yahya Khan had promulgated all necessary Islamic laws and it was up to the citizens to practice them.

    When the general elections were held in 1970, none in Yahya Khan’s regime expected the results that came out: Awami League won all but two seats in East Pakistan and Bhutto’s PPP swept West Pakistan. Religious parties had popularised anew the slogan: “Pakistan ka matlab kya…” but their use of the Quran in processions did not work. Such slogans may have been there even before partition, but they were made operative in the 1970 elections.

    The army and Yahya Khan, along with most of the people in West Pakistan, did not want the Awami League’s rule at the Centre because of its real or perceived separatist ideology. Bhutto and others are blamed for not reaching a deal with the Awami League, but the fact of the matter is that East Pakistan had been lost much before the elections, as Yahya Khan acknowledged in one of his interviews later.

    The military operation in East Pakistan played havoc with Pakistan’s economy and its international standing. A genocide-type murderous military operation and the ultimate routing by the Indian military (justified or not) created a mullah-military alliance in the remaining Pakistan. Besides, the JI had fought along with the military against the Bengali Muslims. Pakistan’s armed forces were ideologically so insecure that they developed a strong belief that it was only religion that could save the rest of Pakistan. Therefore, instead of being thankful to Bhutto for bringing thousands of prisoners of war home, they felt threatened by his not-so-Islamic ideological stance. Bhutto tried to placate them through his own Islamisation, but it never worked.

    The anti-Bhutto mullah-military alliance also strengthened because of the rapidly changing intra-class status quo and mammoth changes in the political economy. Bhutto had awakened the masses to get their genuine rights, which did not go down well with the traditional middle classes and the elite from where the military is recruited. In addition, the old mode of agrarian production was changing from the thousands of years old ox and wooden plough into mechanised cultivation. Internal migration from the rural to urban areas was accelerating. These trends were accentuated by the Bhutto regime’s liberal passport policies, resulting in the mass migration of workers and foreign earnings flowing into the economy. In short, the political economy was changing fast while the state was stuck in its old mode. The gap was filled by rising religious ideology aided by the elites and the military. By 1977, the mullah-military-elite alliance was so strong that Bhutto’s election victory did not matter and he was hanged eventually.

    Ziaul Haq, an extremely conservative Muslim, built upon the Islamisation Yahya Khan and Bhutto had started. At this point, the communist takeover in Afghanistan and the eventual military intervention by the Soviet Union furthered the cause of Islamisation. In its effort to defeat the Soviet Union, the US threw in billions of dollars and weapons, and provided training to bolster the Islamisits and jihadists. As a matter of fact, it was the US that injected the concept of international jihad into the Pak-Afghan localised religious movements through systematic propaganda and even a change in the curriculum being taught in Pakistan.

    After the Afghan war ended, the US left in haste, leaving behind the mess of several hundered thousand jihadis. The Pakistani establishment, intoxicated by the routing of the Soviets, undertook ventures to conquer Afghanistan and Kashmir, and destabilise India. The mullah-military nexus was further strengthened, playing havoc with all other institutions of the state. The rapidly changing political economy of Pakistan through the electronic media and other technologies was unsettling the institutions as well. This was the worst combination of factors that created anarchy and lawlessness in the country. This phase has been prevalent till very recently, despite the US intervention after 9/11. However, the situation has been changing for the last few years with some institutions of the state getting stronger and the mullah-military alliance teetering. Emerging trends need a lengthy discussion which is beyond the scope of this column.

    The writer can be reached at\02\10\story_10-2-2010_pg3_3

  7. تین تکبیروں کی گونج

    محمد حنیف | 2010-02-09

    اگر آپ یہ انٹرنیٹ پر پڑھ رہے ہیں تو آپ کو یقیناً پتہ ہوگا کہ کیچ اپ کیا ہوتی ہے۔ بلکہ ہوسکتا ہے جس وقت آپ یہ پڑھ رہے ہوں تو ساتھ ساتھ آلو کے چپس کیچ اپ میں ڈبو ڈبو کر کھا رہے ہوں۔

    بچوں کو تو کیچ اپ بہت ہی پسند ہے۔ لیکن جب آپ چھوٹے تھے تو کیا آپ اس فکر میں رہتے تھے کہ آپ کی کیچ اپ حرام ہے یا حلال؟ راقم کا ہمیشہ سے یہ خیال تھا چونکہ کیچ اپ ٹماٹروں سے بنتی ہے اس لیے اس میں حلال اور حرام کا سوال ہی پیدا نہیں ہوتا۔ لیکن اب اپنے کچن میں پڑی بوتل اٹھائیں، ہوائی جہاز میں ملنے والے سینڈوچ کے ساتھ پلاسٹک کی چھوٹی تھیلی اٹھائیں سب حلال ہے۔ ایسی اشیا کی فہرست جو گذشتہ صدی میں اپنے حلال ہونے کی دہائی نہیں دیتی تھیں لیکن اب چیخ چیخ کر کہتی ہیں کہ میں حلال ہوں، بہت طویل ہے۔

    آپ صبح ناشتے میں حلال دلیہ کھا سکتے ہیں، پھر ایسی گاڑی میں بیٹھ کر دفتر جاسکتے ہیں جو حلال قسطوں پر لی گئی ہے۔ سٹاک ایکسچینج میں حلال بانڈز کا دھندہ کر سکتے ہیں گھر واپس آتے ہوئے اپنی بیوی کے لیے حلال میک اپ خرید سکتے ہیں اور اگر خود شوقین مزاج ہیں تو الکحل فری حلال پرفیوم اپنے لیے بھی خرید سکتے ہیں۔

    اس سازش کا آغاز فاسٹ فوڈ بنانے والے عالمی اداروں نے کیا تھا۔ جب پاکستان میں میکڈونلڈ اور کے ایف سی جیسی برکات کا نزول ہوا تو ان کے مالکان ویگنوں میں مولانا حضرات کو بھر کے لائے ہیپی میل اور زنگر برگر سے انکی تواضع کی اور ان سے سرٹیفیکیٹ حاصل کر کے اپنی دکانوں میں آویزاں کرلیے تاکہ سند رہے اور بوقت ضرورت کام آئے۔ اور اب عالم یہ ہے کہ محلے میں مرغی بیچنے والے نے بھی حلال کا بورڈ لگا رکھا ہے۔ حالانکہ راقم نے اپنی پوری زندگی میں، پورے پاکستان میں کوئی غیر مسلم قصائی نہیں دیکھا پھر نجانے کیوں ہر جانب تین تکبیروں کی گونج ہے۔

    کچھ چیزیں بہرحال اب بھی ایسی ہیں جن کے لیے حلال سرٹیفیکیٹ لینے کی ضرورت نہیں ہے۔ بندہ مزدور کی کم ازکم مزدوری کیا ہونی چاہیے اس پر کوئی فتویٰ موجود نہیں ہے۔ ایک ہزار گز کی کوٹھی کی ہفتے میں سات دن صفائی کے لیے کسی کم عمر بچی کو چار پانچ ہزار دینا عین حلال ہے۔ اب چونکہ ہمارے پاس حلال اور حرام کا ایک عمرانی نظریہ تو موجود ہے تو ظاہر ہے اس نظریے میں سے ایک سائنس بھی وجود میں آئے گی اور نت نئی ایجادات بھی ہوں گی۔

    اگلے سازش بلاگ میں ہم آپ کو امت مسلمہ کی اس دہائی کی سب سے بڑی سائنسی ایجاد کے بارے میں بتائیں گے۔

  8. پلاسٹک کا مسواک ہولڈر
    محمد حنیف | 2010-02-10

    گذشتہ چار سال سے کراچی میں ایک عالمی کتاب میلہ منعقد ہوتا ہے۔ یہ ایک تجارتی میلہ ہے جس میں پاکستان اور دنیا کے کئی دوسرے ممالک کے ناشرین اپنے سٹال لگاتے ہیں اور کتابیں بیچتے ہیں۔

    راقم کو گذشتہ سال پہلی دفعہ وہاں جانے کا اتفاق ہوا۔ اور کیا روح پرور نظارہ تھا۔ سیکیورٹی کی صورت حال کی وجہ سے اس سال غیر ملکی پبلشر خال خال ہی نظر آئے لیکن اپنے ساتھ وہ جو مال لے کر آئے وہ قابل دید تھا۔ ایران کے پبلشر ہمیں فارسی اسلامی کتابیں بیچ رہے تھے۔ سعودی عرب کے پبلشر عربی اسلامی کتابیں بیچ رہے تھے اور ہمارے اپنے پیارے پاکستان کے پبلشر اردو اسلامی کتابیں بیچ رہے تھے۔ ہندوستان سے آنے والے کچھ ناشرین میڈیکل کالجوں کے کورس کی کتابیں بیچ رہے تھے (آپ ہندو بنیئے سے اور توقع بھی کیا کرسکتے ہیں؟)

    صرف چھوٹے بچوں کے لیے ہزاروں کتابیں ایسی تھیں جن میں انہیں اچھا مسلمان بچہ بننے کے آسان نسخے سمجھائے گئے تھے۔ درجنوں کمپیوٹر پروگرام برائے فروخت تھے جنہیں استعمال کر کے آج کے چھوٹے بچے کل کے مجاہد اور مومن بن سکتے ہیں۔ اگر تاریخ میں دلچسپی ہے تو اسلامی فتوحات کی رنگ برنگی اٹلس خرید لیں۔ اگر عورت ہیں اور صحت ٹھیک نہیں رہتی تو بیماری کے دوران اسلام کے احکامات کے بارے میں کئی جلدیں ہیں۔ اور ڈیجیٹل تسبیحاں اور الیکٹرانک قرآن تو اتنے تھے کہ کراچی کا ایکسپو سینٹر بقعہ نور لگتا تھا۔

    بیچ بیچ میں کچھ نادان پبلشر شاعری اور ناول جیسی لغویات بھی بیچنے کی کوشش کر رہے تھے وہاں بھی مرحوم اشفاق احمد کے نورانی ادب کی بکری زیادہ تھی۔ لیکن سب سے زیادہ رش لینے والا آئٹم نہ کوئی کتاب تھی نہ کوئی اسلامی کمپیوٹر گیم۔ امت مسلمہ کے لیے منفرد ایجاد کے نام سے متعارف کی جانے والی یہ معرکۃ الارا ایجاد پلاسٹک کا مسواک ہولڈر تھا۔ جی ہاں۔ صدیوں سے بھٹکتی ہوئی یہ امت اس مخمصے میں تھی کہ اپنی مسواک کہاں رکھی جائے۔ اب یہ مسئلہ حل کر دیا گیا اور پلاسٹک کا کور ڈھکنے کے ساتھ ایجاد کر لیا گیا ہے۔ اس منفرد ایجاد کے لیے لگائے گئے اشتہاروں میں جس طرح کی زبان استعمال کی گئی تھی وہ عام طور پر اپنے ایٹم بم اور جوہری میزائلوں کے لیے استعمال کرتے ہیں۔ میں چشم تصور میں وہ دن دیکھ رہا تھا جب نوجوانان اسلام ایک ہاتھ میں جوہری میزائل اور دوسرے ہاتھ میں پلاسٹک ہولڈر لیے کافروں کے چھکے چھڑادیں گے۔ اتنی دیر میں ایک بزرگ نوجوان دکان دار کو مشورہ دیتے سنائی دیے۔ میاں اگر یہ پلاسٹک کور سبز رنگ میں بنوا لو تو سیل اور بھی بڑھ جائے گی۔ نوجوان نے مودب طریقے سے جواب دیا کہ جب اللہ کا دھندہ کرتے ہیں تو منافع کا نہیں سوچتے ۔ منافع کا اللہ خود سوچتا ہے سبحان اللہ۔

    تو ظاہر ہے کہ اللہ کا دھندہ کرنے والا کوئی دوسرا اگر آپ کو جان سے مار دے تو کم ازکم یہ موت اس سے تو بہتر ہے جو کسی ایسے کے ہاتھوں آئے جو اللہ کا دھندہ نہ کر رہا ہو؟